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This Thesis uses a case-study approach to examine the sustainability of crime 
prevention in the built environment and more specifically, Impact and Implementation 
factors over an extended time period – almost 25 years and one rarely encountered 
in the research literature. At its heart lie seven high-rise tower blocks constructed 
during the 1950s/early 1960s in Nechells, a district of inner-city Birmingham. These 
twelve-storey high blocks were refurbished in the early 1990s, albeit to different 
grades of CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design). Four blocks 
constitute the case study site (CSS), three the comparison and all seven received 
separate Secured by Design (SBD) awards. 
 
This investigation began with a review of all the available literature. As a result, it 
was decided to adopt a case study approach methodology combining changes in 
various kinds of crime data with a broader analysis based on the 5Is (a detailed 
process model of crime prevention). Recorded crime data covering the years 1988-
2014 was requested from West Midlands Police and the vast bulk (some 1,459 
offences) received. Knocking on the doors of the 532 flats at the CSS and 
comparison, resulted in questionnaires being completed for 286 tenant households. 
Twenty-two of these tenants were subsequently interviewed at length. And 12 
professionals (who had been involved with the refurbishments in the early 1990s, 
management of the sites, or police crime prevention) similarly interviewed. 




A number of key findings have been produced: how the potential conflict between 
security and fire safety issues requires careful/creative design to enable both, rather 
than compromise; knowledge of crime in high-rise tower blocks; uniqueness of a 25-
year timeframe investigation; effectiveness of CPTED and SBD approaches; how the 
entrance doors to each flat and ground floor communal entrance doors should be of 
sufficient quality (durability and security effectiveness) to deliver sustainability of 
crime reduction over the very long term; the benefits of partnership working 
(including the tenants) and what works in practice to assist local authority and police 
managers as to where resources should be concentrated; that amongst the six crime 
categories analysed, burglary is most susceptible to the CPTED and SBD 
approaches, with no reported instances of aggravated burglary at either site and an  
89.2 per cent reduction in burglary sustained at the CSS over 20 years; value of the 
DOCO role and their number; a once in 30-year opportunity to get things right; the 
value of 5Is as a research tool; and how the needs of the victims of crime and anti-
social behaviour (ASB) should be at the forefront of all such decision-making. 
Ultimately, this investigation adds to the canon of existing research regarding the 
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In the context of police led crime prevention initiatives, there exists a necessity for a 
thorough evaluation of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) 
practices and the UK’s Secured by Design (SBD) delivery mechanism. This is 
especially required in the context of vastly reduced police numbers, shrinking police 
budgets, perceived failure of the criminal justice system in dealing with crime and 
increased demand for policy-related research to identify 'what works' in practice. 
Since buildings have a service life of decades, the long-term sustainability of security 
is a significant, but unknown, consideration. 
 
By using a case-study approach, this thesis seeks to identify the Impact and 
Implementation factors of crime prevention in the built environment. In particular, it 
aims to produce new and systematic knowledge that can influence the improvement 
of long-term sustainability. Using Ekblom’s (2011a) 5Is framework, a process model 
of crime prevention, it will necessarily focus on the diverse tasks of Intelligence, 
Intervention, Implementation, Involvement and Impact. The seven inner-city tower 
four blocks that form the core of this thesis, were deliberately selected for this role. 
Those four of the case study site (CSS) were the first high-rise blocks (five storeys or 
more) to be built in Birmingham in the early 1950s and officially opened in 1954 by 
the then Minister for Housing and Local Government, Harold Macmillan. A five-
minute walk away lie the three high-rise blocks that form the comparison site, 




By the late 1980s both the CSS and comparison were experiencing high levels of 
crime, and were already due for refurbishment (or demolition). Birmingham City 
Council (BCC) entered a partnership arrangement with West Midlands Police 
(WMP). This utilised a recently launched UK-wide police specialism delivered by 
Architectural Liaison Officers (ALOs – now known as Designing Out Crime Officers, 
DOCOs). Their primary role was to design out the opportunities for crime and anti-
social behaviour (ASB) at new and refurbished developments within the built 
environment. This was achieved by making practical CPTED (Jeffery, 1971) 
recommendations delivered via the SBD (1989) award delivery mechanism. 
However, following a reduction in central government funding, during each 
refurbishment project different grades of CPTED were applied and it is this range of 
Intervention principles customised to context that this thesis will explore.  
 
At the CSS, higher grade CPTED measures were installed including: high quality 
multi-point locking entrance doors to each of the 264 flats; fob-reader, access- 
controlled, electronically-operated communal entrance doors; an on-site 24/7 staffed 
concierge scheme; and enclosing the grounds with brick walls, bespoke metal railing 
fencing and additional symbolic barriers (Shaftoe and James, 2004) to create 
defensible space and enhance territoriality (Newman, 1972). At the comparison a 
lesser grade of CPTED was incorporated – most significantly the simple addition of a 
second locking mechanism (a BS 3621 mortise deadlock) to the entrance doors of 
each of the 268 flats. 
 
The thesis incorporates four distinct research aims: 
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1. Has there been a net reduction in police-recorded crime at the CSS 
compared to the comparison site?  
2. Has any such net reduction in police-recorded crime been sustained 
over a period of 25 years? 
3. What impact have the individual elements of design had on crime in the 
study area? 
4. Which (if any) specific crime prevention interventions can be shown to 
have impacted on reductions in crime and how effective were they? 
 
Chapter One examines the geography of crime and its mechanisms, including 
Situational Crime Prevention (SCP), CPTED, SBD and the 5Is (Ekblom, 2011a). 
SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment – Eck and Spelman, 1987; 
Clarke and Eck, 2003) was considered as the means of investigation. However, the 
process model of crime prevention provided by the 5Is (Intelligence, Intervention, 
Implementation, Involvement and Impact) was selected because it breaks down the 
response phase of SARA into Intervention, Implementation and Involvement. Indeed, 
the 5Is permeate this investigation and were chosen as the most suitable means of 
analysis by which the effectiveness of the CPTED measures could be assessed – in 
terms of their durability and sustainability over the very long term. Chapter Two 
provides a narrative history of The Four Towers (the CSS) and of Severn, Thames 
and Medway Towers (the comparison) from their construction, refurbishment and 
through to the present-day major refurbishments. Whilst Chapter Three, 




Chapters Four, Five, and Six answer the question ‘what happened next?’ They 
constitute the findings chapters and possess the following separate strands of 
investigation: 
1. Examination of the quantitative police-recorded crime data covering a 25-year 
period. 
2. Examination of the quantitative questionnaire and qualitative interview data 
obtained from a selection of tenants at both the CSS and comparison. 
3. Examination of the qualitative interview data obtained from a selection of 
professionals involved in the refurbishment or management of the CSS and/or 
comparison. 
 
Finally, Chapter Seven provides a wider discussion drawing on the key findings of 
this study. These include: the potential conflict between safety and security; the 
contribution to knowledge of crime in high-rise blocks; analysis over a 25-year 
timeframe; effectiveness of CPTED and SBD; security of entrance doors; value to 
senior management; desirability of consulting the tenants; effectiveness in reducing 
residential burglary; the number of police DOCO; once in a 30-year opportunity; 
value of the 5Is as a means of analysis; and the pertinence of the victim’s 
perspective. The issues examined during the course of this investigation are 
considered, including the case study approach and the considerable difficulties in 
conducting research over such a very long-time frame – together with the inherent 
limitations of the data. It concludes by identifying potential strategies, techniques and 
by making a number of recommendations relating to the durability and sustainability 






This opening chapter begins with analysis of 5Is framework (Ekblom, 2002) and 
CPTED (Jeffery, 1971), these being the theoretical frameworks upon which this 
thesis is based. As a brief outline, 5Is is a process model of crime prevention similar 
to SARA (Eck and Spelman, 1987; Clarke and Eck, 2003) discussed below, but with 
enhanced detail. It also has the capacity to capture and manage practice knowledge 
in pursuit of replicating ‘success-stories’. Furthermore, following extensive 
deliberation it was decided to use 5Is as the theoretical framework upon which to 
assess the effectiveness CPTED during the course of the investigation and indeed, 
constitutes the structure of this thesis. 
 
Believed to be of key relevance to this investigation, SCP and the theories and 
frameworks that underpin both it and CPTED are examined. Namely: Routine 
Activity Theory (RAT – Cohen and Felson, 1979); Crime Pattern Theory (CPT – 
Brantingham and Brantingham, 1995); Rational Choice Theory (RCT – Cornish and 
Clarke, 1986); and the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity (CCO – Ekblom, 2000). 
Discussion then turns to Guardianship (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Reynald, 2009) a 
key element of the theories. Followed by the relevance of Problem Oriented Policing 
(POP – Goldstein, 1979) and Problem-solving (Eck and Spelman, 1987). Finally, the 
history of high-rise housing in the UK is examined. All these elements are discussed 





The rationale for choosing the 5Is (Ekblom, 2011a) as the pre-eminent theoretical 
framework is fully detailed in Chapter Three, Methodology. Suffice to say, it is 
believed necessary to explain from the outset how 5Is provide the most 
comprehensive means of assessing all the elements identified at both the CSS and 
comparison site – including the presence and effectiveness of CPTED. Ekblom 
(2011a, p.83) describes how he developed the 5Is from the “preventive process”, a 
term first used in 1988 for the rational, “action research” (2011a, p.7) model of crime 
prevention. For Ekblom, 5Is “comprises five top-level task streams of the preventive 
process” (Ekblom, 2011a, p.85) and are set out under the following headings. 
 
5Is: Intelligence 
This includes gathering and analysing the nature, causes and negative 
consequences of a particular crime. The highly significant purpose of this exercise is 
to influence the crime prevention and community safety aims and priorities of the 
practitioners/organisations responsible for addressing such crime. Ekblom (2011a) 
uses Ratcliffe’s (2008) especially wide definition of intelligence which encompasses 
data, information, knowledge and intelligence as a specific kind of “…knowledge 
designed to generate and guide action.” (Ekblom, 2011a, p.164). The intention is to 
ensure that nothing of potential value is excluded from delivering the following types 
of intelligence and what they include. 
 
General social/geographical context to the problem, including design, layout and 
management issues, demographic analysis and both historical and existing action. 
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Initiation and demand, as evidenced by audits, emergent problems, referral and 
intake processes. Together with information concerning the actual crime problem. 
The latter will include definitional issues, action frameworks and aspects of the crime 
problem e.g. offender types; modus operandi (MO); businesses, homes or goods 
targeted; managers or owners; persons assaulted; physical and social context; crime 
and disorder background; timing of criminal events; recent or longstanding problem; 
and relevance of repeat victimisation. 
 
Evidence of the crime problem is similarly instrumental in terms of crime pattern 
analysis; forecasting; analysis of risk and protective factors for offending; and 
interviews with actual or potential offenders. Know-how in data collection and 
analysis should include innovative solutions, difficulties and trade-offs. Whilst 
significant harmful consequences may be identified in immediate and wider effects, 
and specific consequences for further offending. The immediate causes, remote 
causes and risk factors for offending will include – on the offender side: criminality; 
lack of resources to avoid crime; readiness to avoid crime; readiness to offend; 
presence in a crime situation. And on the situational side: target person, property, 
service, etc; target enclosure; wider environment; absence of crime preventers; 
presence of crime promoters. Dynamic configurations may consist of lifestyles plus 
routine activities and scripts. Such issues are believed to highly pertinent to this 
thesis and thus their inclusion. 
 
Remoter, area or higher-level causes might include criminal careers, networks, 
organisations, sub-cultures and markets, exclusionary processes and absence of 
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social capital/collective efficacy of a community to tackle the problem. Complex 
crime problems; risk and protective factors for offending (conditions in early life); 
needs of individual offenders/those at risk of offending; and evidence of causes 
should also be considered. Finally, aims and aim-setting at the planning stage will 
seek to examine the nature and priority of aims; nature and any consultation to set 
aims; and the nature of any climate-setting activities in respect of establishing 
acceptance/understanding the objectives, managing expectations, reconciling aims, 
etc.              
  
5Is: Intervention  
This element of 5Is encompasses the important delivery mechanisms including 
design and planning practical methods to block, divert, or weaken the causes of 
future and ongoing crime, or mitigating harm already done. It provides focus by 
combining local evidence from intelligence and generic evidence/ knowledge of what 
works in practice. Ekblom (2011a) describes how Intervention itself can also be 
divided into a number of sub-headings. These will include those in place prior to 
project commencement – either focused on crime prevention, or relevant actions 
with wider aims. Whilst the overall Intervention strategy will consist of aims; summary 
and explanation of the contribution of individual Interventions; overview of judicial, 
para-judicial, civil, or judicial institutional context; and the design process for the 
overall Intervention strategy. Organisational context and the working structure of 
Interventions (more specifically, structure and the significant contributions to 
Intervention mechanisms), constitute other important considerations – ones highly 
relevant to this study. Describing the actual Interventions forms two further sub-
headings: content – including aim, method, principles, and their necessary 
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integration. And design principles – the requirements to capture process; idea 
generation, iterations, pilots and consequent improvements; issues of co-design with 
end users; risks and trade-offs; and finally, undesirable ‘system failure’ 
consequences.           
 
5Is: Implementation 
This component of 5Is covers the practical and management tasks necessary to 
deliver the Intervention methods (e.g. recruitment, training and management). More 
specifically, the master list of Implementation headings includes: the institutional and 
organisational contexts e.g. institutional settings; organisational arrangements; 
important recent or current transitions; and infrastructure such as training, guidance 
and data systems. Further headings set out by Ekblom (2011a) are mode of delivery 
– whether the action is a project, service, or capacity-building alone like training. And 
targeting – whether the problem, behaviour or condition within the aim of ecological 
level of action; or targeting strategy, be it the basis or principle of selection, 
coverage, or targeting issues such as widening the net. Additional headings are 
devoted to tailoring the generic Interventions; lifestyle(s) of action; the basic 
execution process (including process, outputs and practical Implementation issues 
including solution; plus management, planning and organisational issues such as the 
setting of aims and objectives, development of informational capacity, quality 
assurance of operations, risk management, structures of internal and external 
management, and finally change management and wider issues of adaptive 




5Is: Involvement  
Intertwined and intrinsic to Implementation, is the Involvement of other people and 
agencies to appreciate, accept, undertake, share or support the tasks, roles and 
responsibilities involved in the Implementation of preventive Interventions, or by 
otherwise providing a receptive climate. Headings which fall under the category of 
include communication “…which pervades the Involvement task stream…” (Ekblom, 
2011a, p.250); together with Intelligence actions to guide and support Involvement 
processes; and demand – be it initiation (which might ordinarily constitute 
Intelligence, but conceptually is sited under Involvement) and recruitment of crime 
prevention for another aim e.g. economic regeneration. Partnership can be divided 
into two forms: first, structural issues which includes its outcome purpose; 
operational, strategic or providing infrastructure; composition of agencies; 
geographical scope; pooling of resources; governance issues; and the partnership 
environment. And second, process issues such as practical creation; creation and 
maintenance; handling boundaries; which 5Is tasks the partnership completes; 
partnership operations; tactical and strategic working relationship; sustainability; and 
dismantling or disengagement of the partnership. 
 
Mobilisation is another multi-faceted element of partnership based on the CLAIMED 
framework (clarify, locate, alert, inform, motivate, empower, direct).  The mnemonic 
CLAIMED involves “…factors which alert, motivate and empower designers to 
undertake design against crime; or more likely, unfortunately, those which lull, deter 
or disable them from doing so.” (Ekblom, 2011a, p.233). More specifically, what they 
are and what sort of entity; what roles they play; why they were selected for the role; 
how they became aware of their potential role; how informed; motivated; 
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empowered; directed; sustained; and where appropriate, why their mobilisation was 
curtailed. Multiple mobilisations include Implementation chains; systems of 
Involvement; gateway mobilisations; conflicts, constraints and ethical issues; and 
outreach issues. 
 
There are five remaining Involvement headings, each of which has a direct relevance 
to this thesis. Consultation – covers with whom; about what issues; by what methods 
and media; and during which parts of Intervention planning and delivery. 
Accountability – with whom, internally or externally; specific issues; by what methods 
and media; and during which parts of Intervention planning, delivery and review. 
Building collaborative capacity – pre-partnership activity, including the targeting of 
specific communities, agencies and groups. The wider climate of opinion in which 
the action was implemented – whether it was locally hostile/suspicious or 
supportive/accepting); awareness, expectation and interest; public attitudes and 
beliefs about crime, offenders and community safety. Risks and blockages to and 
from Involvement – the chances of failure including raising/dashing expectations, 
stigmatisation, breakdown of trust and conflict exacerbation.      
  
5Is: Impact – and process evaluation 
The equivalent of the ‘assessment’ phase of the SARA process (see below), Impact 
and process evaluation encompass harvesting evidence of the effectiveness of 
preventive action (Interventions). This can then be used to improve performance; 
guide continuation, expansion and replication; accountability; and transfer into the 
‘collective evidence base’ – highly relevant in the context of assessing CPTED 
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Interventions. Under the final ‘I’ of Impact evaluation (which in summary asks, did it 
work?) fall seven headings, each containing multiple sub-headings. Self-evidently, 
Impact is of special relevance to this thesis. Beginning with aims (as Intervention and 
their causal connection with outputs). This is followed by the context of evaluation – 
whether internal or external; independent or not; formative or summative; routine or a 
one off for example realistic; orientation (Impact, process, or both); and issues 
relating to a climate of understanding amongst stakeholders. 
 
Methodology of evaluation constitutes: approach – theories of change, experimental, 
qualitative, realistic; design – methodological quality such as the Maryland scale, 
before/after and action/control; basic parameters, including intermediate and ultimate 
output measures; statistical testing; problems, issues, trade-offs and resolutions. 
Implementation and Involvement overview can be used for failures and successes in 
both Implementation and Involvement – more specifically, the outputs achieved, 
ingredients and causes of any failures e.g. absence of security standards. 
 
Results of Impact evaluation include: any significant change in intermediate or 
ultimate outcome measures; whether this can be attributed to prevention outputs; 
were such effects confined to sub-sets; adaptive reactions such as displacement or 
diffusion of benefits; how the Intervention worked; the ingredients essential to or 
boosted Impact; any harmful side-effects; beneficial side-effects; the size and cost-
effectiveness of the ‘gross attributable change’; how these changes translated into 
benefits; durability and sustainability of the Impact; whether no significant change 
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was due to failure of Impact evaluation, Implementation and Involvement; how the 
Intervention met aims and targets – again, did the CPTED measure work?  
 
Wider performance/selection measures cover: questions of response and scalability 
to crime/safety of the action; prioritisation of community safety action; accurate 
targeting on needs of the victim/wider safety; the policy aims to tackle; timescale of 
Implementation; and legitimacy or acceptability of the preventive actions. Finally, 
learning on evaluation methodology addresses whether an inconclusive evaluation 
was attributable to a failure of design or execution; and how this adds to our learning 
within evaluation methodology.          
 
Criticism of the 5Is most often relates to its complexity. Because, compared to the 
RAT (Cohen and Felson, 1979) triangle and crime triangle (or PAT – problem 
analysis triangle, Clarke and Eck, 2003), the 5Is is complex – and with good reason. 
Indeed, Ekblom repeatedly asserts, crime is itself complex and cannot be reduced to 
simple three-sided geometric forms. Ekblom (2011a, p.279) challenges the ‘Not 
rocket science’ claim (Read and Tilley, 2000) and assiduously observes: “What is 
difficult are the detailed, practical engineering and control systems required to reach 
the sky alive and not plough into a nearby hillside. Just like crime prevention.” 
(Ekblom, 2011a, p.279).  
 
In this context, a focused realistic discussion concerning the issues pertaining to 
causal and Intervention mechanism and research methods, should naturally adopt 
the strongest and most appropriate research framework. On this basis and despite 
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their links with CPTED principles rather than the 11Ds (Ekblom and Hirschfield, 
2014), PAT and the 25 techniques of situational prevention (Cornish and Clarke, 
2003), the 5Is are considered the most appropriate form of holistic analysis for this 
investigation. Indeed, the 11Ds is mechanism-oriented and already tested by 
considering the Intervention mechanisms. 
 
This decision to adopt the 5Is is based on the belief that it is best suited in this study 
for detailing (by way of Intervention, Implementation, Involvement and the causal 
mechanisms underlying each) the constraints, enablers, failures, issues and 
problems associated with the practical process of crime prevention and Conjunction 
of Criminal Opportunity (CCO – Ekblom, 2001). CCO provides a multi-faceted crime 
analysis tool, consisting of 11 proximal causal pathways of crime and 11 counterpart 
principles and by default a more complex model than that of the PAT or crime 
triangle, one with manifest detail, integration and potential application. 
 
Ekblom (2011a) observes how the 5Is resemble and are both compatible and better 
than the SARA (Clarke and Eck, 2003) process synonymous with problem-solving 
and problem-oriented policing/partnerships (POP – Goldstein, 1979). Where they 
differ is that in the 5Is, Intelligence covers both the Scanning and Analysis elements 
of SARA, whilst the ‘amorphous’ Response phase of SARA is further sub-divided 
into Intervention, Implementation and Involvement. Similarly, Impact is the equivalent 
of Assessment. Therefore, it can be argued that the 5Is has improved upon SARA – 
even though the latter has ‘market dominance’. This is important because both 
SARA and the PAT are relatively simple frameworks that necessarily do not reflect 
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the “rich complexity of preventive action” (Ekblom, 2011a, p.86). The 5Is develops 
SARA to provide systematic and detailed analysis, together with design of 
Intervention, Implementation and Involvement options. 
 
5Is can be described as an action-oriented knowledge management and application 
framework, one that focuses on the work of ground level practitioners. However, it 
can also assist delivery managers and policy makers in reaching their aims and 
objectives. And most pertinent to this thesis, 5Is has great potential as a research 
tool for assessment and evaluation. For practitioners, 5Is tasks aim to combine 
evidence and experience of the crime problem and consequently should assist to: 
• Identify and clarify the crime and community safety problems, plus the causes 
or risk factors they are attempting to prevent (e.g. residential burglary) 
• Search and select appropriate good practice from the body of existing 
knowledge and experience e.g. SBD (see below) 
• Replicate the preventive process, adapting (where necessary) to the specific 
problem, causes or risk factors and context e.g. recommending enhanced 
security measures where the crime impact statement/crime pattern analysis 
suggests these are necessary 
• Innovate intelligently, especially where there is no well-documented and well-
evaluated volume of good practice examples e.g. in the absence of a specific 
SBD design guide. Such innovation should be based on tested theoretical 
principles e.g. via CCO Interventions, and plausible practice knowledge. 
 
At this functional delivery level, 5Is framework is largely concerned with capturing, 
assessing, consolidating and sharing good practice with fellow practitioners. 
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However, for policymakers it should assist in assembling and organising the 
knowledge that connects policy to practice through delivery – together with the 
selection and design of policies so that they can be delivered at acceptable cost, 
timescale and risk. 
 
5Is is essentially a process model of crime prevention and community safety. A 
structured series of tasks (and purpose) is involved in this process and every task 
requires management/planning and performance dimensions. Unfortunately, there is 
an inherent ‘messiness’ about action (putting decisions into practice) many of which 
are detailed in this thesis: 
• Convoluted Implementation chains e.g. a residential development may have 
been sanctioned by the local authority (LA) housing department, but its sister 
architecture, planning, highways and other departments may require 
additional measures be incorporated 
• Parallel actions under the different 5Is e.g. identifying and responding to a 
specific crime issue would fall under the Implementation heading, whereas 
researching the causes of the crime counts as Intelligence  
• The 5Is procedures can act on each other, thus in developing a partnership, 
Involvement may have a purpose of pooling Intelligence; whilst Intelligence 
actions may be undertaken to help identify those partners to involve  
• Combining reproducible and interchangeable action elements with 
progressive detail to support customisation and innovation  
• Feedback – in designing and trialling methods of Intervention and Involvement 
• Initiation of action (tasks) may take place at different points in the cycle. For 
example, POP approaches begin with Intelligence. Design-based solutions 
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commence even earlier e.g. an application for an SBD award ideally should 
be made at the development’s concept stage.  
 
5Is aims to facilitate the systematic capture and transfer of knowledge (Ekblom, 
2011a) an important consideration in the context of this thesis. Familiarisation with 
the 5Is involves investing in more complexity in how we structure our knowledge and 
know-how to enable improved thinking, communication and action in the reality of 
immense complexity of real-life prevention. 
 
Indeed, Ekblom quotes Brown and Scott's (2007, p.45) observation     
“...organizational memory about particular interventions can be short, and there can 
be a danger that mistakes made in implementation are repeated time and again 
because the response knowledge is not disseminated.” This is particularly significant 
at a time when experienced police employed CPTED practitioners (DOCOs) have 
left the service, taking their knowledge with them and with little evidence of a 
corporate memory. See also the conclusion to this thesis. 
 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) 
Jeffery (1971) advocated a cross-discipline approach to reducing crime. Indeed, he 
disagreed with conventional criminological causal explanations of crime (such as 
poverty or employment), arguing that more attention should be given to the 
behavioural, biological, political and psychological and social explanations. Jeffery’s 
inclusion of social explanations is somewhat contradictory. Nevertheless, more than 
half a century later this cross-discipline approach appears eminently logical – albeit 
at the time such ideas were generally perceived as avant-garde, if not revolutionary 
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thinking. According to Robinson (1996) Jeffery’s CPTED concept emerged from his 
experiences with a rehabilitative project for juveniles in Washington D.C. By using 
the behaviourist learning theory of Skinner (1953), CPTED stressed the role of the 
physical environment in the development of pleasurable and painful experiences for 
the offender and capacity to alter behavioural responses: “Jeffery ‘emphasized’ 
material rewards and the use of the physical environment to control behaviour” 
(Jeffery and Zahm, 1993, p.33). 
  
CPTED aims to reduce crime through design and manipulation of the built (and on 
occasion the natural) environment – removing the crime opportunity (Clarke and 
Mayhew, 1988) so that the crime itself will not occur. To achieve this, its primary 
focus is on designing out the opportunities for crime at the concept or planning 
stages for a development. Nevertheless, many Interventions are made post-
construction, usually in the wake of an emerging or perceived crime problem – 
including counter terrorism design (NaCTSO, 2017). There are a range of 
formulations by different authors e.g. Crowe (2000), Ekblom (2011b), Armitage 
(2013), Cozens (2014), albeit the links to those SCP theories have never been 
formalised or adopted in the CPTED canon – and this is one of the limitations of 
CPTED as currently practised/written. Furthermore, one study reported:  
            The findings also revealed a discrepancy between the emphasis placed upon  
            each component by DOCOs and by burglars. Whilst all DOCOs referenced  
            surveillance, movement control and defensible space, only 70% referenced  
            physical security and 30% management and maintenance. This aligns with  
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            burglars to some degree… but burglars appear to place a greater emphasis  
            on physical security… (Armitage and Monchuk, 2017, p.16-17). 
 
Alternative definitions of CPTED also exist. For example: 
            The proper design and effective use of the built environment can lead     
            to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime, and an improvement  
            in quality of life.  The goal of CPTED is to reduce opportunities for     
            crime that may be inherent in the design of structures or in the design  
            of neighbourhoods. (Crowe, 2000, p.46).   
Crowe’s definition is concise (perhaps overly so) but does include elements of 
Intervention, Involvement and Impact. However, it does not explain the constituent 
parts of CPTED, or the mechanisms that will achieve it.  
 
Ekblom (2011a) and Cozens (2014) contend that CPTED ideas have been over-
simplified (a far more complex set of variables is at work) causing the former to 
redefine CPTED to include security – (meaning perceptions of safety and an 
absence of crime, ASB and fear of crime) and contextually appropriate design. 
Security is relevant because it adds a strong (if not necessarily sustainable 
dimension) to CPTED elements. Similarly, contextuality broadens the perspective 
and helps to determine the measures present or required in a given situation. In 
addition, there is the possibility of intervening at different stages between pre-
planning and post-construction: Consequently, the Ekblom (2011b) definition states: 
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            Reducing the possibility, probability and harm from criminal and   
            related events, and enhancing the quality of life through community  
            safety; through scales and types of place, from individual buildings   
            and interiors to wider landscapes, neighbourhoods and cities; to  
            produce designs that are ‘fit for purpose’, contextually appropriate in  
            all other respects and not ‘vulnerability led’; whilst achieving a balance  
            between the efficiency of avoiding crime problems before construction  
            and the adaptability of tackling them through subsequent management  
            and maintenance. (Ekblom, 2011b, p.4). 
Unsurprisingly, Ekblom’s CPTED definition encapsulates all 5Is elements of 
Intelligence, Intervention, Implementation, Involvement and Impact.  
 
Similarly, the Armitage (2013) definition includes elements of social and 
environmental sustainability: “...design, manipulation and management of the built 
environment... to enhance sustainability through the process and application of 
measures at the micro (individual building/structure) and macro (neighbourhood) 
level.” (Armitage, 2013, p.23). Compare this to Cozens’ updated definition that 
concentrates on: “...analyzing and assessing crime risks in order to guide the design, 
management and use of the built environment (and products) … public health, 
sustainability and quality of life.” (Cozens, 2014, p.21). Not only has this definition 
expanded to encompass ‘products’ and ‘the fear of crime’, it now also includes the 




Whilst the addition of sustainability and fear of crime seems justifiable (this is 
arguably natural CPTED territory), the inclusion of the others is not – although it 
could be argued that CPTED’s concentration on crime and security should not be 
made in isolation and must be undertaken in coordination with and addressing wider, 
quality of life considerations (enhanced Involvement). Nevertheless, the Cozens 
(2014) definition appears especially all-embracing. This is highly problematic and not 
simply due to CPTED’s roots as a constituent part of SCP. The extension threatens 
to dilute the core elements of CPTED, whilst simultaneously over-reaching its 
purpose and function. And perhaps of greatest relevance, much of what is contained 
within the expanded version of CPTED is already occupied by the SCP description. 
Consequently, the Ekblom and Armitage definitions appear more credible in that, 
whilst extending the scope to include causal contributions and interactions that are 
not vulnerability led (together with the especially important issue of sustainability), 
they do not trespass into subject areas that ordinarily are not understood to be within 
the remit of crime prevention. And perhaps most importantly from an investigative 
viewpoint, they include elements from all 5Is. 
 
Independently (yet simultaneous to the development of Jeffery’s ideas) the architect 
and urban planner Oscar Newman was producing his own CPTED theories – which 
both authors later accepted as near identical. Newman (1972) can be identified as 
applying much of Jacobs (1961) thinking about the criminogenic capacity of the built 
environment. And whilst he was also influenced by social and behavioural scientists 
like Hall (1959), Wood (1961), Angel (1968), Sommer (1969) and of course Jeffery 
(1969; 1971), his holistic concept of ‘defensible space’ (as a means of controlling 
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crime) was very much delivered from an architectural viewpoint. Indeed, Poyner 
(1983) contends that in the UK Newman’s ideas were viewed by architects as 
primarily applicable to combatting vandalism. Whereas Cozens and Love (2015) 
contend that Newman ‘operationalised’ Jacobs’ theories into practical application.       
 
Jeffery (1976) accepted Newman’s work on defensible space (1972) as the basis of 
modern CPTED, not his own work’ (Cozens and Love, 2015). Andresen (2010) 
believes this was because Jeffery’s work necessitated long-term investigation, 
whereas Newman’s ideas were easier to appreciate and apply. However, whilst this 
may be true in respect of Newman’s concepts of defensible space, natural 
surveillance and territoriality, an extensive literature search indicates that those of 
image and milieu are rarely given more than passing reference – although it might be 
suggested that these have morphed into management and maintenance. 
 
Poyner (1983), Cozens et al (2005) and Montoya et al (2016) set out the core 
principles of CPTED which Armitage (2013) described as physical security, 
surveillance, movement control, management and maintenance and defensible 
space. Cozens et al (2005) and Cozens and Love (2015) list the ‘The Seven First 
Generation CPTED Concepts’ (2015, p.4) as: territoriality, surveillance, 
maintenance, access control, target hardening, legitimate activity support and image 
management.  However, to date there appears to have been little attempt to group 
these under separate headings and this may help explain the apparent confusion 
amongst DOCOs (see below). For the purposes of this investigation, 5Is does not 
detail the specifics of a crime prevention/security Intervention. It simply contends an 
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Intervention is anything that blocks, deflects, or weakens one or more causes of 
criminal events and thus reduces the risk, so that such instances are less likely or 
harmful consequences are reduced.    
 
Ultimately, a more limited definition of CPTED is preferred – one that includes the 
following three core sub-headings (subsequently discussed in detail). Physical 
security ‘target hardening’ measures (Newman, 1972; 1973; 1996) – including doors 
and door security, windows and glazing, perimeter security walls, fencing, hedges 
and gates and defensive planting; Technological Innovations – including all forms of 
lighting, fob-reader controlled door entry systems, intruder alarms, CCTV (closed 
circuit television), ANPR (automatic number plate recognition) and fogging agents. 
Environmental elements – to include defensible space, natural surveillance, 
territoriality, geographical juxtaposition, image, milieu, symbolic barriers and 
permeability/movement. 
 
The constituent elements of CPTED are discussed and evaluated in the following 
sub-chapters. They have been chosen for detailed discussion as determined by their 
perceived relevance to the tower blocks under investigation. Indeed, these elements 
are believed to be instrumental in making the legitimate user feel safer (reducing the 
fear of crime), whilst simultaneously causing the potential offender to perceive the 
opposite and feel at risk, together with causing a range of practical difficulties in 




Before discussing these elements, it is necessary to be aware that the core 
principles and concepts of CPTED often overlap and on occasion are ill-defined. 
Indeed, Ekblom describes territoriality, activity support and target hardening as 
“vaguely defined” (2011a, p.1). Whilst through the testimony of victims and 
offenders, Armitage and Monchuk, (2017) highlight the lack of clarity concerning 
CPTED. Monchuk, Pease and Armitage (2018) discuss the language issues of 
CPTED and how these may influence the credibility of the Designing Out Crime 
(DOC) discipline when applied practically in the built environment. Collectively, these 
CPTED shortcomings provide additional justification for this thesis using the 5Is 
analytical framework, to investigate those sites chosen for analysis.  
 
Core principles of CPTED 
The core principles of CPTED used in this thesis are those originally set out by 
Newman (1972; 1973). These include his core concept of defensible space and its 
design elements of territoriality, surveillance, building image and juxtaposition of 
residential with other areas. Such CPTED elements are equally 5Is Interventions 
(Ekblom, 2011a). 
 
CPTED concepts: Defensible space 
Newman (1972) views defensible space as the creation of buildings and their 
surroundings that assist occupiers (originally residents) in dissuading offenders. 
Newman argued that the physical design of a neighbourhood can increase or reduce 
residents’ belief in control of the environment in which they reside. He can be seen to 
develop the themes of Jacobs (1961) and Jeffery (1971) and describes how: 
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“...defensible space is a model for residential environments which inhibits crime by 
creating the physical expression of a social fabric that defends itself.” (Newman, 
1973, p.84).  
 
He asserts that the defensible space elements have a common purpose in providing 
a safe, productive and well-maintained living space. The aim is that a potential 
criminal perceives such an environment to be under the control of its residents and 
as a result, he or she will be easily recognised. Newman also contends that 
defensible space will be immediately apparent (visual environmental cues, Rapoport, 
1982) to both lawful users and those with no right of access, thereby indicating who 
had a legitimate reason to be there. CPTED measures can be used to reinforce 
defensible space – although the use of ‘symbolic barriers’ (see below) is the 
preferred option, rather than resort to purely physical barriers. He observes this is 
partly: “...target hardening – the traditional aim of security design as provided by 
locksmiths.” (Newman, 1972, p.73).  
 
Newman also contends that instead of delegating all security issues to the police, 
people must also protect themselves as a community. For Newman, defensible 
space is a collective term for a series of mechanisms (Interventions): real and 
symbolic barriers; strongly defined areas of influence; and improved opportunities for 
surveillance.  Taken together, these are expected to provide the residents with 
control (Involvement) over their environments. He also set out four characteristics 
(Interventions) of defensible space (1972): 
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1. Territoriality – the capacity of the physical environment to create perceived zones 
of territorial influence 
2. Surveillance – the capability of physical design to provide surveillance 
opportunities for residents/agents 
3. Image – the ability of design to influence perception of a project’s uniqueness, 
isolation and stigma 
4. Milieu – influence of geographical juxtaposition with ‘safe zones’ and the security 
of adjacent areas. 
 
During the subsequent two decades Newman continued to develop the concept, first 
adding the ‘Five Principles’ for creating defensible space’ (Newman, 1976): 
1. Assignment to different types of occupier environments that are bespoke to needs 
and aspirations in the context of their backgrounds, family size, age makeup, 
income, lifestyles and social activities 
2. Territorial definition of space that affords different resident types and their rights as 
occupiers. However, this should not act as a barrier towards residential neighbours 
coming from different backgrounds and consequently the aim is to celebrate 
difference, whilst simultaneously fostering tolerance 
3. Interior design of dwellings should work in harmony with exterior vulnerability, in 
order to maximise surveillance opportunities. For example, the windows of those 
rooms most regularly occupied (kitchens and living rooms) most often known as 
‘active rooms’ (Armitage, 2013) should overlook main entrance doors, public areas, 
car parking, etc. 
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4. Locating dwelling entrances into city/urban streets in order to extend residential 
territoriality into the public environment and thereby influence same 
5. Following Newman’s concerns with image and milieu, ensuring building design for 
the least able in society does not define and stigmatize them as such. For example, 
social housing has often been of poor-quality design and construction, thereby 
increasing the vulnerability and isolation of tenants (Powers, 1997). And as Mawby 
(2001) reminds us, crime and especially burglary target the poorest in society. 
 
Newman contends a hierarchy of living and community spaces exists. Those 
housing developments that incorporate territoriality are said to have the strongest 
deterrents to criminal activity. This influences the way housing is grouped and how 
space is laid out to prevent crime. Crucially, he suggests that in such an environment 
people should not only challenge unusual behaviour, but feel it is their duty to do so. 
And the fear of this should be a powerful deterrent to criminals. Similarly, for 
Schneider and Kitchen (2002) encouraging residents to feel attached to that 
environment should nurture a willingness to take control and defend it. 
 
Newman has been criticised for his methodological weaknesses (Bottoms, 1974; 
Mawby, 1977). Indeed, defensible space has been described as: “a rat’s nest of 
intertwining hypotheses.” (Rubenstein et al, 1980, p.6). Furthermore, in much of the 
early work claiming to be CPTED a deficiency of evidence appears to exist. Cozens 
(2014) contends that defensible space is difficult to measure and define. 
Nevertheless, it was Cozens et al (2005) who extended the CPTED definition to 
include the seven principles of defensible space: territoriality, access control, 
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surveillance, target hardening, image and activity support. In the context of this 
thesis, this is relevant because not only does it point to the deficiencies of CPTED, 
by default it once again reinforces the decision to use 5Is as the analytical 
framework.       
 
CPTED concepts: Territoriality               
One of his four characteristics of defensible space (and potential Intervention, 
Implementation and Involvement), Newman defined territoriality as: “The capacity of 
the physical environment to provide opportunities for residents and their agents to 
exert the impression of ownership and control over their environment.” (1972, p.43).  
More specifically: “Territoriality involves the human emotion/response to the space 
which people define as their own.” (Armitage, 2013, p.23) and prima facie evidence 
of Involvement. Territoriality is claimed to promote social control through increased 
designation, ownership and influence over space.  In such an environment, strangers 
and intruders stand out and legitimate users more likely to challenge their presence.  
Furthermore, the use of communal entrance doors, walls, hedging, fencing, gates, 
paving and surface treatments, vegetation, lighting and signage/notices (including 
such relatively minor elements as a house name) have the capacity to reinforce 
territoriality. In this context, territoriality utilises the human motivation to ‘control’ any 
space that they believe belongs to them and/or over which they have control. This 
can be achieved through adoption and management, or ownership in law.  
 
The objectives of territoriality can also be achieved in existing locations by assigning 
space to designated users (Involvement). The contention is that a well-maintained 
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environment exudes an atmosphere of care and legitimate activity, as supported by 
‘Broken Windows’ theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). This can be achieved through 
the provision of soft landscaping, such as properly tended garden areas. Real and 
symbolic barriers also have a role in reinforcing territoriality, suggesting activities like 
ball games should be restricted to well-defined private areas. However, evidence 
supporting the effectiveness of symbolic barriers is sparce (Shaftoe and James, 
2004). Signage can be displayed at location entrances, where necessary.  Whilst 
outdoor seating should be located where it is under the territorial control of specific 
residents (or businesses willing to accept that role) and not where it might act as a 
generator of ASB or criminal conduct. 
 
Cozens et al (2005) and Cozens and Love (2015) reflect Newman’s (1972) 
understanding of territoriality as a separate entity from that of defensible space.  
However, as Armitage (2013) contends, a more concise description of CPTED 
principles might perceive them to be inextricably linked, in that the creation 
(Intervention and Implementation) of defensible space aims to produce territorial 
control over that space. 
 
Guardianship 
From the perspective of RAT, Cohen and Felson (1979) argued that a crime would 
only occur in the absence of a capable guardian. Whilst Eck (1994) incorporated 
place managers and handlers within the umbrella of guardianship. Felson (1995) 
pointed to the spectrum of responsibility associated with such roles in the residential 
environment and over time evolved the concept and perceived all such guardians as 
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control agents (Felson, 2006). However, detailed examination of the concept of 
guardianship is a far more recent phenomenon and contains lessons for practical 
application in real world situations. 
 
Reynald (2010) describes a capable guardian as the “critical actor” in preventing 
crime and sets out “three critical dimensions of capable guardianship.” (2010, p.1): 
willingness to act; capacity to detect possible offenders; and being willing to actually 
intervene if necessary. She describes capable guardianship as critical to 
victimization and how previous research (Miethe and Meier, 1990; Coupe and Blake, 
2006) demonstrated a correlation between reduced guardianship and higher 
victimization. She contends that property crime was lower at homes with higher 
intensity of directly observable guardianship during the daylight. (Reynald, 2009). 
Such guardianship intensity is the product of monitoring by available guardians – 
control agents within RAT (Felson, 2006). 
 
Willingness to act will be influenced by a range factors, including physical ability, 
protective tools and incident seriousness. Similarly, the capacity of guardians to 
separate potential offenders (suspicious behaviour) from those with no criminal intent 
is an important skillset – often compromised by resort to stereotypes in offender 
identification. Ultimately, a willingness to intervene when required is a key 
mechanism of guardianship (instead of simply calling the police) and is presumed in 
much of the existing literature (Reynald, 2010). However, she has developed four 
types of guardianship: invisible guardian, available guardian, capable guardian and 




Most importantly, guardianship can strengthen the extent to which residents exert 
control and thereby reinforce territoriality over their space (Newman, 1972). One final 
observation, whilst guardianship has been incorporated into CPTED, this is not the 
case with the other PAT elements of place managers and intimate handlers – 
thereby pointing to the limitations of CPTED as a means of analysis. 
 
CPTED concepts: Access control  
Access control (Intervention and Implementation) refers to the design of buildings 
and the space they occupy, to actively prevent entry by those with no right of access 
It aims to: 
1. Limit the capacity of offenders to realise it is a potential target.   
2. Increase the difficulty for offenders to gain access, exit and navigate within the 
premises they have decided to target.     
3. Increase the physical difficulty of gaining access to their target. 
4. Increase the psychological difficulty of entering and moving within the target 
premises without feeling they are being watched. 
5. Deny offenders any excuse to be within the target premises, whilst 
simultaneously maximising the confidence of legitimate occupiers to challenge 
those without such right of access. 
  
Armitage contends that ‘access control’ is too limited a definition and should be 
described as “limitation of access, egress and through movement” (2013, p.25).  
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Indeed, it could be argued that ‘access control’ appears more accurate a reference 
to the actual dwellings (or other premises) and their curtilage, whereas 
‘permeability/movement’ might better describe the estate layout beyond that of the 
dwelling boundaries. Such permeability of the built environment and its capacity to 
produce criminal opportunities, was not identified by the original proponents of 
CPTED.  Indeed, ‘urbanists’ (her self-description) like Jacobs believed that 
‘movement’ would produce increased “eyes upon the street” (1961, p.35) and this in 
turn would reduce crime. In reality, the reverse appears to often take place as 
detailed by Johnson and Bowers (2010). And there are also the examples of horse 
race meetings, fun fairs, busy transport interchanges, etc., where the sheer volume 
of people provides anonymity for offenders – regardless of the number of eyes.    
    
The crime opportunity afforded by a highly permeable built environment, will cause 
concern from a CPTED perspective. Furthermore, it might be thought that following 
the development in the UK of many ‘sink estates’ (Blair, 1998) during the 1950s, 60s 
and 70s, where such permeability facilitated so much crime, that mistake would not 
be repeated – and certainly not so soon. Moreover, the rationale for their inclusion is 
now most usually based on grounds of sustainable transport links – that is to say, 
persuading people to walk or bicycle rather than drive motor vehicles. However, and 
in contrast, this ignores the potential carbon saving and therefore long-term 
sustainability elements of CPTED and SBD, detailed by Pease (2009) 
 
There now exists a range of convincing research data and further evidence that 
points to the efficacy of minimum entry/exit and limited movement/permeability: 
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Brantingham and Brantingham (1975, 1993, 2008); Bevis and Nutter (1977); Brown 
and Altman (1983); Newlands (1983); Greenberg and Rohe (1983); Beavon (1984); 
Taylor and Gottfredson (1987); Cromwell et al (1991); Poyner and Webb (1991); 
Armitage (1999); Rengert and Wasilchick (2000); Wiles and Costello (2000); SURF 
Centre (2002); Poyner (2006); Armitage and Monchuck (2009); Johnson and Bowers 
(2010); Armitage (2013). 
 
Furthermore, Beavon et al (1994) reported a correlation between increased 
accessibility and burglary risk. Whilst Poyner called for “proper consideration” (2006, 
p.4) of the issue of permeability, in view of New Urbanism’s desire for unrestricted 
permeability and hostility of the cul-de-sac as a design feature of the built 
environment (Cozens, 2008). Manifestly in-depth research of permeability (culs-de-
sac and burglary risk) was delivered by Johnson and Bowers (2010). They begin 
with the premise that crime is concentrated in space (Eck et al, 2005) and then 
concentrate on the role of permeability in facilitating crime. CPT (Brantingham and 
Brantingham, 1981, 2008) supports the notion that permeability and crime risk are 
linked. And Armitage (2007) found that homes located on main roads were at greater 
risk from burglary – whilst those in culs-de-sac were at least risk. However, where 
the cul-de-sac included a ‘leaky’ (interconnecting) footpath the risk of crime was 
unsurprisingly much greater. 
 
In comparison, the concept and methodology known as Space Syntax provides an 
alternative perspective. Hillier and Shu (2000) and Shu and Huang (2003) concluded 
that risk of burglary is twice as high in culs-de-sac than it is on permeable through 
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roads. Despite this assertion, culs-de-sac were thought to be: “...very safe places’ if 
linear and part of a larger system of linear roads…” and “when combined together to 
form hierarchical systems of interconnected culs-de-sac, they can become extremely 
vulnerable.” (Hillier, 2004 p.39). Nevertheless, he subsequently acknowledged that 
the early research did not differentiate between ‘leaking’ and true culs-de-sac. 
 
On which theme, Johnson and Bowers (2010) used data from one police district in 
the Merseyside police area covering 56.8 square km and 118,161 homes. They 
determined this contained 10,760 street segments, producing 11.94 homes per 
segment. Police recorded burglary data was used for the period April 1998 to March 
2002 (four years). A majority of the culs-de-sac in the study area were connected to 
around three others and to ensure misidentification as through roads did not take 
place, each was identified manually. Two types of cul-de-sac were identified: 
1. Linear culs-de-sac – off through roads with linear geometry 
2. Sinuous (curving) or isolated culs-de-sac – non-linear with little visibility down 
the cul-de-sac 
 
The aggregate results, in terms of burglaries per 1,000 homes per annum, disclosed 
that the lowest risk of burglary was in culs-de-sac and private roads. Indeed, the rate 
of burglary on major roads was three times that of private roads and more than twice 
that in sinuous culs-de-sac. Furthermore, the risk is higher in linear culs-de-sac than 
in sinuous or hierarchical types. Indeed, the Johnson and Bowers research suggests 
that linking a street section to another major road increases the burglary risk by 8%, 
and to three other such roads by 26%.  Whilst both forms of linear and sinuous cul-
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de-sac would appear: “...to be associated with a statistically significant reduction in 
the expected count of burglary”. (Johnson and Bowers, 2010, p.18). The findings 
demonstrate that connectedness is linked to increased burglary risk – in line with 
Bevis and Nutter (1977), Beavon et al. (1994). 
 
The authors conclude that for future policy decision-making and because movement/ 
permeability may lead to increased risk of burglary, it should be limited to that 
necessary to facilitate local journeys and sustainable transportation. Moreover, ‘true’ 
culs-de-sac (rather than ‘leaking’ culs-de-sac) are arguably a beneficial design 
feature and should be encouraged. Other research results of special note include: 
how increased housing density appears to have had a positive effect on crime; 
burglary is higher in areas with higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity; and a small 
positive link between levels of unemployment and burglary association. But in 
summary, the authors conclude that their results support the hypothesis that 
increased movement/permeability is inherently associated with burglary risk. 
  
The findings of Wiles and Costello (2000) describe the relatively short travelling 
distances of opportunistic offenders, both in England and North America – thereby 
contradicting a commonly held belief that increased mobility leads criminals to travel 
further to commit crime, especially into affluent suburbs and rural areas. Moreover, 
the authors report how the overwhelming majority of offenders tend to commit crime 
within the areas in which they reside or socialise. Their main conclusions include: 
• The vast majority of offender movements are relatively short 
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• Most travel associated with crime is largely not motivated by planning to 
offend and is much more dependent on opportunities becoming available 
during normal routines, rather than long-range search patterns 
• When offenders travel to commit crime, it remains overwhelmingly local 
• Long-range crime is mainly to places with strong connections to the offender’s 
home location 
• There was little evidence that offenders’ travelling to commit crime was 
significantly increasing over time, or of new travel opportunities being 
exploited. (Wiles and Costello, 2000, p.v.) 
 
Much of the previous research relating to offender travel comes from North America. 
Wiles and Costello (2000) detail how in general these distances do not appear to 
vary by time of day or year. However, such distances did increase with age (and by 
extension, criminal experience). For residential burglary, average travel distances 
were very low (averaging approximately two miles) and therefore walkable from the 
offender’s home address. 
 
‘The new opportunity theories’, Felson and Clarke (1998) including RAT, CPT and 
RCT point to known offenders committing high volume crime, dominated by 
opportunistic offending during routine and limited travel patterns. Indeed, Wiles and 
Costello (2000, p.45) “...feel confident in asserting that generally, high volume crime 
is a highly localised phenomenon, especially for offences like residential burglary 
and criminal damage.” Meanwhile, Al Kahtani (1996) discovered similarly short 
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travelling distances (‘crime travel footprint’) amongst offenders in Saudi Arabia – 
thereby suggesting an international pattern of offending behaviour.  
 
Ultimately, it might be expected that the overwhelming majority of offenders do not 
travel long distances to commit crime. Long range travel requires knowledge, 
confidence, skills and resources – talents which many offenders do not possess. 
Moreover, and as in nature, human endeavour seeks to minimise effort (conserve 
energy). Houghton (1992) describes how offenders often live in poorer social 
housing containing a surplus of suitable targets (‘impacted crime areas’). This facet 
of criminal behaviour, where victims are often poorer than offenders (localised 
victimization), is especially disheartening.   
 
Of perhaps most crucial importance, having established that a high proportion of 
offenders travel relatively short distances to commit crime, it might be contended that 
enhanced movement/permeability assists their target selection – in that they will 
pass more properties suitable for burglary (more crime opportunities) within their 
‘crime travel footprint’ (or ‘opportunity radius’) in a shorter distance and space in 
time. This will be especially true where they are travelling to the enclosure and/or 
target on foot – especially relevant to this investigation. 
 
CPTED concepts: Surveillance 
The manner in which an area can be designed to maximise the capacity for 
suspicious activity to be seen, is known as surveillance (Intervention). Two axes of 
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surveillance can be identified: natural to technological; and informal to formal.  
Natural/informal surveillance is displayed by residents, shoppers, passing 
pedestrians, cyclists or motorists. Whereas formal surveillance refers to the actions 
of the police, security guards and employees. As noted above, in RAT, those who 
intervene on either an informal or formal basis, are often referred to as ‘capable 
guardians.’ Technological surveillance is most often used as a reference to CCTV, 
although it could also include lighting, intruder alarm installations and biometric 
applications such as facial recognition.  
 
CPTED concentrates on maximising the opportunities for informal/natural 
surveillance – the surveillability (Ekblom, 2011b) causing an apparent perception 
amongst offenders that they are being watched. In conventional dwelling design this 
is achieved by ensuring: main entrance doors face the street; habitable ‘active’ 
rooms, such as the kitchen or lounge overlook the street; and that vegetation and 
high walls do not obscure sightlines (Implementation and Involvement). As with 
territoriality, the overall rationale is that legitimate users recognise suspicious 
behaviour and are then confident to either challenge it directly, or report it to an 
agency like the police. Furthermore, surveillance has a dual purpose of both its 
operational task in alerting legitimate users, whilst simultaneously creating the 
perception amongst offenders that their actions are being watched. 
 
References to informal/natural surveillance pepper design briefs, perhaps because 
unlike the other CPTED elements they have attracted little critical commentary.  
Unfortunately, the likelihood (or not) that there are sufficient “eyes upon the street” 
Jacobs (1961, p.35) or movement generation to provide any credible capacity for 
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informal/natural surveillance is rarely considered – and has parallels with Reynald’s 
(2009) guardian intensity discussed above. Nor is there a guarantee that human 
witnesses to suspicious or offending behaviour will act (Involvement) on what they 
see and either intervene in person or make contact with the concierge, security 
guard or the police. Jacobs (1961) and Newman (1972) both maintained that in an 
environment where what are now described as CPTED elements are maximised, 
residents would be more willing to intervene. However, their ideas often appear to be 
deficient of evidential support.    
 
Subsequent research that encompassed interviews with convicted burglars indicated 
that surveillance and their being seen were highly influential elements in their 
decision making: Repetto (1974); Brown and Bentley (1993); Nee and Meenaghan 
(2006). Winchester and Jackson (1982) researched residential burglary offences in 
the Kent police area and reported that occupancy, surveillance and access 
opportunities were important determinants when criminals were selecting targets. 
They concluded that properties overlooked by neighbouring ones experience less 
crime (and more crime where the reverse was true) – also the verdict of Van de 
Voordt and Van Wegen (1990); Armitage (2006, 2011). 
 
Macdonald and Gifford (1989) interviewed 44 convicted male burglars and used 50 
photographs of different forms of housing, displaying a range of environmental cues 
involving surveillance. The burglars were then asked to arrange the photos in terms 
of poor, moderate, or good burglary targets. The surveillance opportunities 
emanating from the properties proved to be a good indication of their attractiveness 
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to burglars. Secluded homes were especially favoured, whereas corner plots and 
those with good visibility or overlooked by neighbours, far less so. Whilst Cromwell et 
al (1991) discovered that properties located in close proximity to a stop sign, traffic 
lights, commercial business establishment, park, church or busy road are more 
attractive to offenders. This apparent contradiction with Jacobs’ “eyes upon the 
street” (1961, p.35) is also evidenced by Winchester and Jackson (1982) and Groff 
and La Vigne (2001) who found that properties located on a main road experience 
more crime – thereby challenging Hillier and Shu (2000) and Shu and Huang (2003). 
 
Groff and La Vigne (2001); Van de Voort and Van Wegen (1990); Welsh and 
Farrington (2008) all conclude that properties located in areas with poor street 
lighting experience increased levels of crime. Whereas, Hearnden and McGill (2004) 
interviewed convicted burglars and discovered that belief of there being goods within 
the property worth stealing, was the most important consideration. Amongst 72 
respondents, only 35 thought the ‘type of property’ important. Moreover, the fear of 
being seen came very low on the list of offenders’ concerns – not surprising when 
their primary motivation was to steal goods to sell and finance their drug addiction – 
a finding that supports RCT. Armitage (2006) also concluded that properties visible 
from nearby footpaths experience more crime: as do those located within viewing 
distance of traffic lights. Whilst Reynald (2009) deduced that increased levels of 
surveillance lead to enhanced levels of guardianship activity. Technological 
innovations as substitutes for guardianship are a crucial part of this investigation and 
discussed below. Of crucial importance, Armitage (2007) contends that: “...the 
current debate surrounding the criminogenic features of permeable design has 
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diverted practitioners’ attention from the immediate task of reducing crime.” 
(Armitage, 2007, p.140).        
 
CPTED concepts: Image and milieu 
Image was the term originally used by Newman (1972), repeated by Cozens and 
Love (2005) and refers to the capacity of the physical design of a development to 
deliver a sense of security (Intervention). This has since evolved into the CPTED 
‘image maintenance/management’, Cozens and Love (2015) – albeit there is a 
subtle difference, in that it is the post-construction propensity of the building or space 
not to be marred by damage, vandalism, graffiti or litter that is considered – together 
with the absence of a negative social reputation. In practice, this means that 
descriptions like ‘sink estate’ (Blair, 1998) will not be incurred – on the proviso that 
the development has avoided a spiral of decay and/or otherwise attracted unwanted 
stigma and thereby come to be known as a problem area. 
 
It can be plausibly argued that image is relevant on two levels. First, by delivering a 
sense of security residents will feel more inclined to intervene and if not challenge 
and report offending or ASB – or at least report it to place managers or the police 
(Involvement and Implementation). Second, and with a direct reference to the 
‘Broken Windows’ theory of Wilson and Kelling (1982), those intent on crime or ASB 
will be less likely to commit such acts in an area that exudes the impression that 
people care and are more likely to be watching (and reporting) such behaviour 




There now exists a considerable canon of research evidence that supports the 
physical condition and ‘image maintenance/management’ of the built environment 
and how this influences crime and fear of crime. This includes Lynch (1960); 
Newman (1973); Perlgut (1982); Eck (2002); Kraut (1999); Ross and Mirowsky 
(1999); Ross and Jang (2000). Moreover, vacant premises may constitute ‘crime 
magnets’ which in turn has a resonance with Brantingham and Brantingham’s (1993; 
2008) concept of ‘crime attractors’. Furthermore, SBD’s approach to management 
and maintenance has also changed during the past decade, in that there are no 
longer references to such issues in design guides like Homes 2019 (SBD, 2019).  
             
CPTED measures 
This study has decided to group these measures under three specific headings: 
target hardening, technological innovations and environmental elements. All three 
can be identified at the two sites analysed in this investigation – and their individual 
effectiveness in preventing crime, fear of crime and ASB is encapsulated within the 
research aims.  
 
Physical security target hardening 
The expression physical security ‘target hardening’ was first used by Newman (1972) 
and is often reduced to either ‘physical security’ or ‘target hardening’ – the preferred 
term throughout this thesis. It includes the original or retrofit incorporation of doors, 
windows, glazing, security ironmongery, fencing and other physical structures 
designed to increase the difficulty for offenders to gain access to the premises. A 
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case can also be made for the inclusion of ‘defensible planting’ under this heading – 
as it is in this study. 
 
Budd, (1999); Tilley et al (2011); Grove et al (2012); and Tseloni et al (2017) report 
how exterior door and window locks are installed on individual dwellings to withstand 
attack. Armitage (2013) charts the rise of security standards for exterior doors and 
windows – beginning in 1989 with the launch of the UK police crime prevention 
initiative SBD. In the absence of security standards, SBD relied on ‘specification’ for 
most of the first decade of its existence. And whilst PAS 011: 1994 was adopted as a 
test standard for SBD windows in the same year, it was not until 1999 and 
simultaneous with the reorganisation of SBD that the performance standards of PAS 
23 and 24: 1999 for doorsets and BS 7950: 1997 for windows, were introduced. The 
distinction between specification and performance (ensured through certification) is 
important, because a door may claim to meet the requirements of the former, when 
in fact it fails the certification necessary for the latter. PAS 24 now applies to both 
doors and windows and has been joined by a number of others operated by different 
testing houses e.g. LPS 1175 and 2081; STS 201 and 202. Designed to deny access 
to offenders, this is the category most likely to attract the inappropriate description of 
‘fortress society’ (Ekblom, 2011a). 
 
Farrell et al (2011) articulated the ‘security hypothesis’ as an explanation for the 
reduction in vehicle crime that began in the early 1980s – in the USA; early 1990s in 
Australia, England and Wales. This specifically related to inclusion of central locking, 
immobilisers and alarms. Tseloni et al (2017) developed this same hypothesis to 
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investigate and explain the reduction in residential burglary that began in England 
and Wales during the mid-1990s. Described as the ‘international crime drop’ by Van 
Dijk et al (2012) and Tonry (2014), Tseloni et al (2017) concluded that “combinations 
of the most effective devices (door and window locks plus security lighting)” (2017, 
p.1), led to a decline in forced-entry burglaries. Amongst a wide range of research 
material, the authors drew on repeated editions of the British Crime and the Crime 
Survey for England and Wales (CSEW), for example Office for National Statistics 
(ONS, 2013). This includes asking a sub-sample of victims about their crime 
experience.  
 
Unfortunately, expecting victims to know what security failing caused their burglary to 
take place is not a guaranteed route to accuracy. Certainly, as a police DOCO for 20 
years, my experience was that the use of retrospectively fitted additional door or 
window locks had negligible effect in preventing burglary by moderately determined 
offenders – as evidenced at the comparison site in this investigation. Nevertheless, 
Tseloni et al (2017) adds to a growing body of evidence in support of the crime drop 
and security hypothesis across a range of different crime types. Door and window 




As one of the trio of specific physical Intervention CPTED headings, technological 
innovations covers a burgeoning number of applications. A generation ago these 
would have been limited to little more than electrically-powered lighting – primarily in 
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the form of street lighting but also including security lighting. However, in recent 
decades the number of categories has expanded dramatically – often as substitutes 
for guardianship (Reynald, 2009) including electronically controlled, fob-reader, 
access-controlled door entry systems; 24/7 staffed concierge control rooms 
operating localised CCTV, caller identification and electronic door entry systems. 
 
Evidence regarding the effectiveness of lighting in preventing crime has featured in 
studies by Ramsay and Newton (1991); Painter (1994); Farrington and Welsh 
(2002). Whilst the evolution of intruder alarms means that visual corroboration is now 
often provided by CCTV (closed circuit television). Beginning with localised security 
applications, over the past three decades public area surveillance by CCTV cameras 
has expanded dramatically across the UK and the country has had a pathbreaking 
role internationally (Key Note Market Intelligence, 2014; Welsh and Farrington, 
2008). CCTV has also been increasingly used in residential environments – albeit 
less so by residential social landlords (RSLs) in external areas (Gill et al, 2005).   
 
Environmental elements 
The environmental elements of CPTED fall outside the headings of target hardening 
and technological innovations. As such, they relate to the environment beyond that 
of the target or enclosure e.g. the external landscape outside the building and how 
those areas are managed. Consequently, many of these environmental elements will 
be synonymous with the CPTED concepts detailed previously in this chapter and 
more specifically: defensible space, territoriality, surveillance, activity support, image 
and milieu. The reason for reordering these generally accepted elements of CPTED 
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under these specific headings, is that it assists in both their categorisation and 
thereafter a systematic analysis of their effects by way of the 5Is.  
 
Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) 
For the purposes of this thesis, SCP is especially relevant because a majority of the 
Interventions prescribed and Implemented at both sites under investigation fall under 
its heading. As a 5Is Intervention, the SCP approach is predicated on reducing 
opportunity through measures directed at highly specific forms of crime. These seek 
to manage, design, or manipulate the immediate environment in as systematic and 
permanent a way as possible; and make crime more difficult and risk-associated, or 
less rewarding and excusable – as judged by a wide range of offenders (Clarke, 
1997). More succinctly, SCP consists of “four important components” (Roach, 2006, 
p.28): a RAT (Cohen and Felson, 1979) theoretical basis heavily influenced by RCT 
(Cornish and Clarke, 1986); action research methodology; the twenty-five techniques 
of situational prevention (Cornish and Clarke, 2003); together with a canon of 
evidence-based research emanating from practical application in the built 
environment.    
 
Consequently, SCP aims to modify the immediate conditions in which crimes are 
committed or pre-empt crime events, by removing or reducing the opportunities 
(Tilley, 2009). And not just crime events. Clarke and Mayhew (1988) report how the 
domestic change in England and Wales from coal gas (with its inherent painless, 
soporific and poisonous qualities) to methane between 1958 and 1977, reduced the 
number of suicides from 2,637 to 8 – roughly 50 per cent of all suicides to 0.2 per 
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cent. Moreover, this simultaneously led to a reduction in all suicides of some 25 per 
cent during the same timeframe – from 5,298 to 3,944 (Felson and Clarke, 1998). 
Most importantly and on the basis of the previous figures, it can be deduced that a 
quarter of all potential suicide victims (1,300 people) were not displaced into 
choosing another means of taking their lives. Mayhew et al (1976) stress the power 
of opportunity in determining behaviour and describe how for both offenders’ and 
victims’ crime opportunities vary according to age. Clarke (1995) distilled the 
elements contained in his definition of SCP into the ‘Twelve techniques of situational 
crime prevention’. Following the challenges of Wortley (2001) regarding ‘excuse 
removal’ and ‘provocation reduction’, these were subsequently expanded to become 
the ‘Twenty-Five techniques of situational prevention’ (Cornish and Clarke, 2003).  
 
Perhaps the most important facet of SCP is that it is the overarching framework 
under which other crime prevention theories can be located, for example RAT 
(Cohen and Felson, 1979); RCT (Cornish and Clarke, 1986); CPT (Brantingham and 
Brantingham, 2008) and CPTED. On occasion, SCP measures can lead to certain 
types of crime being all but eliminated: ‘safe-cracking’ (due to much stronger safes 
equipped with electronic, time delay locking systems); lock-picking (many locking 
systems incorporate measures to prevent this MO, such as those present in BS 3621 
five lever mortise deadlocks); and obscene phone calls (the advent of the ‘1471’ 
caller identification system) – see Felson and Clarke (1998). However, in the majority 
of instances situational measures only affect cost, effort and reward at the margins. 
This is a reference to the proportion of potential offenders for whom expected 
benefits would have previously exceeded expected costs (risk and effort) but who 
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will not now commit the offence due to the reduced balance of expected benefits to 
costs – Tilley (2009).  
 
However, not only are the twenty-five techniques limited to SCP measures: there are 
other restrictions. For example, they concentrate on the offender’s decision making 
and capacity to be provoked, rather than including the preventer’s perspective. Plus, 
only a single causal mechanism is attributed to each element, which under-estimates 
the inherent preventive effect of such techniques. This may also inadvertently 
suggest there is only one solution to a given problem and indeed, deny the capacity 
to comprehend the extent to which each of the risk-effort reward mechanisms is 
working in a certain situation. 
 
Underpinning theories 
The following sub-chapters include those theories believed to be of most importance 
to this thesis. The first three were described by Felson and Clarke (1998) as ‘the new 
opportunity theories.’ Indeed, the authors went on to detail the ‘ten principles of 
opportunity and crime’ in which they assert that: “…no single cause of crime is 
sufficient to guarantee its occurrence; yet opportunity above all others is necessary 
and therefore has as much or more claim to being a root cause.” (1998, p.1). 
Nevertheless, criticisms such as victim blaming, relative deprivation and a failure to 
address the root causes of crime, whilst considered to provide additional (if not 
alternative) explanations, are not believed to deliver the location specific validity of 
the following theories. Furthermore, there is also the capacity to fall into the trap of 
62 
 
“theoretical fragmentation” (Ekblom, 2011, p.25) together with the ongoing failure to 
integrate these underlying theories.  
   
Routine Activity Theory (RAT) 
Often perceived as the most all-embracing theory (a meta-theory) in crime science, 
RAT (Cohen and Felson, 1979) and has been further developed and extended by 
Felson (2002, 2018). RAT has had a major influence on criminological thinking, 
primarily because it contradicts the dominant assumption that links social problems 
with crime. If there is such a link, what could explain how in the UK (for example) 
between 1921 and 1991 there was an upward curve in the number of crimes 
committed, yet simultaneous to this timeline poverty decreased? The answer 
proposed is that progress (be it socio-economic, technological, and/or political) 
assists in causing crime and creates new crime opportunities. 
 
Cohen and Felson (1979) contend that for a crime take place, three elements must 
coincide. RAT aims to explain the changing supply of the following elements: 
1. Likely offender – sometimes the terms ‘motivated offender’ or ‘potential 
offender’ are used – in that given the opportunity any of us might commit or be 
tempted to commit a crime, whilst even professional/career/travelling criminals 
do not commit crime all the time. However, ‘sufficiently likely offender’ better 
describes this element as it incorporates offender capability/resources as 
stated in the original. 
2. Suitable target – meaning a person, product, building, vehicle, etc. Suitability 
depends on the context e.g. not all criminals are robbers and thus what is 
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suitable for one criminal is not to another. Now regularly described as ‘suitable 
enough target’. 
3. Absence of a Capable Guardian – originally, someone who was able to 
protect the suitable target (the absence of guardianship). The overall title of 
Absence of ‘sufficiently capable guardianship’ is now often used (Reynald, 
2009 – see above). For example, since the 1970s bus services in the UK 
have increasingly operated without conductors – with the expectation that the 
bus driver will perform both roles. However, as the driver will be concentrating 
on their primary role, it can be argued that he or she is not a sufficiently 
capable guardian in respect of activities elsewhere on the bus e.g. graffiti. 
 
The absence or presence of an ‘intimate handler’ and ‘place manager’ (Felson, 
1986, 2018) as a variation on the capable guardian element, has since been added 
to the equation. For example, whilst a bus conductor could be regarded as a capable 
guardian, a disapproving mother, father or other guardian might fulfil the role of 
‘intimate handler’ in respect of the potential actions by their child. RAT was further 
developed by Clarke and Eck (2003) to produce a more advanced PAT – also known 
as the ‘crime triangle’). This has now evolved to become two triangles, the first inside 
the second. The three sides of the first triangle translate as target/victim, offender 
and place. Those of the second, outer triangle as guardian, handler and manager. 
The PAT can be justifiably understood to be closely related to RAT. 
 
At the practical level, RAT suggests it is necessary to influence (remove) any of 
these three elements to prevent the crime from taking place (Andresen and Farrell, 
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2015). Nevertheless, in a practical setting it might be contended it is desirable to 
influence more than one side of the PAT where the aim is to engineer an absolute 
block, rather than a simple reduction in risk. A primary criticism is that as a macro-
level theory of crime and victimization, RAT fails to identify offenders or explain how 
they become motivated (like much of Crime Science). However, in its defence RAT 
is increasingly being applied to micro-level explanations. Jeffery (1993) argued that 
RAT is simply a description of crime, not an explanation. Whereas Akers and Sellars 
(2004) contend that RAT implies victims can be blamed for crimes committed against 
then. Ekblom and Tilley (2000) suggest a further refinement in RAT would include an 
assessment of the potential offender’s capabilities. Furthermore, Ekblom (2011a) 
convincingly observes how there has been little attempt to integrate these different 
theories within CPTED. Indeed, he convincingly asserts that elements like 
surveillance and territoriality: “...have surface simplicity, but in fact confusingly 
overlap” (2011a, p.25). 
 
Rational Choice Theory (RCT) 
Whilst other approaches are concerned with the distant causes of crime (social and 
individual sources of criminality), RCT concentrates on the immediate considerations 
(underlying mechanisms) that cause an offender to decide to commit or not commit a 
crime in a given situation. However, it also includes the first level of decision making 
– deciding whether a crime is something that person is prepared to commit. The 
original authors of RCT, Cornish and Clarke (1986, 2008) suggested a theory of 
action that underpins the choices available to the offender in the commission of 
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crime. These choices take account of the risk, effort and potential reward of their 
criminal conduct. 
 
Tilley (2009, p.110) describes RCT as “weak”, meaning the rationality exhibited by 
the criminal is very limited. The offender does not systematically consider all the 
possible options for his actions, but he does take at least a passing interest in the 
potential risk, effort and reward of his crime. For Cornish and Clarke, such behaviour 
is not driven by external factors and consequently there is the capacity to alter the 
conditions in which the choices are made to: “...produce preventive benefits at the 
margin” (Tilley, 2009, p.110). Tilley describes this as the fraction of potential 
offenders for whom the situation would have previously led to benefits exceeding 
costs (risk and effort) who will not now commit the crime because of the reduced 
balance of benefits to costs. Cornish and Clarke (1986, 2008) contend that the 
commission of a crime will usually involve a series of actions involving decisions 
made at each point along the timeline. Cornish (1994) coined the term ‘crime script’ 
to describe the individual elements of this series of actions taken by the offender 
along the timeline. In the context of this investigation, the crime script is important 
because a dwelling in a high-rise tower block necessitates a particular variant. 
 
For example, in the crime of residential burglary the crime script might be as follows: 
• Preparation: acquire jemmying implements and select co-offenders 
• Entry: enter the neighbourhood 
• Gain access into the tower block (the ‘outer enclosure’)  
• Pre-condition: search for suitable unoccupied properties  
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• Instrumental precondition: identify and select a dwelling  
• Instrumental initiation: disable any alarm system  
• Instrumental actualization: break into the dwelling  
• Doing: stealing items  
• Post-condition: note the address for a repeat attack 
• Exit: walk away from the scene. 
 
Furthermore, he suggests that Interventions at any of these points (disrupting the 
crime script) have the capacity to prevent the crime from taking place, either per se 
or by making the crime more difficult, risky, or by reducing the reward. Pascoe and 
Topping (1997) detail the decision-making processes of the individual burglar. Whilst 
Clarke (1999) emphasises the 'pinch-point' concept to establish the most practical 
and cost-effective stages to intervene along the crime script. And in a related vein, 
invented the ‘CRAVED’ mnemonic (concealable, removable, available, valuable, 
enjoyable, disposable) to describe: “…those target characteristics important when 
contemplating theft and when seeking to conceal or dispose of goods.” (Clarke, 
1999, p.23). Cornish and Clarke (2003) contend that RCT is a constituent part of 
how SCP measures can influence offending behaviour. Thus, it is not so much the 
offender’s choices they want to affect, as his sheer ability to commit the crime. 
Ekblom and Tilley (2000) had previously made this same point, albeit with an 
alternative and deeper analysis of the concept.  
 
In a similar vein, Laycock (1985, 1997) investigated property marking campaigns in 
three Welsh villages and the necessity for (ongoing) publicity. She discovered that 
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reductions in residential burglary were due more to the publicity campaign, rather 
than the actual property marking. In reality, the vulnerability of offenders was not 
increased – but their perceptions made them believe that following the property 
marking campaign they were at far greater risk of being apprehended. This is 
reflected in Clarke’s incorporation of perception into the techniques of SCP. 
Furthermore, there is a cross-reference with the ‘anticipatory benefits’ identified by 
Smith, Clarke and Pease (2002) where perception of risk by the offender is of 
seminal relevance. In essence, anticipatory benefits are noted to take place once a 
crime prevention initiative is announced, but before the measures are put in place. 
The authors contend that potential offenders misjudge the publicity when the 
initiative is announced, and highlight a number of studies where such ‘diffusions of 
benefit’ have been found – rather than ‘crime displacement’: Ross (1973) 
compulsory blood testing causing a reduction in failing to stop after a road traffic 
collision; Poyner et al (1985) reduction in theft of cars; Tilley and Hopkins (1998) 
reductions in non-domestic burglary; Armitage et al (1999) reductions in vehicle and 
property crime.   
 
Crime Pattern Theory (CPT) 
CPT (or the Geometric Theory of Crime) is relevant to this investigation, because of 
the high concentrations of crime across the two sites – and the manner in which they 
subsequently reduced. Environmental Criminology can be traced back 200 years 
(Burgess, 1925). More recently, CPT owes its origins to the work of Brantingham and 
Brantingham (1981, 2014) and aims to explain the geographical distribution of crime 
by examining the routine activities and ‘awareness spaces’ (see below) of offenders. 
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Crime is generally understood to cluster at specific geographical locations according 
to the availability of suitable targets, Sherman et al (1995). In addition, Brantingham 
and Brantingham (1995) contend that certain locations will act as either ‘crime 
generators’ – a magnet to numerous people without prior criminal motivation who 
come across an irresistible crime opportunity, e.g. a parked van with its rear doors 
wide open to reveal an array of high value goods; cargo ship beached during a 
storm). Or ‘crime attractors’ – ones that lure motivated offenders to known crime 
opportunities (e.g. pick-pockets to a horse racecourse meeting). 
 
Lynch (1960) contends that we all appreciate and use our knowledge to navigate 
through our main zones of activity – where we reside, socialise, shop, are educated 
or work. We do this courtesy of our ‘mental maps’ of five spatial elements: paths 
(including roads, transport lines); edges (walls, fencing, hedges); districts 
(neighbourhoods); nodes (focal points such as bus and train stations, shopping 
centres and other hubs); and landmarks (physical structures). In Environmental 
Criminology these zones are described as ‘activity nodes’ and the routes between 
them as ‘travel paths’. Frank et al (2011) describe how the interaction with our own 
environments is predictable. As a rule, this activity space is determined by age, 
gender, residential location (rural, suburban, urban), personal mobility and socio-
economic status. Activity space possesses cross-discipline application and is used in 
criminology, geography, public health and transportation. Furthermore, we each 
possess some knowledge of the places we visit beyond our usual activity space – 
known as ‘awareness space’ (Brown et al, 1977) and subject to a concept known as 
‘distance decay’. This translates as meaning the further away you travel from your 
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activity space, there is a consequent reduction (decay) of knowledge about the more 
distant areas within your awareness space. 
 
CPT contends that higher rates of crime will be experienced at the ‘edges’ of such 
awareness space, where the offender is not recognised (anonymity). For example, 
housing that backs onto interconnecting (‘leaking’) public footpaths, canal towpaths, 
or clusters of shops. Furthermore, crime will more readily occur at certain times and 
locations within offenders’ awareness spaces. Attractiveness, accessibility and crime 
opportunities in an area are reported to influence target selection by offenders 
(Bernasco and Luykx, 2003) and apply to different offender age groups (Groff, 2005). 
In this context, the actual location where offenders reside (see Wiles and Costello, 
2000) combined with knowledge of their activity space, awareness spaces and the 
location of potential targets therein, is highly influential in determining offending 
behaviour – and by extension CPTED preventive interventions. 
 
Activity nodes and travel paths are intrinsic elements of CPT and can be applied to 
our daily activities: when we leave the home, travel to educational establishments or 
work, shop, visit friends or recreation venues. During a normal day our travel paths 
will take us from and to several activity nodes, before most often returning to the first 
– home. Some activity nodes attract large numbers of people (e.g. recreation 
venues) whilst others (like the home) relatively few. The ‘pull’ of such venues is 
further amplified by what are described as ‘spatial temporal transitions’. For example, 
a horse racecourse is likely to generate very little crime on days when no meeting is 
taking place. Similarly, Bromley and Nelson (2002) report, alcohol-related crime in 
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the city of Worcester displayed distinct ‘spatial temporal transitions’. Concentrations 
of such crime or ‘hotspots’ (Sherman, Gartin and Buerger, 1989) peaked around 
midnight. However, once these venues had closed alcohol related crime was 
concentrated in the suburbs and close to residential areas. This research seems 
eminently logical and appears to reflect such behaviour in cities and towns across 
the UK and beyond.  
 
Roads, footpaths, bridleways, cycleways, canal towpaths, etc. constitute the travel 
paths between our activity nodes. Moreover, over time these individual routine travel 
patterns reinforce our activity space and awareness spaces. And what is true for us 
is equally true for offenders. The target selection patterns of serial rapists were 
investigated by Alston (1994) who discovered that initial contact with victims was 
often made close to routine travel paths. Whilst Rengert (2004) reported an 
offender’s journey to crime will consist of three elements: a starting location (usually 
their home); direction of travel; and the distance to the crime location. 
 
Directionality is location specific and usually determined by offenders’ activity nodes 
and travel paths – as described by Brantingham and Brantingham (1981, 2008). The 
contention is that if the offender’s criminal activities take place along a single 
trajectory, directionality is strong. As an example, Rengert and Wasilchick (1985) 
reported that in the instance of burglary, they discovered a strong directional 
preference towards the offender’s place of work – or along the travel paths between 
home and work activity nodes. Once again, this research appears highly credible 
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and because human endeavour will most often minimise effort to maximise reward, it 
is also what might be expected. 
 
Similarly, in their Sheffield-based research, Baldwin and Bottoms (1976) found that 
24 per cent of recorded crime took place inside a half mile radius from the city 
centre. Bottoms (2017) logically contends that this results from routine activities. He 
also suggests that the ‘street segment’ for such crime might include other forms of 
activity area. Weisburd, Groff and Yang (2012) used the street segment as a means 
of analysing high concentrations of crime in Seattle. More specifically, they defined 
such activity areas as including residential streets, arterial streets and 
walkways/stairs connecting streets. This has a potential relevance to this 
investigation with its analysis of crime, fear of crime and ASB in high-rise tower 
blocks (arguably the equivalent of a street segment) most especially when there is 
none, or minimal control over those entering the blocks. Similarly, Bottoms (2017) 
details the re-emergence of offender residences (from its origins in the Chicago 
School of Sociology) to work in parallel with the opportunity tradition in crime science 
to form what he describes as ‘social spatial criminology’ (Bottoms, 2017, p.1). The 
work of Brantingham and Brantingham (1981) in describing how offenders prefer to 
commit crime within their awareness space, provides considerable support for 
Bottoms (2017) contention. Indeed, he states: “That is, in fact, precisely what 
empirical studies have found…” (Bottoms, 2017, p.8). Namely, a disproportionate 
number of offenders’ crimes are committed close to where they live. However, 
Bottoms’ greatest praise is afforded to Weisburd, Groff and Yang’s (2012) attempt to 
incorporate both opportunity and social disorganisation in socio-spatial criminology 
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e.g. how an area with a high level of resident offenders will most often also exhibit a 
high number of offences.     
 
Ekblom (2011a) points to the failure to integrate RCT, RAT and CPT and to describe 
how their constituent parts work together. For example, the relationship between 
opportunity and offending behaviour (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). Similarly, in 
pursuit of the perception and anticipation of crime occurrence: “…under what 
circumstances do perceived effort and perceived risk merely add in their influence in 
discouraging and deterring criminal behaviour, and when do they interact to produce 
unique, emergent patterns?” (Ekblom, 2011a, p.42). Furthermore, Wright and Decker 
(1994) interviewed 105 active burglars in St Louis, Missouri and discovered that 
beyond their rationale of target selection, execution, searching a dwelling and 
disposal of stolen goods: “That the burglars often offend in the own neighborhoods 
also undercuts the value of measures designed to create an illusion of occupancy 
while residents are away from home.” (Wright and Decker, 1994, p.208). Thankfully, 
the illusion of occupancy is of little relevance to the majority of high-rise flats. 
 
Ekblom’s concerns ultimately led to his production of the Conjunction of Criminal 
Opportunity (CCO – Ekblom, 2001, see below). However, he was not alone in 
voicing such questions and seeking the widest spectrum of “Rational Choice Theory-
Plus mechanisms” (Ekblom, 2011a, p,135). For example, Wikstrom (2005) 
articulated the now widely accepted view that self-control and moral choice should 
be included amongst the range of offender motivations. Indeed, Wikstrom’s 
Situational Action Theory (SAT, 2005) is a rival and more traditional theoretical 
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framework to CCO and a competing model on the causes of criminal events – not a 
process model. SAT also includes causal mechanisms and is more specific about 
the different elements and how they interact to cause criminal events, but is a much 
narrower and precise theoretical formulation. Furthermore, CCO covers a broader 
range of ecological and psychological principles – now discussed.  
 
Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity (CCO) 
CCO (Ekblom, 2001) provides a more complex model than the PAT (Clarke and Eck, 
2003) as a framework for causes and Interventions within crime prevention. In this 
context, CCO has additional scope, integration and detail and provides a mechanism 
map of 11 proximal causal pathways of crime, together with 11 counterpart principles 
of Intervention designed to subdue those causes. CCO draws on RAT, RCT and 
CPT. ‘Entities’ include crime targets (inherently criminogenic persons or objects – 
Target enclosures (safes, buildings and gated compounds situated in a wider 
environment – shopping mall, park, housing estate, etc). This is an important 
distinction, because in (for example) the crime of residential burglary, Ekblom is 
differentiating the dwelling that is being broken into (the target enclosure) from that 
which is stolen e.g. cash or jewellery. However, an early decision was made not to 
use CCO in this investigation because in combination with the 5Is it might appear too 
author specific. 
 
Implementation of CPTED: 
Role of the Police DOCO 
Historically, and as Newman (1972 – an architect by profession) observes, architects 
paid relatively little attention to the security aspects of the buildings they designed. 
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Indeed, and through much repeated personal witness as a DOCO over three 
decades, architects continue to receive minimal if any security training during their 
degree courses and subsequent professional development. This may provide an 
explanation (at least in part), why certain types of building were increasingly targeted 
for burglary during the 1960s, 70s and 80s – dwellings in particular (Mawby, 2001). 
Nevertheless, the physical security of the individual home and thereby, its capacity to 
provide a safe environment free of concerns for the occupants relating to crime, fear 
of crime and ASB, lies at the core of this thesis.  
    
In the United Kingdom (UK), for more than half a century the police have played a 
major role in SCP Interventions and their Implementation – Ekblom’s (2011a) second 
and third ‘Is’. When first established in the mid-1960s, these Crime Prevention 
Officers (CPOs) were largely occupied with making recommendations in respect of 
simple target hardening measures e.g. improved quality door locks, window locks, 
bolts, door chains, etc. However, two decades later their remit had expanded (and 
roles diverged) to embrace the full range of CPTED Interventions. With the launch of 
SBD in 1989, a specialist function was to encourage the house-building industry to 
seek and attain the SBD award. Originally knowns as ALOs or CPDAs (Crime 
Prevention Design Advisers), after a series of name changes, those who deliver this 
specialist crime prevention service are now known as DOCOs throughout most UK 
police forces. In terms of 5Is, DOCOs can be seen as agents who deliver – courtesy 
of the SBD delivery mechanism and POP (see below) the element of Intelligence (to 
architects, developers, planners, etc.) in order to encourage Intervention, 




Police sponsored situational crime prevention initiatives owe their ancestry to the 
Willink Royal Commission on the Police (1962), the Police Act, 1964 and the Cornish 
Committee on the Prevention and Detection of Crime, (Home Office,1965). The latter 
recommended that each police force appoint a Force Crime Prevention Officer 
(FCPO) of inspector or chief inspector rank. Two years later the Home Office 
Standing Committee on Crime Prevention was established, with a remit to devise 
new strategies for delivery of crime prevention by not just the police service, but by 
society as a whole. However, as the ‘Prevention of Crime’ was a core principle 
devised in 1829 by one of the first two joint Commissioners of the Metropolitan 
Police, Sir Richard Mayne (Reith, 1956), it might be presumed (although evidence 
has not been discovered) that ad hoc advice in relation to (for example) the provision 
of improved quality key-operated locks, stronger doors, safes and bars on windows 
was being provided by police officers from the inception of their role. 
 
Another element of the Standing Committee on Crime Prevention was the 
establishment of the Home Office Crime Prevention Centre. This was located at 
Staffordshire Police Headquarters in 1974 – but subsequently moved to Easingwold 
in 1996 and was closed in 2004 when the National Police Improvement Agency 
assumed responsibility for all police training. Training is now delivered by the Police 
Crime Prevention Academy (PCPA), a division of Police Crime Prevention Initiatives 
and the owners of SBD. FCPOs met nationally on a bi-monthly basis (personal 
witness) until the late 1990s. According to one former FCPO (interviewed in 2018), 
during the mid-1980s they were influenced by the seminal works of Jacobs (1961), 
Jeffery (1971) and Newman (1972) in embracing CPTED. As a result, these FCPOs 
recommended the creation of a new specialist role of ALO – which this author 
76 
 
occupied between 1992-2011). From the outset, the Metropolitan Police (whose 
crime prevention training was delivered separate to the rest of policing in England 
and Wales at Hendon Police College) chose the different CPDA title. 
 
When these roles were first established in the mid-1980s, the individuals performing 
this CPTED function were almost all serving police officers who had attended both 
the Crime Prevention/Reduction and Architectural Liaison/Designing Out Crime 
courses – a career progression. The one exception was Greater Manchester Police 
who have always employed unsworn police staff recruited from the professions of 
the built environment for this purpose (Monchuk, 2011). However, following the 
publication of Home Office Circular 114/83 (1983) with its instruction to release 
police officers from roles where the power of arrest was not required (Garland, 
1996); and the option to recruit lower paid police staff (Newburn, 2003; HMIC, 2004), 
the number of serving police officers in the discipline has reduced each year. Indeed, 
this author can testify that when he entered the discipline in 1992 all 24 members of 
his training course at the Home Office Crime Prevention Centre in Stafford were 
exclusively white male officers nearing the end of their service (Weatheritt, 1986). 
Only in 2020 was the gender (and ethnicity) imbalance reversed with eight of the 12 
DOCO course members women, four men and two of the number from BAME 
backgrounds. 
 
This rapidly advancing change can be identified in the gender makeup of those 
DOCOs and Crime Reduction Officers (CROs) attending the 2020 annual Atlas 
Training Event (for continuing professional development). Amongst these, 109 (61%) 
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were men and 69 (39%) women. However, the evolution to police staff delivering the 
DOCO function may present difficulties in those circumstances where a police 
officer’s experience adds credibility to their decision-making (Schneider and Kitchen, 
2007). Compare this to Minton (2009) who contends there is no place for the police 
in the design and development process, especially when it results in the fortification 
of the built environment. However, no evidence is provided in support of this 
statement – one that contradicts the overall remit of DOCOs to reduce both crime 
and the fear of crime which a fortress-like environment would compromise.  
 
At the turn of the millennium, it was generally believed within the police crime 
prevention discipline that there were approximately 500 DOCOs practising, or at 
least trained and still employed by the police services of the UK. Wootton et al 
(2009) suggested that by 2009 the total number for England and Wales was 347.  
However, within months that figure had fallen to 305 (University of Salford and 
University of Huddersfield, 2009) which also reported 21 per cent of all police forces 
had 2 or fewer DOCOs in post. Armitage (2016) concluded the total number had 
contracted to 137 – with a threat to the sustainability of Implementation and 
Involvement at the local level, in terms of the provision of CPTED advice and 
recommended Interventions. However, as of autumn 2020 this investigation has 
established that following the creation of the PCPA there are now 199 DOCOs 
working across the UK – 172 with a responsibility in respect of residential premises.  
 
Following a recommendation by the police Crime Prevention Design Group (CPDG, 
2016), Stephen Watson, Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police and National 
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Police Chiefs’ Council lead on crime prevention, wrote to his fellow chief constables 
across the UK asking that for reasons of consistency, they use the descriptive name 
DOCO. This has now overwhelmingly taken place. However, in Northern Ireland they 
are still known as CPDAs and in Greater Manchester Police the aforementioned 
Design for Security Consultants. Across the UK more than 50 per cent of those 
delivering the DOCO function are now police staff, rather than police officers).  
 
According to Monchuk, Pease and Armitage (2018) the DOCOs role is to: 
• Deliver CPTED advice (Intelligence) to planners 
• Review planning applications and assess the extent to which a development 
may provide opportunities for crime and disorder and how these might be 
eliminated in the plan 
• Comment on plans after their submission to the Local Planning Authority 
(LPA) and recommend that an application be approved, amended or refused 
(Intelligence, Intervention, Implementation and Involvement) 
• Liaise with architects and other designers at the concept stage in order that 
CPTED measures are incorporated (Intervention, Implementation and 
Involvement). 
 
Such concept stage consultation is especially rare and DOCOs are most often made 
aware of the intended development after the planning application is submitted to the 
LPA (Wootton et al 2009; Armitage, 2011). Early-stage consultation has the capacity 
to avoid later objections by the DOCO based on crime issues (Colquhoun, 2004; 
Schneider and Kitchen, 2007; Wootton et al, 2009). Furthermore, the later and 
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greater the number of changes specified by the DOCO, the greater the expense for 
the developer (Monchuk, 2011), which might otherwise be expected to act as an 
incentive for early-stage engagement by the applicant. 
 
Secured by Design (SBD) 
One of the key responsibilities of the DOCO is delivery of the SBD award scheme 
Indeed, the necessity for a developer to seek if not attain the SBD award e.g. by the 
former Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) mandate, has increasingly been the 
reason for consultation with the DOCO – and may help to explain the repeated late 
stage engagement by applicants. It remains the case that outside the GMP force 
area, the SBD service is delivered free of any additional financial charge made by 
the police force in whose area the development is located (Armitage, 2013). An 
application (together with the relevant plans) is made by the architect or developer 
for the SBD Award. Following analysis by the DOCO of the relevant crime detail for 
the location in question, together with examination of the submitted plans 
(Intelligence and Involvement), DOC amendments (Intervention) are agreed with the 
applicant. The development is then built, towards the end of which process a final 
site inspection is conducted (Involvement and Implementation). Any remedial 
elements are then corrected and providing these requirements are met, the SBD 
award certificate is conferred. 
 
A similar process is followed in Greater Manchester, but with two major differences.  
First, following negotiations with all ten LAs in their force area, a financial levy 
(calculated on the number of dwellings and/or size in terms of square metres 
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occupied by the proposed development) is placed on each SBD application – and 
collected on their behalf by the relevant LA. Second, prior to construction the local 
DOCO (known as a Design for Security Consultant) produces a ‘crime impact 
statement’ (Intelligence, Involvement and Implementation) for the project concerned 
(Monchuk, 2011; Armitage, 2013). In theory (if not always in practice) delivery of the 
SBD award will follow the ‘preventive process’ (Ekblom, 1988). Based on ‘action 
research’ or ‘operational research’ procedures first applied in the crime field by 
Wilkins (1997), this has since been developed through POP (Goldstein 1979, 1990) 
and the problem-solving approach devised by Eck and Spelman (1987).  
 
The SBD award system is a UK police-delivered crime prevention initiative, one that 
rewards (incentivises) developers who build to an agreed minimum standard of 
CPTED based security measures (set out in the relevant design guide e.g. Homes, 
Commercial, New Schools, Hospitals) with an SBD award certificate. The SBD 
service is delivered by the aforementioned DOCO who has geographical 
responsibility (usually courtesy of the police force that employs them) for the location 
in which the development is to be built. More succinctly: “Secured by Design is a UK 
based award scheme... which aims to encourage the building industry to design out 
crime at the planning stage” (Armitage, 2013, p.38). Devised during 1988 and 
originally launched in just the south-east region of England the following year, by 
1992 SBD had been rolled out across the whole of the UK, including the Channel 
Islands and Isle of Man. Three decades later, SBD is owned by all the UK police 




The original publicity material for the SBD award describes how it had been created 
by: “...Senior Crime Prevention Officers...” and ”The Association of Chief Police 
Officers and the Home Office Crime Prevention Unit are fully backing the campaign.” 
(SBD, The Concept, 1989, p.2). Within that original marketing material, both the 
illustrations (detached houses) and the text indicate the intended audience of this 
Intervention was primarily the private, for sale house-building industry. Similar 
nuances can be identified on the front cover of ‘Safer by Design – CPTED’ in New 
South Wales (2001); and repeatedly within ‘Designing Out Crime, A Practical Guide’ 
(Strathclyde Police, 1994). Nevertheless, from the beginning it was refurbishment of 
existing LA owned housing stock and housing association (HA) new build projects by 
such residential social landlords (RSLs) that dominated the award process for UK 
urban police force DOCOs (Involvement and Implementation, personal witness). It 
appears that only during the past decade have private, for sale house builders 
become actively involved in achieving the SBD award for their developments – often 
because the physical security standards required have merged with those of SBD 
and the economic costs reduced dramatically, see Davis Langdon (2006, 2010); 
Teedon et al. (2010); Pease and Gill (2011) below. 
 
The original SBD design guidance for new homes (1989) was joined by SBD 
Commercial (1992) and almost simultaneously, SBD Refurbishment (1992). The 
latter was published with application to existing residential developments (all but 
exclusively owned by LA housing departments and HAs) that were being refurbished 
as part of a process to extend their original lifespan. SBD Refurbishment was a 
short, (and therefore limited) five pages document which included the sub-headings 
Estate Design; Physical Security; Flats; Security Lighting. Intruder Alarms and 
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Smoke Detectors; and Major refurbishments. Physical Security repeated the 
specification contained in New Homes Security Scheme (1989). However, it also 
contained the following qualifications:      
• The main entrance to flats should be provided with an entry-phone system 
plus electrical release of the lock 
• The front doors to individual flats to be to the same specification as for front 
doors, with such internal variation as may be required by the Fire Regulations. 
(SBD Refurbishment, 1992, p.2)      
 
Indeed, the RSLs are credited with being supporters of SBD since its inception – a 
situation that predates the HAs being mandated to seek the award by the then 
Housing Corporation (Implementation and Involvement). However, it could be argued 
that financial incentives for the adoption of SBD can be identified in the Housing 
Corporation’s Design and Quality Standards (2007) and English Partnerships’ 
Quality Standards (2007), where all new homes requiring Social Housing Grants had 
to adhere to the levels of security included in the Core Performance Standards and 
Recommendations Annex. One contention that supports the necessity for such 
incentivisation is that unlike fire regulations, there is no legal sanction for a failure to 
incorporate crime prevention measures. Changing behaviour to prevent crime: an 
incentive-based approach (Home Office, 2006) details numerous incentivisation 
themes (Intervention and Impact).  
 
A further explanation for this dichotomy between the private and public sectors, 
might be that the RSLs have a wider duty of care for their tenants and a vested 
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interest in the sustainability of their housing stock (currently under scrutiny in the 
wake of the Grenfell Tower fire disaster of June 2017). Unlike the private for sale 
housebuilders, they are responsible for the wider sustainability/maintenance 
environment of their individual projects/properties in the short, medium and long 
term. Furthermore, and as Armitage and Everson (2003) suggest, developers of 
private for sale housing are concerned that mention of security will ‘put people off’, 
because potential buyers will worry that such housing is located in a high crime area. 
 
The success (Impact) of SBD in terms of its adoption by LA housing departments 
(Involvement) was immediate. Indeed, by the end of 1991 every police service in 
England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man 
had at least one DOCO in post with demand for SBD advice and certification for the 
award the greatest motivation. This demand most often originated from within the 
LAs, especially their housing departments. Faced with finite resources and 
increasing maintenance costs, it appears this part of local government was highly 
receptive to a police-managed initiative (Intervention, Involvement and 
Implementation) that promised (and subsequently delivered, Impact) benefits in 
terms of reduced crime, less damage and by extension, higher occupancy rates – 
fewer ‘voids’ (empty dwellings – a more specific Impact). 
 
PCPI demands that various types of building design (most especially dwellings) will 
meet specified minimum standards of physical security, surveillance and access/ 
egress (Cozens, Pascoe and Hillier, 2004; Armitage, 2013). For housing these are 
currently set out in SBD – Homes 2019. A number of different standards listed in the 
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design guide for external doors and windows (including all door furniture and attack 
resistant glass), together with further requirements such as security lighting, fencing, 
gates and for multi-occupancy dwellings, mail delivery and electronic door entry 
systems. To ensure such products meet the security standards listed, SBD insists 
they are examined to far more exacting standards (e.g. in delaying an offender’s 
access into a building) at independent testing houses such as the Building Research 
Establishment (BRE), Loss Prevention Board and Warrington Research 
Laboratories. Only then are they allowed to use the marketing logo ‘Police Preferred 
Specification’.     
 
SBD commissioned the construction consultants, Davis Langdon, to investigate the 
additional capital costs of building a home to SBD standards (Intelligence). For the 
report, Securing the Nation (2006), Davis Langdon estimated these at between 
£480-£740, depending upon the specific type of dwelling.  However, four years later 
they reduced these estimates to between £70 and £240 per dwelling, primarily due 
to the falling costs of security hardware (Davis Langdon, 2010). More specifically, a 
two-bedroom ground floor apartment was estimated as the most expensive to secure 
at £240. A four-bedroom detached house, £200. Three-bedroom semi-detached 
house or two-bedroom terrace house, £170. Whilst a two-bedroom upper floor 
apartment, £70. These figures represented the difference to install security products 
(most especially main entrance doors that meet one of the standards specified and 




Teedon et al. (2010) and Pease and Gill (2011) also investigated the building costs 
of incorporating SBD requirements and collectively these studies demonstrate a 
narrowing over time in the difference between ordinary security measures and those 
required by SBD (costs of Implementation). This reduction in the financial cost of 
SBD is now well documented. Furthermore, a number of building site managers 
have stated (personal witness) that because it is both an SBD and Building 
Regulations (2015) requirement to install PAS 24 (or other standards detailed in SBD 
– Homes 2019) main entrance doors and windows for the 30% of social housing 
often required in any medium or larger housing development, it is as cost-effective to 
specify the same for the 70% that are private, for sale dwellings. Nevertheless, whilst 
the target hardening measures and technological innovations (most especially 
security lighting and CCTV) are emblematic of this apparent convergence of costs 
between SBD and non-SBD security measures, the environmental elements of 
CPTED are most often planning considerations and usually far more difficult to 
influence (Implementation). 
 
Following the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) Housing 
Standards Review (2015) and the example of Scotland, in 2015 door and window 
security were incorporated into the England Building Regulations. However, whilst in 
Scotland and Wales SBD remains a mandatory requirement for all social housing, in 
England the then HCA (since 1 January 2018, Homes England) abandoned such a 




There now exist some six separate pieces of independent research that in general 
terms, attest to the effectiveness of SBD in preventing, or at the very least 
considerably reducing the risk of crime, ASB and the fear of crime: Brown, 1999; 
Pascoe, 1999; Armitage, 1999; Teedon and Reid; (2009); Armitage and Monchuk 
(2009); Jones et al (2016). See Table 1 below. Following the publication of the first 
five evaluations (Intelligence and Impact), Armitage concluded: “...SBD confers a 
crime reduction advantage.” (Armitage, 2013 p.43). Naturally, the evaluation 
methodology differed significantly across all six studies. 
 
Brown (1999) 
In July 1993, SBD became a requirement of Tai Cymru (the then Welsh Office) for 
grant aid in respect of social housing development within the principality. Brown 
(1999) reports how four years later Tai Cymru was requesting evidence as to how 
their adoption of SBD standards was leading to reductions in crime. This was the 
motivation for Brown (1999) to conduct a study of 9,173 homes (1,682 SBD HA 
dwellings and 7,491 non-SBD) in the Gwent Police area of South Wales, for the two-
year period 1 April 1996 – 31 March 1998. He reported a 40 per cent reduction in 
burglary and vehicle crime for the SBD projects, whilst instances of criminal damage 
contracted by a quarter: SBD properties: “...suffered a burglary and vehicle crime 
rate of at least a third of that suffered by non-SBD properties and two thirds the rate 
of criminal damage” (Brown, 1999, p.58). 
 
This quantitative research analysis was conducted by using a series of automated 
and manual search programs of HA properties with recorded crime (Brown, 1999, 
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p.23). This disclosed 91,240 crimes, 41,788 of which were found to be those of 
burglary, vehicle crime and criminal damage. The results were then triangulated with 
those of semi-structured interviews from focus groups and compared with other, 
parallel research being undertaken by the BRE. Set against the numbers of SBD and 
non-SBD dwellings, this disclosed a higher incidence of burglary per thousand 
dwellings in seven out of eight forms of MO: entry through door; breaking glass; 
forced or springing locks; insecure windows; walk in burglary; duplicate key; other 
methods. The one exception was ‘bogus callers’ – which it could be argued is a 
specialist form of burglary unlikely to be prevented by physical security target 
hardening measures like stronger doors and windows – although communal 
entrance doors do appear to be effective by denying such offenders access to the 
building as a whole.  
 
However, where surveillance was limited there was also some evidence of temporal 
displacement – from daylight to night-time hours. This evaluation was based on 
police-recorded crime figures, structured interviews with tenants, architects, HA 
managers and police officers. Results from the qualitative interviews mirrored the 
quantitative analysis, indicating that fear of crime and quality of life were higher on 
the SBD estates. 
 
Pascoe (1999) 
On behalf of the BRE, Pascoe (1999) investigated approximately 5,000 dwellings on 
ten housing estates that had been either built or refurbished to SBD standards. His 
research incorporated surveys and focus groups with local residents, and disclosed 
88 
 
both a perceived and real (confirmed by the crime statistics) crime reduction 
advantage, attributable to the Impact of SBD. More specifically, Pascoe concluded 
and recommended that SBD could be enhanced by: concentrating on improving 
street lighting; controlling and reducing access through streets and making streets 
appear more private; reviewing the criteria for the physical quality and fitting of target 
hardening measures and their performance over time; and controlling/developing 
facilities for youth and advising on the housing management of tenants including the 
vetting of prospective tenants and eviction of anti-social/criminal tenants. 
 
Armitage (1999)  
Armitage’s (1999) mixed methodology evaluation (Impact) of SBD housing estates in 
the West Yorkshire Police area concluded that: “…total crime fell by 55 per cent 
relative to the pre-SBD period.” (Armitage, 2013 p.45). This included reductions of 
50% in burglary and 25 per cent in car crime, together with no displacement of crime. 
Her research also evidenced considerable reductions in the fear of crime and much 
increased community awareness on those same SBD estates. The evaluation 
included: a broad-based analysis; a more detailed analysis; and a residents’ survey 
– all of which involved housing built or refurbished prior to 1998. The broad-based 
analysis compared crime and disorder on 25 SBD estates to 25 non-SBD estates. 
The crime comparison went back to when the SBD award was conferred for new 





The broad-based analysis assessed 1558 SBD dwellings and 1453 non-SBD 
dwellings. Dividing the crime rates by the number of dwellings, revealed a crime rate 
of 0.55 per dwelling on the SBD estates and 0.62 on the non-SBD estates.  
However, this difference between crime rates on SBD as compared to non-SBD 
estates was “...not statistically significant at the level of 0.05, 5% (0.444).” (Armitage, 
1999, p.38). In the more detailed analysis, 25 SBD estates and 25 non-SBD estates 
were compared. These were ordered as matched pairs on the basis of housing age, 
location, HA-owned and environmental/physical characteristics. The mean rate of 
crime per dwelling on the SBD estates was 0.63 (403 offences divided by 660 
properties). Whilst on the non-SBD estates the figure was 1.19 (612 offences divided 
by 522 households). The crime rate was weighted according to the number of 
properties on each estate and by utilising ANOVA (Analysis of variance between 
means – Cox, 2006). This revealed that crime levels per dwelling for the SBD 
sample were far lower than the non-SBD sample and that this difference was: 
“...strongly statistically significant at the level of 0.05, 5% (0.008).” (Armitage, 1999, 
p.13). 
 
Of the 36 crime categories, only six registered higher instances of crime on the SBD 
as compared to the non-SBD estates. And most significantly, residential burglary on 
the SBD estates measured 0.16 offences per dwelling, compared to a figure of 0.35 
(more than twice as high) on the non-SBD estates. Similar differences were 
disclosed for the offences of attempt burglary, theft of motor vehicle, theft and 
attempt theft from motor vehicle and theft other (non-specific target thefts). For the 
residents’ survey, 10 addresses from each of the 25 SBD and 25 non-SBD estates 
were visited, providing a potential 500 responses. This produced an average 
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response rate of 47% consisting of 45% from SBD properties and 55% non-SBD.  
Most importantly, the residents’ survey aimed to assess the extent to which: “...the 
actual and perceived levels of crime and disorder differed from non-SBD 
respondents and the general population as a whole (as revealed by the British Crime 
Survey” (Armitage, 1999, p.13).   
 
It therefore provided a counter-balance to the police provided crime data. Indeed, 
whilst the 1996 British Crime Survey (BCS) disclosed that 6.3% of respondents had 
been burgled in the previous year, the Armitage evaluation revealed that 2.9% of 
SBD respondents (less than half the national average) and 8.4% of non-SBD 
respondents (33% higher than the national average) had been burgled during the 
same time period. This suggests the SBD residents were experiencing burglary at 
less than half the rate of the BCS residents. Moreover, the non-SBD residents were 
also experiencing burglary almost three times higher than the SBD respondents. 
However, whilst 1.2% of BCS respondents had been burgled more than once within 
the previous year, 1.9% of SBD respondents and 1.5% of non-SBD had been 
burgled more than once during the previous 12 months. These figures point to higher 
rates of repeat victimisation on particular estates and at particular addresses. And 
from a 5Is perspective, this study (Impact) produces Intelligence that could 
significantly influence future Intervention, Implementation and Involvement. 
 
Teedon and Reid (2009) 
The authors conducted a before-after, action comparison design study (Impact) 
regarding the effectiveness of SBD endorsed doors and windows, on Glasgow HA 
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developments of the same socio-demographic category. This reduction of the 
analytical scope to a mere two design features, appears somewhat limiting – even if 
entry via doors and windows is generally understood to constitute the overwhelming 
instances of the means of access by burglars. However, these are also the sole two 
elements incorporated within the separate Scotland, Wales and England building 
regulations.  
 
By default, Teedon and Reid (2009) and Teedon et al (2010) do not include all the 
other physical security, technological innovation and environmental elements 
CPTED measures. Nor does it take account of other variables e.g. changing 
demographics, residents’ employment, or how the activities of a single prolific burglar 
can seriously skew the resulting statistics – thereby producing limited Intelligence. 
Nevertheless, by using 2028 dwellings in the SBD sample (and 14,185 non-SBD 
properties) the study disclosed a reduction in total housebreaking (the Scottish title 
for residential burglary) crime of some 61 per cent for the SBD properties, compared 
to a 17 per cent reduction in the control area. Attempted housebreaking with intent 
fell by 80 per cent; housebreaking with intent to steal by 50 per cent and theft by 
housebreaking by 55 per cent. Collectively, SBD can be judged to have delivered a 
statistically significant reduction in housebreaking. Furthermore, there was also a 
reported indication of a ‘diffusion of benefits’ to the non-SBD sample dwellings. This 
Impact study therefore produced Intelligence that is highly relevant in terms of the 
forms of Intervention, Implementation and Involvement necessary at future 




Armitage and Monchuk (2009) 
For their 2009 investigation, Armitage and Monchuk returned to the earlier West 
Yorkshire research to repeat and extend the previous investigation – taking into 
consideration the enhanced security requirements now demanded by SBD as it in 
turn had evolved – a long-term Impact study. Apart from the provision of recorded 
crime data (Intelligence), this research was conducted independently of West 
Yorkshire Police. Moreover, it disclosed even greater long-term reductions in 
recorded crime (on occasion as high as 60 per cent) and far reduced fear of crime – 
when compared to both the force area and non-SBD estates. Their study: 
            ...included an analysis of police recorded crime, comparing a sample     
            of SBD developments built in 2006/2007 (16 developments) with, a.  
            the rest of West Yorkshire, b. non-SBD properties on the same street  
            and c. non-SBD matched pairs which were developments located as  
            close as possible to the SBD development. (Armitage and Monchuk,  
            2009, p.73). 
 
The research methodology involved three separate samples of police-recorded crime 
data. The first compared figures for 342 properties on the 16 SBD developments with 
crime rates for the whole of West Yorkshire during the period August 2007 to July 
2008. The second, SBD and non-SBD properties located on the same street – 
possibly the result of national planning policy mandating a mixture of for sale and 
social housing. This produced a sample of 101 SBD properties and 354 non-SBD 
properties. Whilst the third sample compared crime rates on the original 16 SBD 
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developments as ‘matched pairs’ with properties on 16 nearby non-SBD 
developments. This last element aimed to replicate, as far as was practicable, the 
matched pairs used in the evaluation by Armitage (1999). 
 
In total, figures for eight types of recorded crime category were analysed: assault, 
criminal damage, theft, burglary other (non-residential), theft of motor vehicle 
(including TWOC – taking without owner’s consent and commonly known as ‘joy 
riding’), burglary dwelling, theft from motor vehicle and ‘other’ crime. In addition, the 
research included visual audits (conducted by two Huddersfield University field-
workers) measuring visible signs of crime and disorder (categorised under the 
headings of people, buildings, signs of neglect, general environmental features and 
control signals) on all 16 SBD and 16 non-SBD developments. Scores were 
recorded for each matched pair and for both the SBD and non-SBD samples. Once 
again, the results were “extremely positive” (Armitage and Monchuk, 2009, p.77).   
 
Three quarters of SBD developments scored more positively (in respect of visual 
signs of disorder such as litter, graffiti and vandalism) in the matched pairs analysis; 
whilst the scoring for the 16 SBD developments indicated lower signs of visual 
disorder for this sample. Residents’ surveys of 342 SBD and 253 non-SBD residents 
(595 in total and taken from the 32 matched pairs) were also conducted. Described 
as ‘self-reported crime’ and using a template based on the BCS and that used during 
the 1999 research, this was hand-delivered to residents on both the 16 SBD and 16 
non-SBD matched pair estates, where they were asked to comment on their 




Amongst the findings, perhaps the most emphatic was how the burglary rate was 
74.5 per cent higher on the non-SBD estates. (2009, p.6). Furthermore, 3 per cent of 
SBD respondents had been the victim of domestic burglary during the previous 12 
months, compared to 6 per cent of non-SBD respondents. However, in the Armitage 
(1999) study a decade previously, the figures had been 3 per cent SBD and 14 per 
cent non-SBD. Similar positive responses for SBD over non-SBD responses were 
generally recorded for ‘feelings of safety’ and ‘worry about crime and disorder’. 
Consequently, the Armitage and Monchuk (2009) investigation is the most rigorous 
and long term of the studies concerning the effectiveness of SBD and by extension, 
its Impact can be judged to have produced Intelligence of the greatest validity in 
terms of the lessons learned for future Intervention, Implementation and Involvement 
in both new build and refurbishment of all forms of housing. It should also be noted 
that the studies of Armitage (1999) and Armitage and Monchuk (2009) were found to 
be particularly relevant to this thesis and of a higher methodological rigour than the 
other studies considered. This assists in explaining the extended detail afforded to 
this study compared to the others as part of this investigation. 
 
Jones et al (2016) 
The two-year Impact study conducted by Jones et al (2016) investigated the effects 
of installing new doors and windows manufactured to SBD standards at RSL projects 
in Nottingham. This was delivered as part of Nottingham’s ‘Secure, Warm, Modern’ 
scheme and a constituent part of the ‘Decent Homes’ programme. Results showed 
that on the Bells Lane and Broxtowe estates, residential burglaries fell by 42%, 
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compared to a 21% reduction across the rest of the city where no secure doors and 
windows were installed. Following installation, Nottingham City Homes recorded 62 
fewer burglaries per year, whereas the city average was only 33 fewer burglaries per 
annum. Prior to the work commencing, a third of survey respondents said they felt 
unsafe when alone in their home at night. Whilst after completion no one expressed 
such concerns. Jones et al (2016) therefore produced Intelligence that echoed the 
findings of Teedon and Reid (2009) with an Intervention involving the target 
hardening of doors and windows. However, they both fall methodologically short of 
the gold standard set by the research of Armitage (1999); and Armitage and 
Monchuk (2009).        
 
More recently, Sidebottom, Armitage and Thomson (2017) undertook a systematic 
review of all the published research studies relating to the effectiveness of SBD. Of 
the 300 studies considered, only 27 were judged eligible for consideration in terms of 
the evidence each presented and of these just seven included quantitative data. Of 
the seven, most concentrate on social housing and suffer from considering the 
results over a very short time period – certainly true of the above, with the exception 
of Armitage (1999) and Armitage and Monchuk (2009) – as previously described. 
 
Turning to criticism of SBD, a repeated observation is that it is a design solution 
which by default is creating a ‘fortress society’ (Whattam, 2011; Minton, 2009). Nor is 
this simply a criticism of the architecture involved. Rather, it also implies that the 
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Table 1: Research studies of SBD compared 
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higher levels of physical security that will result in an uglier and more fortress like 
appearance. However, as one of the core aims of SBD is to reduce the fear of crime, 
this accusation of building a fortress seems either misplaced, or SBD is being 
‘irrational’ – its actions inconsistent with its goals.Indeed, throughout its more than 
three decades existence, SBD’s promotional material and design guides indicate that 
it has never recommended the use of barbed wire, razor tape, high-pitched 
screeching alarms, gated communities, or a rash of visually (and audibly) fortress 
like Interventions. Whereas, security exhibitions bristle with such technology.   
 
Minton and Aked (2012) assert that SBD standards have spread throughout the built 
environment and ‘offered: “…a solution to the problem of crime and fear of crime in 
poor places which did not have to deal with the more complex causes of poverty” 
(Minton and Aked, 2012, p.16). However, Clarke (2012), citing the tension between 
mainstream criminology and crime science, contends that SCP is about cutting the 
Gordian knot – establishing that which works and is deliverable in a practical 
environment. Furthermore, these are as much cultural/value-based positions whose 
conflict cannot be resolved by a purely academic approach, although research and 
attention to the widest range of costs and benefits might go some way towards 
clarifying the dispute – and thereby protecting residents/tenants.  
  
Armitage (2013) describes how SBD has now been emulated in both The 
Netherlands and Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. She describes how the Dutch 
version is less prescriptive than in the UK. Yet it demands reassessment at least 
every ten years. This may avoid perhaps the most powerful criticisms of UK SBD: 
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post award deterioration and the failure to maintain the standards that were 
necessary to achieve the original award. A useful comparison here might be with that 
of the Safer Parking ‘Park Mark’ Award operated by PCPI and the British Parking 
Association. Representatives from both organisations (DOCOs and Development 
Managers) conduct annual inspections of those car parks and bus stations signed up 
to the scheme and their recommendations must be complied with for the award to 
remain valid. Moreover, it is the car park operators who pay for this service.  
 
Other criticisms relate to the capacity of SBD to stifle creativity and ‘designing down’ 
to those specific SBD security measures. Ekblom (1997) details the apparent ‘arms 
race’ between crime and crime prevention methodology. For example, what was 
historically a ‘smash and grab’ robbery committed on foot, has developed (in the 
wake of armoured glass, roller shutters and intruder alarms being installed) into the 
‘ram raid’ using at least one motor vehicle to execute the attack (sometimes with a 
second ‘getaway car’); and ‘car key burglary’. where the advent of vehicle alarms 
and immobilisers means that those intent on stealing the motor vehicle break into the 
house (often at night) in order to steal car keys and then the vehicle. Similarly, 
Ekblom (2012) advocates the encouragement of variety, adaptability, design 
freedom, performance standards, etc. Such ideas are especially profound where the 
aim is to prevent repeat MO across a range of dwellings, where the same failing door 
and window systems have been installed; the ongoing problem with protruding euro-
cylinder door locks; or with a particular make and model of motor car where a design 




There is also the issue of transferring UK attitudes to crime and ASB (and delivered 
in SBD mandatory requirements), to countries holding a different system of beliefs 
and responses. For example, in the UK and North America, graffiti is often perceived 
as the crime of criminal damage. Whereas, in The Netherlands and much of 
mainland Western Europe it is more often appreciated (or at least tolerated) as street 
art (Hushen, 2008). 
 
Problem Oriented Policing/Partnerships (POP) 
It is generally accepted that partnership working (known amongst the health 
professions as collaborative working) will deliver improved and more sustainable 
results across a whole field of human endeavour. The growth of new professions, 
institutions and further specialisms has led to cross-discipline failures of 
communication that highlighted the necessity for such partnership working. Indeed, 
over recent decades this has been compounded by high profile instances of 
ineffective partnership working – especially issues of child safety amongst the 
'caring' professions. 
 
Compare this to SBD – perhaps the best evidenced example of POP (in terms of 
effectiveness), which for more than three decades has utilised partnership working to 
improve the safety and security of buildings, by encouraging architects, builders, 
developers, planners and RSLs to incorporate CPTED measures through its police 
led award scheme – possibly the most successful delivery mechanism for POP in the 
UK (if not the world) and demonstrating all 5Is working together: Intelligence, 




SBD might be more appropriately described as one of problem anticipation, rather 
than reacting to a revealed crime pattern through remedial design modification. 
Nevertheless, CPTED and SBD have been used increasingly in recent decades from 
amongst a canon of Interventions under the banner of problem-solving (Clarke and 
Eck, 2003) with the aim of delivering POP. At the heart of such a debate lies the 
logical maxim that prevention is better than cure – a homily as true in respect of 
crime as it is in medicine. And whilst SBD can be identified as problem anticipation 
when applied to the design of new housing or other buildings (most especially on 
greenfield, undeveloped land), this thesis is concerned with how CPTED and SBD 
were used to prevent crime following the refurbishment of two existing locations 
where in recent history, crime had increased considerably.  
 
This investigation has found very little evidence of UK policing being actively 
involved in the delivery of SCP prior to the recommendations of the Willink 
Commission (1962) and wholesale reorganisation of policing following the Police Act 
(1964). Thereafter, whilst the foundations of SCP were being embedded across UK 
policing, partnership working between these early force-based crime prevention 
departments and (for example) local government might be best described as ad hoc. 
 
Goldstein (1979, 1990) recommended that rather than organisational efficiency, the 
police should focus their finite resources on a range of key areas important by the 
public including problem reduction, elimination, better handling or lessening; 
identification and attendance to multiple interests in a problem; and evaluation. In the 
UK, POP can be first identified in Home Office Circular 8/84 (1984) and detailed in 
Home Office Crime Prevention Centre Preventive Policing Skills (1991). However, 
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Read and Tilley (2000) describe how from 266 responses, 42% of the POP initiatives 
were deemed to have been failures by the police force concerned. Moreover, in 40% 
of UK schemes, the police were the sole partner – suggesting two fifths of 
respondents did not understand the rationale that enables POP to work. Another 
concern was the 95% who reported the police were the major partner. However, it 
could be argued that such a high percentage might be expected when the police are 
the primary agency seeking success – for which purpose SCP, CPTED and SBD are 
both effective delivery mechanisms and strategies.  
 
The desire to reduce domination of the partnership process by the police is well 
detailed e.g. Bullock, Erol and Tilley (2006) who provide an overview of best practice 
and the evolution of POP. Indeed, since the mid-1990s the Home Office have used 
the slightly different description, Problem Oriented Partnerships (Home Office POP 
Conference, 1996). This is not an instance of devaluing the role of the police, but as 
with Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (see below), an encouragement 
for partner agencies to accept their role as part of the corporate approach to crime 
prevention and community safety (Morgan Report, 1991; Moss and Pease, 1999). 
The key conditions through which effective partnership working can deliver highly 
positive results, include a necessity for “particularly motivated individuals” (Bullock, 
Erol and Tilley, 2006, p.15). Too many partnerships are said to exist in name alone. 
However, where the potential for such obstacles as indifference, career protection 
and inappropriate professional behaviour are overcome, the rewards can be 
immense – especially for the communities served. Goldstein (1997) subsequently 
produced a 'Hierarchy of Levers' designed to influence partners concerning their role 
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in the POP process. These range from producing advice leaflets through to taking 
civil action in the courts. 
 
In particular, POP places great emphasis on “evidence-based policy and practice” 
(Tilley and Scott, 2012) perhaps the highest form of 5Is Intelligence). Unfortunately, 
scrutiny of many POP projects has identified the absence of such evidence and in 
particular, the rarity of the full Implementation of POP principles – even amongst the 
best projects. Similarly, evaluation (Impact) is often an infrequent commodity. The 
immediacy of dealing with crime, fear of crime and ASB might provide a token 
excuse for such lapses. However, the serial nature and lack of improvement over 
time (Bullock, Erol and Tilley, 2006) suggests something more serious. Namely, a 
culture unwilling to accept that POP demands holistic engagement (Involvement), 
rather than a pick and choose mentality (Goldstein, 2003). 
 
In the UK, an extremely well-known POP examples remains the Kirkholt Burglary 
Reduction Project. Established in the wake of exceptionally high levels of residential 
burglary (24.6% in 1985) on the Kirkholt estate in Rochdale, Greater Manchester, the 
Kirkholt project (Pease, 1991) used coordinated measures (Interventions) including: 
property post-coding; removing coin-payment gas and electricity meters; upgrading 
physical security ‘target hardening’ measures; Home Watch; Cocoon Neighbourhood 
Watch; and computerised monitoring and evaluation. Impressive reductions in 
residential burglary (first 40% and ultimately 76%) were achieved, especially in 




In addition, a number of statutory instruments effectively incentivise RSLs to seek 
and attain the SBD award for each of their new build and refurbishment housing 
projects. For example, Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 states: 
“Without prejudice to any other obligation imposed upon it... exercise its functions 
with due regard to... the need to do all it reasonably can to prevent crime and 
disorder in its area” (UK Government, 1998). Failure to comply with Section 17 may 
attract legal liability in the form of a breach of a statutory duty in private law, or 
judicial review under the doctrine of ultra vires (Bullock, Errol and Tilley, 2006). 
However, whilst the LA planning and housing departments (thereby covering council 
housing stock) have always been subject to Section 17 (and from 2002 primary care 
trusts; 2003 fire and police authorities), until 2006 it did not offer any additional 
incentive to either the HAs or developers building homes for sale. In 2006 the Police 
and Justice Act partly changed this situation by bringing all the RSLs within the 
scope of Section 17. However, and despite this extension of Section 17 to many 
other bodies, evidence of its effectiveness over more than two decades appears to 
be especially slim and has yet to merit the description “a wolf in sheep’s” clothing 
(Moss and Pease, 1999). 
 
On a related theme, over the past quarter-century national planning policy and 
guidance has repeatedly changed. This began in 1994 with Department of the 
Environment Circular 5/94, Planning Out Crime (1994), itself superseded by Safer 
Places: the Planning System and Crime Prevention (DCLG and Home Office, 2004) 
in which the role of DOCO (ALO in the actual text) was detailed for the first time and 
Planning Policy Statement 1: Delivering Sustainable Development (DCLG, 2005). 
Both the latter were repealed and replaced by the National Planning Policy 
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Framework and National Planning Policy Guidance) (DCLG, 2013). During the early 
years of the Twenty-First Century, a raft of strategy and other policy documents can 
also be identified in Supplementary Planning Guidance, Securing the Future (DCLG, 
2005) and the Code for Sustainable Homes (DCLG, 2008 – repealed in 2015). 
Moreover, the majority of this guidance applied to all forms of housing, private for 
sale and RSL – although much was subsequently repealed at the behest of private 
developers. 
 
Problem-solving can be viewed as a delivery mechanism for POP. Eck and Spelman 
(1987) operationalised problem solving through development of the SARA 
‘preventive process’ (Ekblom, 2011a). SARA distils Clarke’s (2005) five stage, SCP 
action research model: collection of data (scanning); analysis of the situational 
conditions (analysis); systematic study of possible means to block opportunities; and 
implementing the most promising; (response); monitoring results (assessment). 
Nevertheless, the actual incidence of problem-solving (and POP) “...is probably best 
described as pockets of isolated good practice which tend to be associated with 
highly motivated individuals.” (Bullock, Erol and Tilley (2006, p.17). 
 
Zahm (2005) has attempted to merge conventional POP and SARA with CPTED, by 
concentrating on the stakeholder perspective and developing an Implementation 
plan. However, it is constrained by the limitations of SARA – most especially at the 
response stage. This is where the 5Is (Ekblom, 2011b) provides a more structured 
and holistic response – using its task streams of Intelligence, Intervention, 
Implementation, Involvement and Impact to ensure POP, CPTED and (where 




High-rise housing  
“Homes fit for heroes” had been a rallying cry for British troops returning home at the 
end of the First World War, one on which prime minister David Lloyd George 
promised to deliver in a speech given the day after the armistice. He actually said 
“Habitations fit for the heroes who have won the war.” (Lloyd-George, 1918) and 
appointed the Paymaster General and architect by profession to enquire into the 
state of housing and produce The Tudor Roberts Report (1918). One of the most 
interesting conclusions of the Tudor Roberts Committee was how it acknowledged 
the advantages of different types of housing and of not restricting an estate to one 
social class. Minister for Health, Dr Christopher Addison, piloted the Housing Act 
(1919) through parliament. His ‘Addison Act’ saw the construction of 213,000 new 
homes by 1923 – although this figure fell far short of the half million originally 
promised. Subsequent Housing Acts in 1924 and 1930 led to a total of 1.1 million 
new houses being constructed between the world wars. However, this number was 
insufficient to satisfy demand, a situation intensified by the subsequent economic 
depression of the 1930s. 
 
Within the study of architecture, the origins of high-rise living are most often 
attributed to world-renowned architects such as Le Corbusier and Mies van der 
Rohe. Power (1997) observes it was Le Corbusier who particularly advocated the 
concept of mass, high-rise housing. However, Nuttgens (1989) cites Robert Matthew 
(architect to London County Council following the Second World War and 
subsequently Professor of Architecture at Edinburgh University) who believes Walter 
Gropius (founder of the Bauhaus design movement) was instrumental via his text 
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The New Architecture and the Bauhaus (Gropius, 1936). Gropius advocated ten-
storey, slab-like apartment blocks, suggesting these would maximise both living 
space for residents and sunlight. Indeed, he argued that both prime living conditions 
and a city’s improved urban character could be achieved, providing there was a fixed 
angle of light between the blocks of 30 degrees. This would in turn increase 
residential capacity by 40 per cent: “In short, the higher the blocks the greater the 
space and the better the Sunlight.” (Nuttgens, 1989, p.69).   
 
The first high-rise blocks to be built in the UK date back to 1934. The Isokon Building 
(or Lawn Road flats) in Hampstead and where Agatha Christie once resided. 
Followed by the eight-storey high Highpoint 1 (1935) and Highpoint 2 (1938) in 
Highgate, both of which were designed by the Russian émigré architect Berthold 
Lubetkin – more famous for the penguin enclosure at Regents Park Zoo. 
Interestingly, all three developments were constructed to very high standards in 
north London and contained exclusively private, for sale flats. Le Corbusier visited 
Highpoint 1 and described it as conforming to his concept of “the vertical garden city” 
(Architectural Review, 1936, pp.9-10; Montes Serrano and Casariego, 2014, p.51). 
These buildings are of immense architectural importance and were highly influential 
with the Modernist Movement and amongst younger architects.  
 
During the Second World War, accurate figures concerning the number of homes 
destroyed in bombing raids by the Luftwaffe over the UK were not recorded. 
Richards (1953) suggests that more than one million homes were destroyed or 
damaged. Whereas, Nuttgens (1989) contends in excess of 200,000 homes were 
destroyed and at least 2 million damaged (Nuttgens, 1989). Unsurprisingly, there 
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was a considerable demand for new housing following that war. Between 1945 and 
1951 during the Atlee Labour government, 807,000 social housing dwellings were 
built, 180,000 private-for-sale and 28,000 for HAs – together with the 157,000 
‘prefabs’ (prefabricated bungalows) constructed at the very end of the war and with a 
ten-year life expectancy. However, few of these new homes were high-rise. That 
began after 1951 when Churchill’s Conservative government increased the home 
building targets, explaining in part the recourse to high-rise development and the 
construction of the seven tower blocks that lie at the heart of this investigation. 
 
Political ambition, credibility and targets encouraged the boom in construction during 
the decades following the Second World War (Dunleavy, 1981).  
            Dynamic postwar politicians often cut their teeth on ‘mass’ housing  
            programmes. Scale, speed and minimal decent standards were the   
            essentials of success. The style of ‘mass’ housing quickly became part and  
            parcel of the programmes – large estates, high- and medium-rise blocks,  
            industrialised construction, uniform layout, replicated units, compact flat  
            building and high technology. (Power, 1997, p.37).       
 
Nevertheless, amongst LA council owned housing, high-rise never amounted to 
more than 6.5 per cent of the total number of dwellings (Nuttgens, 1989). And 
indeed, the construction of these high-rise dwellings took place during a twenty-year 
period that began in the early 1950s and finished in the early 1970s. Crucially. “The 
housing of the fifties and sixties was not the product of theoretical studies; it was 
essentially a pragmatic solution for definable problems.” Nuttgens (1989, p.70). That 
pragmatism was caused by a shortage of land and the need to build quickly, if 
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demand was ever to be sated – themes that remain constant up to the present day. 
Back in the 1950s for every property built there were 30 tenant family applicants 
(Nuttgens, 1989). Furthermore, The London Plan (Abercrombie and Forshaw, 1943) 
suggested a housing density of 135 people per acre would deliver improved living 
conditions, superior facilities and open space for recreation and health. 
 
Despite this, it appears to have been the architect community that drove the high-rise 
solution to housing, heavily influenced by pre-war developments such as the 
aforementioned Highpoints 1 and 2. However, as Nuttgens poignantly observes: 
            …high buildings are suitable – and may even be the best kind of dwelling for   
            the well-to-do. They are costly to construct and require much care and  
            maintenance. Ideally, they need staff to control them and to ensure, at the  
            very least, that the lifts work. The mistake was to apply this to housing for the  
            ordinary working man – houses promoted and maintained by local  
            authorities, always short of money, always trying to economise. (Nuttgens,  
            1989, p.73).      
 
High-rise housing was also celebrated by local councillors and by officials like 
borough engineers: fewer roads were required and there were additional cost 
savings in terms of the provision of utilities (Jones, 2002). ‘System building’ provided 
the construction method – one that utilised prefabricated techniques and was 
primarily fast. However, the financial cost of initial machinery investment was high 
and could only be recovered with large scale repetition. This also helps to explain 





Furthermore, one commentator observes: 
            …under this system any mistake was disastrously replicated and required  
            large sums to eradicate later. The whole mass high-rise housing  
            phenomenon was in part a product of that problem – a replicated form,   
            identical in concept if not in exact detail, in order to facilitate endless  
            repetition resulting in tumbling costs and built-in effects. Power (1997,  
            p.57-58).    
Speed and the demand for new housing stock therefore can be identified as primary 
motivations in building high-rise blocks – with the bonus that higher densities 
required less land (Jones, 2002). Consequently, construction companies competed 
with each other to secure these lucrative contracts.   
 
The role of central government is another important consideration. High-rise homes 
were encouraged and championed by both Conservative and Labour governments, 
with the Department for Housing and Local Government providing grants, because 
tower blocks cost more than conventional two storey houses – perhaps the most 
important fact ignored by those who advocated high-rise housing. Indeed, Jones 
(2004) details how the Housing Subsidies Act (1956) created a payment escalator 
determined by the height of the building and maximised at six-storeys or more. 
These subsidies were “…a critical enabling factor in causing the high-rise boom.” 
(Jones, 2004, p.12). Indeed, the number of high-rise dwellings increased from 8,000 
in 1956 to a zenith of over 44,000 in 1966. The irony is that without this ‘progressive 
height subsidy’ conventional “cottage style housing” – the description used by senior 
civil servants to dismiss low density housing (Jones, 2004, p.13) was of lower 
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economic cost. Then (as now) central government feared urban sprawl and wanted 
to encourage LAs to build housing on brownfield sites. In this regard, cities like 
Birmingham were already setting the high-rise example as part of its slum clearance 
programme. However, across the UK York was one of the very few cities to decline 
such funding and refuse to build high-rise dwellings, thereby suggesting that such 
attractiveness was not universal. The issue was further complicated by Secretary of 
State for Housing and Local Government, Harold Macmillan’s, introduction of his 
‘People’s House’ which included specific minimum dimensions for rooms. 
 
The earliest concerns regarding the efficacy of tower blocks related to their suitability 
for children. A repeated theme is the absence of ‘somewhere to play’, although this 
author can recall as a child in the mid-1960s visiting his grandmother in the 
Ladywood district of Birmingham and playing on the swings and slides constructed 
simultaneous to that of the tower block. For children residing in the block, such 
facilities were hardly immediate (lift or stairs and multiple doors to negotiate in order 
to access same) and unsuitable for very young children, unless their parents 
accompanied them. Physical and psychological effects on children were also 
identified, and on both pregnant and young mothers – feeling cut-off, isolated and 
lonely. In addition, building and moving to peripheral estates broke up both 
communities and extended families. Lifts frequently broke down and remained so for 
extended periods of time. Noise from fellow tenants together with other forms of ASB 
and crime were also frequently reported. All of the above are detailed taking place in 




Nuttgens (1989) contends that even during the ‘tower block boom’ many architects 
were concerned about the social-context of high-rise housing – yet opted for 
pragmatism. Minoru Yamasaki, architect of the Pruitt-Igoe high-rise scheme in St 
Louis, Missouri, dismissed such concerns claiming he was restricted by economic 
cost. Constructed in 1954 and containing 2870 flats in 31, 11-storey tower blocks, 
within two years occupancy peaked at 91 per cent (Jencks, 1984) and Pruitt-Igoe 
began its descent into worldwide notoriety. It is also one of the estates with which 
Newman (1973) is most associated – in terms of critical commentary. With 
occupancy rates below 70 per cent, Pruitt-Igoe was demolished between 1972-1976 
having become symbolic with crime, poverty and racial segregation (Ramroth, 2007). 
 
Coleman (1985) applied Newman’s (1972) ideas and concluded that in the UK there 
was a link between RSL estate design (especially high-rise housing) and social 
problems – including crime. Using the ‘Design Improvement Controlled Experiment’ 
(DICE) as a template, she was allocated £50 million funding by the DOE for the 
refurbishment of a number of ‘sink’ (Blair, 1998) estates across England. However, in 
Birmingham only the Nazareth estate in Longbridge attracted such funding. And 
there were no aerial walkways whose removal Coleman had recommended at any 
location in the city – unlike in the London boroughs where Coleman (1992) had 
concentrated much of her research. Furthermore, three decades later attributing 
blame to architectural design whilst dismissing poverty and the effects of a 
dysfunctional property market, might appear somewhat simplistic.    
  
In the UK a festering hostility towards high-rise housing reached its denouement in 
1968, with an accidental gas explosion in an eighteenth floor flat at the Ronan Point 
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tower block in London. ‘Progressive collapse’ meant that every room beneath it fell to 
the ground. Four people died and 17 were injured. Furthermore, when the 
subsequent enquiry report was eventually published, it found that construction 
methods were flawed due to inadequately researched national policy guidelines.  
As one observer describes, “Concrete became the main building medium, partly 
because it was vaunted as being long-lasting, if not indestructible.” Powers, 1997, 
(p.58). However, across Europe the use of concrete revealed early signs of decay 
including ‘spalling’ (AKA ‘concrete cancer’) caused by chemical reaction between the 
concrete and internal steel reinforcements. Concrete also turned grey and lost its 
original pristine white appearance, as extolled by Le Corbusier (1947). Eventually, 
this caused (at least in part) the eventual recourse to the use of cladding with 
potentially lethal effects – as evidenced at Grenfell Tower, London in 2017.    
 
In retrospect, the effects of the Ronan Point collapse in 1968 marked the end of the 
high-rise construction boom. Indeed, one former advocate had already written in the 
Architectural Review under the heading The Failure of Housing: “More slums are 
likely to be built in the next five years than in the next twenty.“ (Taylor, 1967. p.345). 
Whilst across the UK high-rise flats were becoming difficult to let with tenants voting 
with their feet. This culminated in 1979 when only 21 years after construction, 
Birkenhead District Council demolished the six-storeys high blocks of unlettable flats 
at Oak Gardens and Eldon Gardens – believed to be the first LA to do so. 
 
The economic costs of building high-rise, combined with construction methods that 
were technically deficient and an unwillingness of people to reside in them, meant 
many blocks would not survive. In 1970 the incoming Conservative government 
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endorsed new cost controls that no longer favoured high-rise and high-density 
housing. Instead, the Department of the Environment (DOE) limited density for new 
housing to the range of 70-100 rooms per acre – that for families at the lower end of 
this scale. 
 
During the 1980s, high-rise blocks were being demolished or their role reassigned. 
Nuttgens (1989) observes how towards the end of that decade, across the UK 54 
tower blocks had been converted into sheltered housing schemes. Camrose Tower 
in Birmingham (less one mile from the CSS), was one such block with the ground 
floor converted into a community area and a warden employed – much to the 
immense satisfaction of the elderly residents. Another significant innovation was the 
adoption of the “caretaker or concierge role” (Nuttgens, 1989, p.94). One of the first 
examples of this French-style version of the traditional British caretaker (providing 
enhanced guardianship), took place at the 18-storey high Gloucester House, in 
Kilburn, London. The employment of the first such caretaker at that location, Sharon 
Coudy, was recommended by the tenants’ association. She is reported to have 
transformed the block, making it both graffiti and crime-free and ensuring that the lifts 
always worked. However, this was only a stay of execution. Gloucester House was 
demolished in 2018 and the site is now being redeveloped into predominantly five- 
storey, high-density housing. 
 
As head of housing at London County Council and Greater London Council between 
1959 and 1974, Kenneth Campbell argued that high-rise housing failed due to three 
factors: poor lift maintenance; the inability to find new homes for couples once they 
had their first child; and the slow speed of management and maintenance. Moreover, 
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there is no universal distaste for high-rise housing – as the aforementioned tenants 
at Camrose Tower in Birmingham can testify. Unfortunately, hostility developed in 
the social housing tower blocks and can often be attributed to alienation, vandalism 
and crime (Newman, 1996; Power, 1997). In addition, these tower blocks were built 
at a time when deference to expert opinion was still the norm in UK society. Only 
when tenants’ associations (as at Gloucester House above and at the CSS in this 
investigation) were consulted and a ‘buy-in’ obtained, were genuine and sustainable 
improvements delivered.     
                        
Another perspective contends that in retrospect, high-rise housing cannot be blamed 
as “the product of architectural egotism or of an artistic and technological dream.” 
Nuttgens  (1989, p.95). The original proponents believed it provided the answer to an 
enduring housing crisis and cite the reality that for many tenants, high-rise delivered 
a great improvement when compared to the slums from which they were rehoused 
and were “…grateful and excited at the break it offered from previous poor 
conditions.” (Powers, 1997, p.59). The problems came from building quickly, failing 
to thoroughly research the construction methods, or deliver the amenities originally 
promised. However, the brutalist architectural style of many blocks, standing like 
bleak monoliths in a barren landscape, meant they were often regarded by many of 
the tenants as emblematic of a dystopian, Orwell-inspired nightmarish future and 
anything but home. Furthermore, the greater proportion of those 1.1 million 
conventional homes built between the wars survive to this day. As an economic 
investment, they have massively out-performed the post-Second World War 




Compared to other European countries (France, Germany, Denmark and Ireland) 
only in France was a similar proportion of social housing constructed in the form of 
high-rise blocks (Powers, 1997). Furthermore, there were other similarities with the 
UK, including high turnovers of tenants – most especially those with young children. 
High-density and forced communality resulted in neighbour disputes, made worse by 
mixing poorly assimilated groups from mixed-ethnicity backgrounds. Similarly, as in 
the UK there were ongoing maintenance issues. Plus, ‘clumsy’ design elements 
were another constant, in particular: multiple entrances, excessively long corridors 
and external decks. Oversized blocks necessitated forced sharing and a dominant 
experience of anonymity. Whilst amongst ordinary non-residents there was strong 
disdain for this form of housing. 
 
The European and US (Newman, 1996) experience was also identical to that of the 
UK in other multiple ways. For example: open spaces were unattractive, under-used, 
poorly supervised, and badly maintained; underground car parks, internal corridors, 
enclosed entrances, lift shafts and staircases provided ample attack and escape 
routes for those intent on ASB and criminal behaviour; whilst burglary, vandalism 
and the fear of crime were endemic (Powers, 1997). The Housing Subsidy Act 1956, 
acted as an incentive for LAs to build even higher than 20-storeys and a symposium 
on high-rise flats was described as: “an unprecedented example of professional 
support for a particular building form” and that it “exercised a decisive influence on 
virtually all the major housing authorities’ architects departments” (Dunleavy, 1981, 
p.135). Of additional interest, Powers (1997) reports that many architects, especially 
those in the public sector, believed that their ruling body, the Royal Institute of British 




Industrialised construction began in 1962-3, but remained far more expensive than 
conventional housing types. It also provided opportunities for poor workmanship 
culminating in the partial collapse of Ronan Point in 1968, only two months after 
construction was completed. However, the Housing Subsidies Act, 1967 had already 




Figure 1: Repeat robbery location: sinuous footpath with poor natural surveillance opportunities 








The case study site (CSS) and comparison site 
  
Birmingham context 
Following the Second World War and as reflected across much of the UK, there was 
an insatiable demand for housing in Birmingham. Since the stewardship of Joseph 
Chamberlain as mayor during the 1870s, Birmingham had a national reputation for 
establishing public utilities in respect of gas, sanitation and water – the latter piped 
from the Elan Valley in mid-Wales (Gehrke, 2016). As early as 1875 Chamberlain 
had been a proponent of slum clearance (Marsh, 1994). However, 70 years later that 
was still work in progress, a situation exacerbated by Luftwaffe bombing raids during 
the Second World War. 
 
After 1945 the city council’s architects worked within Herbert Manzoni’s Public Works 
Department. Then in 1951, AG Sheppard Fiddler, was appointed to become 
Birmingham’s first independent architect (Jones, 2002). Sheppard Fiddler was 
mainly concerned with estate layout and his influence can be identified on the 
Lyndhurst estate in Erdington, with its emulation of London County Council 
Architects Department’s mixed housing (including high-rise) Alton estates in 
Roehampton. 
 
The CSS and comparison site tower blocks were constructed during the early years 
of Birmingham’s high-rise programme when 10-12 storeys were considered 
sufficient. However, following the Housing Subsidy Act 1956 (see Chapter One) the 
next wave of construction provided “…scope for municipal pride to swell upward.” 
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(Jones, 2002, p.3). As a result, during the 1960s tower-blocks of 20-22 storeys were 
constructed in the Birmingham districts of Lee Bank, Highgate, Ladywood, Bromford 
Bridge and the Priory Road Estate opposite Edgbaston Cricket Ground. There was a 
desire to go even higher, following an explorative visit to Chicago by the then 
chairmen of the House Building and Housing Management Committees. However, 
just two 32 storey tower blocks were built: The Sentinels at Holloway Head in the city 
centre. Furthermore, they were completed after the Housing Subsidies Act 1967 had 
scrapped the ‘progressive height subsidy’ and the Ronan Point disaster in 1968. 
Birmingham’s final housing development that featured tower blocks was located at 
Chelmsley Wood on the eastern edge of the city. However, even there high-rise 
never amounted to more than 17% high of all new housing and many of those blocks 
have now been demolished.    
 
Identification of the CSS and comparison site 
It was all but impossible to identify two entirely comparable groups – the CSS and 
comparison site in this instance, there being very little chance that such a pair of 
locations will be perfectly matched. Nevertheless, in the context of this investigation 
the selection proved to be relatively easy. The refurbishment of the CSS tower 
blocks is believed to have been the first high-rise scheme in the UK to be processed 
through to and achieve SBD awards – one for each block. Moreover,  
because the quality of the CPTED measures recommended and incorporated during 
their refurbishment was of an exceptionally high grade (and not known to have been 
replicated to such a level at any other location across the UK), they appeared to be 
an obvious choice for analysis. Furthermore, on completion they attracted national 
publicity, a ministerial visit by the late Baroness Blatch and for many years were 
119 
 
perceived and broadcast as the ‘gold standard’ of SBD amongst the police 
community of DOCOs. Having identified the CSS, the next task was to choose the 
comparison. The SBD awards for the CSS were conferred by the then Chief 
Constable, Sir Ron Hadfield, on 29 April 1993 and in a ceremony organised by this 
author. Even before that date, consultation had begun with police DOCOs 
concerning the next high-rise refurbishment project to be undertaken by BCC: 
Severn, Thames and Medway Towers – the comparison site. 
 
In addition to being located in the same inner-city district as the CSS, the 
comparison tower blocks also lay adjacent to each other, with little more than the 
Nechells Parkway dual carriageway (itself a major route into and out of Birmingham 
city centre) separating the two sites. This area had been heavily bomb-damaged 
during the Second World War and was also subject to slum clearance in the 1950s, 
during which decade construction commenced of both the CSS and comparison. The 
total number of dwellings at each site (264 and 268 respectively) was also a 
determining factor in providing a close approximation between the two. However, the 
real attraction of the comparison site lay in the standard of CPTED measures 
incorporated during the refurbishment process. Due to financial stringency, these 
were the barest minimum necessary (a lesser grade of CPTED) to achieve an SBD 
award. As a result, the existing front doors to each flat were not replaced and merely 
augmented with a second key-operated lock. In these circumstances, comparing the 
police-recorded crime for the CSS with that of the comparison, should constitute a 
worthy subject for investigation. Results indicating the level of CPTED ‘treatment’ 
required to produce and/or maintain a reduction in crime, would also prove to be 




The CSS blocks were the first to be built in Birmingham, designed by SN Cooke and 
Partners and constructed around a steel frame to an extremely high (and financially 
expensive) standard. This included a Garchey waterborne waste disposal system 
and oil-fired central heating plant located in the basement of Home Tower. According 
to one observer they: “…represent Birmingham tower blocks at their best. Indeed, 
following a major refurbishment programme and security measures installed ten 
years ago, the blocks are still among the best in Birmingham. (Jones, 2002, p.2). 
They were officially opened on 5 February 1954 by the then Minister for Housing and 
Local Government, Harold Macmillan. He became prime minister five years later in 
1959 – the same year in which construction began on the comparison blocks. They 
were completed in 1961 and fully occupied that same year.  
 
Unfortunately, by the late 1980s high-rise social housing like that at the CSS and 
comparison, were experiencing high levels of crime and ASB never foreseen by the 
original proponents of this form of living – world-renowned architects like Le 
Corbusier, Gropius and Mies van der Rohe. The flats had become difficult to let, with 
many tenants staying less than 12 months. Annual residential burglary figures were 
high and at the CSS went well into double figures per block (see Chapter Six). 
Unoccupied flats with no tenants were repeatedly targeted and executed by way of 
their unique fire-escape stairwells. And there was also a murder committed at South 
Tower. Consequently, the area in which both the CSS and comparison are located 





                       TIMELINE OF EVENTS RELEVANT TO CSS & COMPARISON  
 
Case study site (CSS) constructed  
CSS officially opened by Housing Minister Harold Macmillan 
Comparison site built 
West Midlands Police appoint first Architectural Liaison Officers (DOCOs) 
Launch of Secured by Design as national police CPTED delivery initiative 
Refurbishment of CSS  









Department of the Environment Circular 5/94 Planning Out Crime launched 1994 
Housing Corporation mandates Housing Associations to seek SBD certification 1994 
Flat entrance doors and communal entrance doors at comparison replaced 
Circular 5/94 replaced by PPS1 and Safer Places  
2003 
2005 
£400,000 upgrade of CCTV at the CSS 
DCLG launches Code for Sustainable Homes 
National Planning Policy Framework replaces PPGs and PPSs 
SBD National Building Approval (NBA) launched 
Building Regulations incorporate PAS 24 doors and windows 







SBD Homes 2016 design guide launched 2016 
Grenfell Tower fire disaster takes place with loss of 76 lives 2017 
DCLG becomes the Department for Housing, Communities & Local Government 
Homes and Communities Agency becomes Homes England 
Grenfell Tower Inquiry begins hearing evidence  
Major refurbishment of CSS 











In the search for potential contextual/confounding influences on crime and other 
issues at the CSS and comparison, background reading was used to discover 
whether any non-crime prevention actions were undertaken by local government or 
other agencies at either or both sites during the time span studied. For example, 
Coleman (1985, 1992); Jones (2002, 2004); and Towers (2000); all of which are 
considered in Chapter One. 
 
The CSS 
Queens, Home, High and South Towers constitute the CSS and are located in 
Duddeston Manor Road, Nechells. Twelve-storeys high, all four are identical in 
appearance with (until 2019) the original brick cladding on the exteriors. There are 
two lifts and two internal staircases within each tower, although ‘compartmentation’ 
(meaning each block is divided into two separate halves) limits this to a single lift and 
staircase serving each half of the block. Their stretched X-shaped layout is 
reminiscent of the ‘cluster block’ that was popular with Modernist architects after the 
Second World War. Moreover, with round porthole style windows and white tubular 
railings on the roofs, The Four Towers portray a distinctly Art Deco(ish) style, 
combined with nautical imagery. Proposed in 1950 and constructed between 1953 
and 1954, six blocks were originally planned. However, failure to purchase the 
necessary land explains why South Tower is isolated away from the other three. Had 
the missing two towers been built they would have solidified the group, albeit in an ‘L’ 
shaped pattern. Nevertheless, The Four Towers were credited with positive reviews 
and the Modern Movement supporting editor of Architectural Review described them 




Because high-rise public housing was a relatively new concept in 1950s Britain, the 
design of these flats was revolutionary in a number of respects. For example, it was 
believed necessary to include additional internal fire-escapes within each block. This 
was achieved by way of an enclosed staircase (five per block – one at each corner 
and a fifth in the centre of the tower – see Appendix 7) adjacent to each flat’s 
external balcony and providing a further escape route to the ground. In the below 
photograph (Figure 2) the route of these fire-escapes is marked by the 
aforementioned round porthole style windows. There is no evidence that these fire-
escape staircases have ever been used for their allotted purpose. However, 
following the Grenfell Tower tragedy in North Kensington, London in June 2017, fire 
safety and escape from such high-rise tower blocks have taken on new-found and 
highly justifiable urgency and prominence. Another feature at The Four Towers and 
one that subsequently became the norm in cities across the UK and further afield, 
was the total movement/ permeability caused by a failure to develop the surrounding 
‘brown-field’ land, which in turn originated from the unmarked wells that were capped 
and grassed over during the slum clearance (an unknown number of which may 
have been inaccurately recorded). As a result, subsequent attempts to develop this 




Figure 2: High and Queens Towers at the CSS in 2017 
 
Such was their perceived success as a housing strategy, that over the next quarter- 
century BCC (one of the largest LAs in Europe) went on to build a total of 464 high-
rise tower blocks (Jones, 2002), although none of them replicated the multiple, 
balcony-linked fire-escape system witnessed at The Four Towers. 
 
Intelligence/demand at the CSS 
In practical terms, during the late 1980s there already existed at the CSS an 
organised and effective campaigning group of residents known as The Four Towers 
Tenants’ Association. They repeatedly petitioned elected members and the city 
council to invest in refurbishing the blocks and also reduce both the crime and ASB 
taking place – only to be told time and again there was no funding available. In this 
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last regard, tenants who had resided at the CSS for at least three decades 
repeatedly (see Chapter Five, Findings: Tenants’ perceptions of crime, ASB, safety 
and security) mention two women who were instrumental in the tenants’ association, 
both of whom have since passed away. These two women can thus be identified as 
‘particularly motivated individuals’ (Read and Tilley, 2000; Bullock, Erol and Tilley, 
2006). Their efforts assisted in ensuring that BCC Housing Department sought 
CPTED advice from the police and incorporated such elements during the 1989-92 
refurbishment programme. 
 
By the late 1980s/early 1990s, the majority of tower blocks built by BCC Housing 
Department had either reached or were fast approaching their original projected 
lifespan of thirty years. Furthermore, whilst some tenants at both the CSS and 
comparison site had exercised their ‘Right to Buy’ (Grant, 1992) under the Thatcher 
governments’ flagship housing policy, there was very little finance available to build 
new LA owned social housing or refurbish existing dwellings. This may suggest an 
essential strategy for all development programmes – and more especially 
refurbishments like that at the CSS and comparison, where the residents remain in 
situ long after completion and by which time the project managers, builders and all 
those involved in service delivery have moved to new projects. Namely, that it would 
seem to be an essential element of sustainability to encourage active participation by 
the residents/tenants. Because as Morris (1996) recommends, long term solutions 
require the support of the community. Similarly, residents must be engaged by local 
officials who in turn should be encouraged and supported in taking a longer term, 
problem-solving approach to incidents and solutions. At the comparison site there is 
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no record that there ever existed a tenants’ association or other body that could have 
been consulted. 
 
In 1989, the central government DOE launched a bidding process for local LAs 
known as ‘Estate Action Funding’ (Local Government and Housing Act, 1989). Under 
this heading, LAs in England and Wales (similar schemes existed in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland) were asked to bid for central government funding to refurbish their 
existing social housing located within blighted inner-city areas. BCC was successful 
in securing £4 million for the refurbishment of The Four Towers – including measures 
to reduce crime and ASB. The key departments within BCC involved in utilising the 
£4 million awarded, were Housing, Planning and Architecture and the Landscape 
Practice Group. Furthermore, the timing of this investment appears to have been 
especially fortuitous, in that the announcement coincided with the creation of the 
SBD award scheme (see Chapter One).    
 
Estate Action funding required a commitment to eliminate crime and ASB. As a 
consequence, an ad hoc symbiosis evolved into partnership working  
between the aforementioned council departments (most especially Housing), West 
Midlands Police (WMP) DOCOs (an ALO police inspector and ALO sergeant at that 
time) and The Four Towers Tenants’ Association – who initiated and maintained their 
interest in the refurbishment process including the inclusion of CPTED measures, 
the overwhelming majority of which were similarly specified as process elements 
under SBD guidelines. This partnership working began a decade before Section 17 
of the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) made it a statutory responsibility and eight 
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years before Saville and Cleveland (1997) discussed the theme of community 
consultation as a requirement of ‘Second Generation CPTED’. Or of ‘Third 
Generation CPTED’ as described by Gamman and Thorpe (2012) plus others. 
Between 1989 and 1992, the partnership worked collaboratively to design out crime 
and ASB at the CSS. Nevertheless, it is important to note that ‘The Four Towers’ 
were not selected for refurbishment as a result of following a systematic approach 
such as the ‘hot-spots’ and ‘hot wards’ analysis identified by Bennett and Durie 
(1999) when studying residential burglary in Cambridge. Close to four decades after 
construction the primary motivation at the CSS was the necessity for physical 
refurbishment. Nevertheless, and in accordance with Estate Action funding guidance 
crime, fear of crime and ASB were perceived by all partners as contributory factors.  
 
In 1993 when it was decided to refurbish the comparison, Estate Action funding 
remained in existence. However, financial constraints were far tighter than four years 
earlier and explain the reduced funding for CPTED measures. This is relevant for 
assessing process/outcomes between the CSS and comparison, together with any 
divergence of sustainability between the two. Furthermore, BCC Housing 
Department naturally initiated the refurbishment programme and controlled the 
finances, albeit under central government direction. And it provided the leadership 
role in this project. Their willingness to listen to the tenants, police DOCOs and 
incorporate the recommended CPTED and SBD measures, demonstrates the 
practical application of the problem-solving (more problem prevention in this context) 
and POP approach, with the police also providing the necessary crime pattern 
analysis (evidence/Intelligence) to justify expenditure on the security elements 
recommended. In a similar vein, acknowledgement also needs to be made of the 
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Involvement of other ‘particularly motivated individuals’ within BCC Housing 
Department (most especially the Area Housing Manager and Senior Architectural 
Technician), Planning and Architecture Department (including the Landscape 
Practice Group) and WMP DOCOs, in ensuring the refurbishment was a success – 
in terms of reductions in crime, fear of crime and ASB (albeit there is no evidence of 
a post-occupancy evaluation immediately thereafter or, for example, five or ten years 
later other than the ad hoc audits described in Chapter Three, and those conducted 
by this author prior to the SBD award ceremonies).  
 
CPTED and SBD in practice at the CSS 
In terms of CPTED at the CSS, Interventions recommended by the DOCOs included 
a heavy emphasis on higher grade measures covering: ‘target hardening’ (Newman, 
1972); technological innovations; and environmental elements. As a delivery 
process, SBD demanded a minimum standard of security was demonstrably 
incorporated and appropriately matched to the context. In real terms, this was well 
exceeded at the CSS – in practice, a higher intensity of CPTED measures were 
employed. It should also be noted that SBD is a process model for Intervention and 
as such, should not be confused and kept separate from the actual CPTED 
measures – a repeated failing within descriptions of SBD. 
 
Target hardening measures included: high quality 'Mul-T- Secure’ front entrance 
doors to each of the individual flats; windows and balcony doors constructed of 
double-glazed PVC-u units; metal railings/grilles and gates on all the ground floor 
balconies to prevent access into the integral fire-escape system (see Appendix 7) by 
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those intent on burglary; and high standard communal entrance doors at ground floor 
level. Similarly, all ground floor windows contained two panes of glass, that on the 
inside (to maximise safety) of laminated safety glass, which has a proven potential to 
be of crucial importance in preventing residential burglary.  
 
Technological innovations included: installation of CCTV cameras in vandal proof 
housings within the interior communal areas and lifts; electromagnetically-operated 
communal entrance doors at ground level, activated by a fob-reader controlled entry 
system for residents; and the 24/7 staffed concierge presence located in security 
offices on the ground floor of Queens Tower, linked via an intercom to each flat. This 
was both a revolutionary and unique innovation by BCC Housing Department. 
Electric lighting of internal communal areas, the grounds and car parks was 
upgraded to produce a minimum average illumination of 12 Lux – the level 
recommended by SBD as necessary for surveillance and deterrence in external 
areas when the award was first launched (SBD, 1989). 
 
At the time of the 1989-92 refurbishment, considerable concern existed (and 
continues to this day) regarding the privacy and civil liberty aspects of CCTV 
cameras (especially those in public areas) and recorded images. In retrospect, it 
might be viewed as a mistake to limit the CCTV coverage to the ground floor internal 
communal areas and lifts. Because, once through the communal entrance doors 
(‘tail-gating’ legitimate callers is generally understood amongst security professionals 
worldwide to be the usual means of gaining access at both residential and 
commercial venues) unwanted visitors could not be tracked through the building. 
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Nevertheless, despite a £400,000 upgrade of the CCTV system in 2006 (which 
included colour cameras, extension to cover all landing areas and digital recording), 
there remains no external CCTV coverage of the grounds or car parks, other than by 
the fob-reader and door-caller system (which incorporates a CCTV camera). 
Personal witness indicates that this situation is the norm at the overwhelming 
number of residential areas across the UK – be they social housing, private rented 
sector or owner-occupied. 
 
When the refurbishment of the CSS was completed in 1992, there was an 
expectation that its revolutionary 24/7 staffed concierge might be replicated at 
Birmingham’s high-rise tower blocks as they were in turn refurbished. However, due 
to funding issues, it was never repeated at any other location. Then in April 2015, the 
24/7 staffed concierge facility at the CSS was itself closed – almost certainly on a 
permanent basis. This decision was made by BCC Housing Department as a result 
of central government changes to the way in which housing benefit was paid (it could 
no longer be deducted at source). The closure of the concierge caused a spate of 
complaints from the tenants. Nevertheless, all CCTV and door entry monitoring is 
now managed from a remote site, central station control room covering the majority 
of high-rise blocks and schools across Birmingham.  
 
BCC’s Landscape Practice Group were actively involved with the DOCOs in 
designing the CPTED environmental elements that were incorporated at the CSS 
(and comparison – albeit once again to a lesser grade of CPTED). This included 
aesthetically decorative but highly functional brick walls and metal railing fencing, 
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together with symbolic (psychological) barriers in the form of brick pillar gateposts 
and painted steel gates (that are never closed); changes in road surface texture and 
colour; and soft landscape planting of trees and shrubs – of specific maximum 
growth heights to ensure they would not become barriers to natural surveillance. All 
these features were designed to define public, semi-public, semi-private and private 
defensible space (Newman, 1972) around the blocks; encourage territoriality; and 
deny movement/permeability for those with no legitimate reason to be present. 
 
Following completion of the refurbishment in 1992, WMP conferred their first major 
SBD awards. At the SBD award ceremony held in 1993, the then Chief Constable, 
Sir Ron Hadfield, presented the awards (one for each tower) and as part of his 
speech made the following observation: 
            We now appreciate that the built environment can have a positive or  
            negative influence on criminal acts and the introduction of the police driven  
            concept of ‘Secured by Design’ is now becoming widely accepted and like a  
            weather front, it is spreading north from its birthplace in the south east of  
            England. (Hadfield, 1993). 
Thereafter, all parties waited to see the results – especially the effects on crime. 
 
The comparison site  
The comparison site consists of Severn, Thames and Medway towers located in 




Figure 3: Severn, Medway and Thames Towers – the comparison site in 2017 
 
the construction company Wates between 1959 and 1961. However, whilst the 
comparison towers were erected less than a decade after the CSS, the design of 
these three identical 15 storey blocks (each 47 metres high and containing a total of 
270, 268 and 270 flats respectively) is radically different. Indeed, their original off-
white coloured, bare concrete, monolith ‘Brutalism’ style can be identified in similar 
high-rise social housing built across Britain, Europe, the countries of the former 
Soviet Union and North America during the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
The comparison blocks were refurbished in 1993/5. However, unlike the CSS there 
was no organised tenants’ association with which the housing department could 
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liaise and thereby solicit their views. Furthermore, four years after the DOE had 
authorised considerable funding for the refurbishment of the CSS, at the comparison 
only the bare minimum necessary to ensure compliance with minimum SBD 
guidelines was invested. Sadly, during the early years of the award: 
            ...window and door requirements (were) based upon ‘specification’ as there     
            were no specific standards at this time. The windows section of SBD was    
            very basic, with a requirement only for windows to be lockable (with a  
            key). Requirements for doors mirrored those within the National House   
            Building Council security section. Armitage (2013, p.183). 
 
Three decades later, SBD continues to act as a minimum standard. However, 
successive enhancements in the minimum specified standards and certification 
demanded, mean that it is now massively advanced in terms of the quality and 
robustness of the security measures required. Moreover, local crime conditions 
enable the DOCO to demand a higher security specification for doors and windows. 
Nevertheless, this only partly explains the massive reduction in financial investment 
made at the comparison, in contrast to the CSS. It appears that because the CSS 
was one of the very first schemes to be processed through both Estate Action and 
SBD, funding for all requested security measures received DOC approval. The fact 
that the CSS had been officially opened by Harold Macmillan in 1954 may also have 
had some influence (see Chapter Six). However, four years later financial stringency 
meant that funding was markedly reduced – a common theme of central government 
investment, bidding rounds and support in recent decades. As a result, no 24/7 
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staffed concierge was introduced at the comparison (or indeed at any other high-rise 
block in Birmingham); only a very limited, non-monitored CCTV system was 
installed; no electronic communal door entry system; and perhaps most importantly, 
no new main entrance doors to each of the individual flats. Nevertheless, their stark 
appearance was ‘softened’ by way of painting the block exteriors in different pastel 
shades. 
 
CPTED Interventions recommended by the DOCO (this author) included the same 
high-quality target hardening (Newman, 1972) measures; technological innovations; 
and environmental elements as had been recommended at the CSS. However, it 
was explained by Housing Department staff that financial constraints meant only the 
minimum required to achieve an SBD could be afforded. Indeed, it appears (although 
written evidence to corroborate this statement has not been located) the DOE had 
used the then SBD homes basic level security guidelines to calculate what was 
required to ensure compliance, but at minimum financial cost. Consequently, having 
established that the entrance door to each flat was in good condition, a minimum of 
44mm thick and that it contained either none or 6.4mm thick laminated glazing, the 
only other requirement at the comparison site was for two independent locking 
systems – a surface mounted rim-latch (most often already installed) one third of the 
distance from the top of the door) and a mortise deadlock (installed one third of the 
distance from the bottom) – or vice-versa. The aim of these two locks was to spread 
the load should the door come under attack. In addition, windows were replaced with 
double glazed units – on the ground floor one pane of which was laminated safety 
glazing (a BCC Housing Department requirement). However, even before the 
refurbishment was complete, the additional security elements on the main entrance 
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doors to the individual flats proved to be too weak and residential burglaries 
continued – often it was subsequently claimed (although no tangible evidence to 
support these claims has been located) committed by drug abusers residing in the 
same tower block. 
 
Similarly, the technological innovations introduced represented a much-reduced 
version of those at the CSS. For example, there was no 24/7 staffed concierge. 
Instead, the door entry control system was linked (like that of many other high-rise 
tower blocks that were refurbished in the mid-1990s) to a central control room with 
no communication to individual flats. A very basic CCTV system was also installed, 
covering just the ground floor communal areas, producing monochrome pictures and 
merely recorded images during the years immediately following refurbishment. 
Nevertheless, and as at the CSS, electrical lighting of the internal communal areas, 
the grounds and car parks was upgraded to produce an average minimum level of 
illumination of 12 Lux. 
 
BCC’s Landscape Practice Group ensured that a raft of CPTED and SBD 
environmental elements (similar to those at the CSS), were similarly included around 
the comparison site tower blocks. Semi-public defensible space was created using 
low-level brick walls, fencing and changes in road surface texture and colour. 
Surveillance opportunities utilised the windows from the flats overlooking external 
areas and the few CCTV cameras monitoring internal areas. Territoriality was 
extended from the blocks to include the now semi-enclosed grounds, which in turn 
restricted access and movement/permeability. 
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INSTALLED DURING REFURBISHMENT CASE STUDY SITE            COMPARISON SITE 
 
INTERNAL 
New Mul-T-Point front doors to each flat 
 
 
            YES                                     NO 
New windows with laminated glass             YES                                     YES 
Installation of intruder alarms 
Grilles fitted to ground floor balconies & gates 
            NO                                       NO 
            YES                                     N/A 
New ground floor communal entrance doors             YES                                     YES 
Fob-reader access-controlled entrance system                  
CCTV inside tower blocks 
YES                                     YES 
            YES                                     YES 
24/7 staffed concierge             YES                                     NO 
 
EXTERNAL 
CCTV outside tower blocks 
 
 
            NO                                       NO 
Enhanced security lighting 
Use of external symbolic barriers 
Creation of defensible space 
Creation of territoriality 
Maximisation of surveillance opportunities 
            YES                                     YES 
            YES                                     YES 
            YES                                     YES 
            YES                                     YES 
            YES                                     YES 
 




CPTED and SBD at the CSS and comparison site 
SBD is heavily influenced by CPTED for the security standards it demands are 
incorporated into any new build or refurbished homes scheme. However, and as 
previously indicated, it is a minimum standard and this helps to explain the original 
disparity in the security elements employed at the CSS, when compared to the 
comparison site and how an SBD award was nevertheless conferred on all seven 
blocks at both sites. A quarter-century later, the SBD minimum standard is now far 
higher, having evolved through a number of periodic revisions and as the technical 
standards for the numerous security elements have themselves been updated. 
 
The greatest difference in target hardening concerns the front doors to the individual 
flats at both sites. At the comparison and in similar refurbishments across the city 
during the mid-1990s, the existing front doors were merely reinforced with the 
addition of a second locking mechanism – most often a five-lever mortise deadlock 
complying with BS 3621. Whereas, at the CSS, new high-quality doors were installed 
– ones where the frame, door and door furniture (the doorset) were constructed as a 
single entity in the factory. The latter took place almost a decade before this became 
a mandatory requirement of the new security standard PAS 24 (BSI, 1999) and its 
incorporation within SBD minimum standards.  
 
However, the inclusion of frame armour and hinge bolts in these doorsets at the CSS 
might be described as ‘over-engineering’ – or “over-fortification” (Armitage, 2013, 
p.109) meaning that the level of security they afforded was unnecessarily excessive. 
Quite apart from the high level of financial cost for these high security doors, a 
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greater concern relates to how excessive security has the capacity to compromise 
safety. Complaints from specialist police departments like the former WMP Drugs 
Squad were made, regarding their inability to force open these doors to effect arrests 
and secure evidence. More importantly, West Midlands Fire Service voiced their 
concerns about how they were delayed in gaining access and that even their 
hydraulic jacks could not circumvent the frame armour. Indeed, in the wake of the 
2017 Grenfell Tower tragedy, fire safety concerns that were manifest when the tower 
blocks of the CSS were designed, have now returned to their original and rightful 
high level of prominence. 
 
In this context, the fact that each CSS and comparison tower block were able to 
achieve a SBD award might attract particular interest – especially when this 
represented a wide spectrum in the range and quality (intensity or ‘dosage’ of the 
CPTED measures installed and the levels of subsequent crime – see Chapter 4). 
However, in the context of the earliest years of SBD (1989-1992) when the setting of 
process standards was in its infancy (SBD was launched in 1989) and before the 
majority of present-day crime science research had been conducted and published, 
a dispassionate observer might conclude that the application of CPTED (most 
especially at the CSS) was excellent. Subsequent SBD design guides (e.g. SBD – 
Homes 2019) demonstrate how SBD is constantly evolving and improving. 
 
At the CSS, the pedestrian gates at the multiple entrances to each tower block are 
designed to be left permanently open and therefore deliberately symbolic. Similarly, 
the walls and metal railing fencing can be easily climbed. And the changes in road 
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surface colour and texture are purely cosmetic. The value of such symbolic 
(psychological) barriers, especially in what was an inner-city high crime area, is open 
to considerable debate regarding their effectiveness (Shaftoe and James, 2004). 
 
Over the past quarter-century, partial refurbishments have followed the major ones 
of the early 1990s at both the CSS and comparison. For example, new PAS 24 
entrance doors to the individual flats were installed at the comparison in 2003; and a 
£400,000 upgrade of the CCTV and communication systems at the CSS in 2006. 
However, the criminogenic design (sinuous/curving and snake-like, resulting in poor 
surveillance opportunities) of a public footpath between Queens and Home Towers, 
leading to a bus stop and pedestrian crossing on Nechells Parkway, has never been 
addressed. This despite it having acted as a repeat location for robbery over three 
decades. Nevertheless, the pedestrian subway that predated the surface-level 
crossing close to this location was removed in 1999 – primarily because it was acting 
as a generator of crime and fear of crime. Whilst the fourth CSS block, South Tower, 
is located in an isolated position, a quarter of a mile (400 metres) away from the 
other three, albeit adjacent to a row of shops and Duddeston train station. 
Meanwhile, there is no evidence to suggest it has generated more crime or ASB than 
its siblings. 
 
As detailed above, at the time of refurbishment the CPTED target hardening 
measures installed at the CSS were of a far higher quality than those at the 
comparison site. In addition to the lower levels of recorded crime at the CSS, those 
that which can be directly attributed to such target hardening (most especially the 
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main entrance door to each flat) can be similarly identified in the research into the 
effectiveness of SBD by: Brown (1999); Pascoe (1999); Armitage (1999); Teedon et 
al (2009); Armitage and Monchuk (2009); Jones et al (2016). Likewise, the CPTED 
technological innovations installed at the CSS were of a higher specification than 
those introduced at the comparison. Evidence of the effectiveness of such measures 
as fob-reader, access-controlled communal door entry systems and 24/7 staffed 
concierge cannot be sourced. However, there is now a bank of research relating the 
effectiveness of lighting in reducing crime and the fear of crime (Welsh and 
Farrington, 2008). Whereas, that pertaining to CCTV is far from conclusive in terms 
of its preventive role, as detailed by Gill et al (2005).  
 
The CPTED environmental elements incorporated at both the CSS and comparison 
site are now almost identical – in that access and movement/permeability through 
the grounds of all seven tower blocks are partially restricted. Van der Voordt and Van 
Wegen’s (1990) Delft Checklist; and Armitage’s (2006) Burgess Checklist both 
highlight through movement as a: “...key factor associated with both burglary and 
crime-prone homes.” Armitage (2013, p.131). Similarly, Taylor (2002) maintains that 
increased neighbourhood permeability leads to more crime. However, this was not 
the case immediately post-refurbishment. At the CSS and for almost three decades 
there has now existed a partial denial of such access and movement/permeability – 
as delivered by brick walls, metal railing fencing and ceremonial gates. But at the 
comparison site there was no funding available for such perimeter protection, which 
was only installed retrospectively and after the turn of the century following 




Future developments and long-term sustainability 
On a sad note, the formerly active and instrumental Four Towers Tenants 
Association ceased to exist in 2006. This was apparently due to a number of causes, 
(primarily key tenants/members having passed away) and it reflects the changing 
nature of inner-city areas like Nechells in Birmingham and in cities and towns across 
the UK – in terms of age profiles, ethnicity and perhaps an ability/willingness to act in 
a community role. Such sustainability issues are addressed in Chapter Seven, 
Discussion, although these are more Involvement/mobilisation factors, together with 
a wider Implementation/Involvement context. It also demonstrates how “particularly 
motivated individuals” (Bullock, Errol and Tilley, 2006, p.15) have their own individual 
life expectancy. This sustainability issue, the replacement of enthusiastic/charismatic 
starters marries with the 5Is concept of Involvement/mobilisation. 
 
The closure of the 24/7 staffed concierge and transfer to a centralised control room 
covering multiple locations (including schools) in 2015, produced tensions. However, 
at least the potential for that most insidious form of property crime, distraction 
burglary (one where the elderly or other vulnerable groups are targeted) remains 
non-existent: no such MO was identified amongst the known 120 police recorded 
burglaries committed at the CSS and comparison during the quarter-century under 
analysis. Nevertheless, Thornton et al (2003) describe how ethnic minority 
communities report higher levels of worry about crime. This is relevant because 
when the CSS was refurbished between 1989 and 1992, the tenants occupying the 
flats were overwhelmingly white British. Indeed, with the exception of the repeatedly 
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mentioned and ‘leading light’ members of the Four Towers Tenants’ Association (one 
an Italian lady) the makeup of that association represented such heterogeneity. 
Whereas, in 2016 during the door-to-door questionnaire phase of this research 
project, it became apparent that a large proportion of the tenants at both the CSS 
and comparison are new British citizens – many of them those who have been 
granted asylum from countries such as Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. Similar ethnic 
diversity is identifiable at the comparison. 
 
The Grenfell Tower legacy 
A unique feature of the CSS tower blocks and not currently known to exist anywhere 
else in the UK or beyond, are the five (per block) enclosed fire-escapes. These are 
accessed via a door from each flat’s balcony – one at each corner of the block 
serving one flat per storey; and a fifth in the centre serving two flats per storey (see 
Appendix 7). These have never been known to be used for their purpose as 
evacuation routes and indeed, for more than six decades were generally perceived 
as an element of ‘over-engineered’ (unnecessarily excessive) fire safety. There are, 
after all, two internal staircases and two lifts per block, albeit should one lift break 
down the internal design of each tower means there is no automatic capacity for 
tenants on one side of the block (33 flats) to use the lift (or staircase) on the opposite 
side (a further 33 flats). Furthermore, during the 1980s these same fire-escapes 
became notorious as attack and escape routes for residential burglary – especially of 
void flats (the proportion of which numbered in excess of 30 per cent) where the 




However, the perceptions of such ‘over-engineering’ have hopefully changed since 
the Grenfell Tower, Kensington, London fire disaster of June 2017 when 72 people 
lost their lives. Had Grenfell Tower (and it would appear virtually all other high-rise 
tower blocks in the UK) been designed in the same manner as the CSS, there would 
have been multiple opportunities for escape. Admittedly, the 1989-92 refurbishment 
did not include any element of cladding. But in any event, having in effect your own 
private fire-escape accessed from the balcony empowers tenants to make their own 
decisions in terms of escape. This points to the highly pertinent “troublesome trade- 
offs” (Ekblom, 2008, p.210) of safety versus security – and how in the opinion of this 
author safety must always be prioritised over security (see Chapter Seven). 
 
During the 1989-1992 refurbishment, the use of these fire-escape staircases to 
execute residential burglary was all but eliminated through the installation of metal 
grilles and gates to secure all four ground floor balconies per block. In addition, new 
balcony doors (complying with the then BS 8213-4:1990 standard) and windows (BS 
7950) for each flat were installed. After 1992 very few burglaries were executed via 
this MO (detailed in Chapter 4) and in order to do so it can be presumed that 
offenders must have gained access from the balcony of another flat (Chapters Five, 
Six and Appendix 7). Furthermore, void flats were all but non-existent post 
refurbishment when the flats were then perceived as highly desirable and maximum 
occupancy resumed. 
 
Between 2018 and 2020, the latest major refurbishment of the CSS took place 
producing a high quality and distinctly post-modern white and battleship grey 
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appearance to the exterior of each block.  Work has now begun on the same 
process at the comparison. Both of these most recent refurbishments have been 




Figure 4: Home Office Minister, Baroness Blatch and Head of Housing at Birmingham City Council, 
Councillor Marge Bridle, inspect Queens Tower at the CSS in 1993. Note in the background the 
then recently installed metal grilles and gates protecting the ground floor balcony and internal 







Chapter Three  
Methodology 
 
This chapter details the methods employed in this investigation. It provides a 
rationale as to why specific approaches were used, adapted and evolved, and 
explains why certain methods were selected instead of others. In addition, the 
methodology describes the potential and real limitations associated with research 
covering an extended, very long-term timeline and most especially – the sourcing 
and accumulation of police-recorded crime data from different systems for a period 
covering close to a quarter-century. Having maintained research diaries throughout 
this investigation, the author increasingly adopted the reflexivity practices advocated 
by Holland (1999) and Finlay (2002) to challenge his own subjectivity (personal, 
interpersonal and contextual). Kelly et al’s (2017) concept of ‘embodied reflexivity’ 
can be identified within the methodological reflexivity described in this chapter – 
most especially recourse to the case study approach. Where considered necessary, 
further information regarding these methods is set out under the appropriate sub-
headings. 
 
Choice of study design 
The main focus of this study was concerned with investigating the quantitative and 
qualitative Impact of CPTED and SBD Interventions on crime at seven inner-city 
tower blocks. In the perfect Impact evaluation of a crime prevention initiative, a high 
degree of internal, construct and statistical validity might be expected. The study 
would therefore demonstrate that the Interventions had an effect on the desired 
outcome – sustained reductions in crime. The randomised controlled trial (RCT) was 
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not a viable option in this study, due to an insufficient number of areas and absence 
of assignment of control groups/areas. Quasi-experimental evaluation was 
considered in terms of appropriate design. However, there were potential issues 
relating to the absence of statistical data before and after the CPTED and SBD 
interventions were applied; and how both sites received this treatment 
(‘contamination’) – through different grades or intensity of CPTED and SBD being 
employed. This also alludes to how the 5Is provided a more nuanced means of 
assessing the effectiveness of particular CPTED measures, particularly those that 
fall under the headings of target hardening and technological innovations.  
 
Moreover, whilst quasi-experimental evaluation (Campbell and Stanley, 1963) is 
assessed at Level 3 on the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale (Farrington et al, 
2002), threats to validity means that the geographical area used as the comparison 
needs to be similar in nature, size, layout and crime problems to the target (‘action’) 
area AND free of the CPTED and SBD Interventions – which unfortunately was not 
the case with the comparison site chosen (or available) for this investigation.  
 
The research methodology was chosen on the basis of a range of factors associated 
with the data that could be used for analysis, as constrained by the complexities in 
calculating and determining the causes of whether crime patterns had been affected 
by Interventions such as CPTED and SBD. In a practical setting, such 
experimentation is extremely difficult due to the likelihood of the comparison site 
receiving at least some degree of treatment (customised types of CPTED) as had 
happened prior to this study taking place. Furthermore, this issue was compounded 
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by the sheer length of time (almost a quarter century) over which analysis was being 
conducted. 
 
As a result of all these considerations, it was decided to adopt a case study 
approach utilising mixed methods. These included: quantitative analysis of police-
recorded crime data for an extended period of 25 years; quantitative analysis of 
tenants’ questionnaire data; qualitative analysis of tenants’ extended interview data; 
and qualitative analysis of professionals’ extended interview data. However, it was 
believed necessary to distinguish between the research design (case study) and the 
data (crime data, questionnaires, interviews, historical information). This perspective 
has been used to organise investigation and analysis, concentrating on Intervention, 
mechanism, context and Implementation. Whilst focusing on its application via 
approaches to causation of/Intervention in crime via various existing frameworks: 
CCO, 11Ds, PAT, 25 techniques of SCP and the process model of the 5Is. 
 
Three elements occupied the first two phases of research: identifying the key areas 
for investigation; devising the research aims; and completing the outline programme 
of research. The deficiency of evidence concerning the sustainability of the 
effectiveness of CPTED and SBD over the very long-term (up to 25 years) was 
implicit. As detailed in Chapter One, only one study, Armitage and Monchuk (2009) 
had investigated the longer-term durability of effectiveness. Durability/sustainability 
studies are arguably deficient across the whole range of crime prevention 
Interventions (Ekblom, 2011a). This deficiency is especially important in the built 
environment where ongoing investment in new and refurbished housing is 
substantial; and insecure design and construction of housing can lead to a legacy of 
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crime lasting for decades. A detailed review of the existing literature confirmed this to 
be the case and pointed to the necessity for new research in this arena – especially 
in view of the multi-billion sterling investment being made in new and refurbished 
housing programmes, witness the then Chancellor of the Exchequer’s commitment 
to build 300,000 homes annually (Hammond, 2017). 
 
The research aims detailed in Chapter One remain a coherent package and cover 
Intervention, Implementation and Involvement issues at both the CSS and 
comparison. Taking into account the issue of assessing one set of CPTED 
Interventions with another, the CSS was identified due to its perception by DOCOs 
as the ‘Rolls Royce’ of RSL refurbishment projects in terms of the grades of CPTED 
invested – not just in Birmingham, but nationally and indeed internationally. This 
higher grade of CPTED is especially evident in respect of: the quality of the doors 
installed to each individual flat; the fob-reader, access-controlled communal entrance 
doors; and the 24/7 staffed concierge – elements originally missing at the 
comparison. However, this does not answer questions regarding why the crime 
reductions at the CSS may have been sustained for more than a quarter-century. 
Analysis and comparison of the crime statistics provides only part of the picture. 
Consequently, a detailed examination of the two sets of Interventions, their 
Implementation contexts and Involvement activity is necessarily required.    
      
Ekblom (2011a) contends there is a context of causation/Intervention and context of 
Implementation/Involvement. CPTED is a ‘tunable’ or ‘customisable’ Intervention – 
i.e. the Intervention principles are customised to context via an Implementation/ 
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Involvement process. In this context, any focused realistic discussion involving 
causal and Intervention mechanism and research methods, might naturally adopt the 
strongest and most appropriate research framework. As a result, and despite their 
links with CPTED principles rather than the 11Ds, PAT and the 25 techniques of 
situational prevention, the 5Is were considered the most appropriate form of analysis 
for this study. Indeed, the 11Ds is mechanism-oriented and already tested by 
considering the Intervention mechanisms.  
 
One of the key research aims was to investigate the mechanisms whereby CPTED 
and SBD might influence crime. With the 5Is chosen as the research framework, it 
was envisaged that the quantitative analysis (supported by the qualitative) would 
provide an Impact evaluation of the CPTED and SBD Interventions employed at both 
the CSS and comparison. However, it soon became apparent that investigating 
different crime types would be especially problematic over the very long term (up to 
25 years). For example, burglary might be relatively straightforward as it relates to a 
specific target enclosure. However, the precise location of a robbery, assault or 
vehicle crime might be assigned to the victim’s address at the CSS or comparison, 
even though the offence had taken place elsewhere. Such deficiencies became 
apparent even before detailed analysis of police records. Furthermore, an increase 
in car ownership meant tenants at both the CSS and comparison had increasing 
difficulty in finding a parking space within the confines of their block and often parked 
in the street. 
 
The 18 years of crime data for both the CSS and comparison was analysed by 
calculating year on year percentage changes for indexed crime rates. This was 
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further converted into rates for comparison purposes by another denominator – the 
number of households at the CSS and comparison site. Thus, at the CSS the rate 
was calculated by dividing by 264; at the comparison by 268. Additional analysis 
involved repeating the same exercise for each of the four tower blocks at the CSS 
and three at the comparison. 
 
Case study approach 
Following extensive research, consultation, deliberation, and evolution, it was 
decided that the overall design would follow that of a case study approach utilising 
mixed methods. In pursuit of this approach, the following practical measures were 
employed. These in turn fall into two distinct categories: methods of sampling and 
methods of data collection. This investigation began by identifying the key areas for 
research (the research aims) and more specifically, its emphasis on the elements of 
sustainable crime prevention. From the outset, SCP, CPTED and the 5Is were 
identified as the preeminent means by which the case study approach would be 
conducted. In particular, the holistic nature of the 5Is with its inclusion of Intelligence, 
Intervention, Implementation, Involvement and Impact was believed especially 
attractive as a framework for investigation (see below). 
 
The study programme                                                                                                                         
The study programme was outlined and over time has continuously evolved. It began 
with extensive reading of the existing canon of research in the fields of SCP and 
CPTED in particular. Indeed, it was the apparent deficiencies in the latter (Ekblom, 
2011a) that led to the 5Is being chosen as the means of analysis. Investigation then 
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commenced on the literature review and thereafter, assembling the potential sources 
of quantitative and qualitative data. These included a desire for: 
• Police recorded crime data – for the years 1988-2014 for both the CSS and 
comparison 
• Questionnaires – completed by the tenants at the CSS and comparison 
• Face to face extended interviews – with a sample of tenants at the CSS and 
comparison 
• Face to face extended interviews – with a sample of professionals involved in 
the original refurbishments or with the Implementation and management of 
CPTED and SBD at the CSS and comparison. 
  
Thereafter, statistical analysis of the police-recorded detailed crime data would take 
place. This could then be matched against the tenants’ quantitative questionnaire 
data and both the tenants’ and professionals’ extended interview qualitative data. 
 
5Is                                                                                                                                                                            
The 5Is are examined in detail in Chapter One. But to recap in brief, Ekblom (2011a) 
describes how they developed from the ‘preventive process’. Ekblom (1988) used 
this term to describe the rational, ‘action research’ model of crime prevention. The 
5Is (‘top-level task streams' of the crime prevention process) Interventions are: 
• Intelligence – gathering and analysing the nature, causes and negative 
consequences of a particular crime, in order to influence the crime prevention 




• Intervention – design and planning practical methods to block, divert or 
weaken the causes of future and ongoing crime, or mitigating harm already 
done. It provides focus by combining local evidence from Intelligence and 
generic evidence/knowledge of what works in practice 
• Implementation – the practical and management tasks necessary to deliver 
the Intervention methods (e.g. recruitment, training and management). 
• Involvement – intertwined with Implementation, the Involvement of other 
people and agencies to appreciate, accept, undertake, share or support the 
tasks, roles and responsibilities involved in the Implementation of preventive 
Interventions, or by otherwise providing a receptive climate 
• Impact – harvesting evidence of the effectiveness of the preventive action. 
This can then be used to improve performance; guide continuation, expansion 
and replication; accountability; and transfer into the ‘collective evidence base’. 
 
This decision to adopt the 5Is was made because it is best suited for detailing (by 
way of Intervention, Implementation, Involvement and the causal mechanisms 
underlying each) the constraints, enablers, failures, issues and problems associated 
with the practical process of crime prevention. Application of the 5Is permeates this 
study and is both an organising concept and the theoretical framework on which to 
analyse and present the findings. In particular, this includes how professionals (like 
the architects, DOCOs, housing department officials, concierge staff, planners, etc) 
undertook their roles – including Implementation and Involvement. But it also 
demonstrates how CPTED and SBD can be used to promote or restrict the activities 
of ‘agents’ (most especially offenders) and enhance the security of entities e.g. target 
enclosures like the flats and tower blocks. Much of this detail emanated from the 
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interviews with tenants and professionals and is recorded in this thesis as qualitative 
evidence (see Chapters Five and Six). 
 
Research methods timeline  
Table 4 below details the research methods timeline. The table sets out the 
individual research objectives and the methods used to achieve each one. This 
began with the Intelligence phase of the 5Is: extensive reading of a broad spectrum 
of relevant material, to establish the research strands necessary for the study and 
commence work on the literature review. There then followed a period of identifying, 
sourcing, requesting and securing police-recorded crime data for both the CSS and 
comparison, before scoping an outline methodology.  
 
The primary activity during the following period of investigation was the devising, 
repeated re-editing, testing on friends and colleagues, then distributing the tenant 
questionnaires to each one of the 532 flats at both the CSS and comparison, in 
pursuit of the collection of survey data. This was followed by authoring the tenants’ 
interview schedule and identifying for interview those professionals involved in the 
refurbishment projects, or otherwise engaged with CPTED/SBD, or housing 
management. Thereafter, a number of key processes took place during the following 
year of study: knocking on doors of each flat for the purpose of completing the tenant 
questionnaires; identifying those tenants and professionals willing to take part in the 
extended interviews; and conducting same with tenants and professionals selected 










April 2012 – 
March 2013 
 
Beginning work on the 
Literature Review 
 
Establishing the strands 






April 2013 – 
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Developing research aims 
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April 2015 – 
March 2016 
 
Devising and delivering 
tenant questionnaires.  
Identifying tenants and 




Delivering by hand 534 
questionnaires to be 
returned by post 
Devising interview 






















April 2017 – 
March 2018 
 
Identifying and sourcing 
additional crime data 
Testing hypotheses in 
relation to research 
questions 
Answering research 





professionals   
Attempting to source 
earlier crime data 











recorded crime data for 
CSS which came to light 
at a very late stage 
 
Late receipt crime data 
analysed from a 5Is 
perspective and included 
in thesis 
 




The penultimate period of study was occupied with identifying and attempting to 
secure earlier crime data covering the years of the actual refurbishments (1989-96); 
testing and answering the research aims; and drawing conclusions. Finally, the 
research extension was devoted to work on completing the thesis with the achieved 
aim of submission by 30 November 2018. During this period, it was also considered 
important to incorporate the crime analysis data for the three years 1992-1994 
solelyfor the CSS and that had been produced at relatively late notice. These final 
stages of the investigation encapsulated the Impact and process evaluation of the 
5Is. 
 
Sample selection                                                                                           
Identifying two entirely comparable sites containing high-rise tower blocks (the CSS 
and comparison) is all but impossible – it being highly unlikely that such a pair of 
locations will be perfectly matched. Furthermore, following a review of all the 
remaining tower blocks, there was a desire to select a CSS and comparison as a 
pair and for a number of specific compatibility reasons. First, a desire to choose two 
sites that had existed since the beginning of the high-rise boom in the 1950s. 
Second, relatively close proximity to each other in order to reduce differences 
caused by geographical location. Third, a similar total of dwellings in each. And 
fourth, ideally one site where CPTED measures had been incorporated, whereas 




In reality, when this investigation began in 2012 it was impossible to locate any site 
that had not received at least some grade of CPTED. Those that might have been 
appropriate for this purpose had all been demolished by that time. Consequently, the 
decision to choose these particular sites was made with the following rationale: 
refurbishment at the CSS had used a far higher grade of CPTED than was mandated 
by SBD. Whereas, at the comparison the CPTED measures were of a lesser grade, 
yet still met the SBD minimum standards. Furthermore, both sites occupy what was 
in the 1950s a Second World War bomb-damaged and slum clearance location 
within the Duddeston and Nechells Redevelopment Area. 
 
Selection of the CSS  
The CSS is described extensively in Chapter Two. But in brief, The Four Towers – 
consisting of Queens, Home, High and South Towers were constructed between 
1951 and 1953 and were the first such high-rise blocks built in Birmingham and 
amongst the earliest in the UK. By the late 1980s they required urgent refurbishment. 
A causal element of the latter was the incidence of crime and ASB then present in all 
four blocks. As a direct consequence, BCC Housing, and Planning and Architecture 
departments consulted the newly created posts of DOCO within WMP and decided 
to incorporate CPTED measures as part of the high calibre refurbishment process. 
This was the first known occasion in the UK that CPTED measures had been 
deliberately incorporated into a high-rise, RSL refurbishment project. These higher 
grade CPTED measures included: new and far stronger entrance doors to each flat, 
incorporating multi-point locking, hinge bolts and frame armour; laminated safety 
glass in all ground floor windows; new security grilles and gates to all ground floor 
balconies; fob-reader, access-controlled main entrance doors to each block; a 24/7 
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staffed concierge service; and the incorporation of CPTED environmental elements 
to the grounds surrounding each block. These measures far exceeded the minimum 
standard required by SBD at that time. Furthermore, because this refurbishment took 
place between 1989-1992 and immediately following the launch of the SBD award in 
1989, The Four Towers were also the first high-rise blocks to receive such an 
accolade anywhere in the UK.   
 
Selection of the comparison site 
When the comparison was chosen, more than half of Birmingham’s original 464 
blocks of six or more storeys (Jones, 2002) had been demolished and all those 
remaining had received at least some degree of customized CPTED treatment over 
recent decades. After considerable research, a comparison site of three tower blocks 
was chosen – largely because they were the closest approximation to a CPTED-free 
location. Indeed, the author of this thesis had worked on the refurbishment of the 
comparison as a police DOCO between 1992-1994 when they had received the 
minimum level of CPTED treatment necessary to achieve an SBD award.  
 
The comparison blocks are located all but adjacent to the CSS, but on opposite 
sides of the Nechells Parkway dual carriageway – a major route into and out of 
Birmingham city centre. The three comparison tower blocks, Severn, Thames and 
Medway) were constructed between 1959-1961 and were subject to a major 
refurbishment during 1993-1995.  Once again, crime and ASB were contributory 
elements in necessitating that work. Severn, Thames and Medway towers had 
similarly received an SBD award each. However, the CPTED treatment at the 
comparison site was far less intensive than that at the CSS. And to add further 
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complication, during the course of this study it became apparent that over the 
subsequent quarter-century, BCC Housing Department had found it necessary to 
install additional CPTED measures. As far as could be ascertained, the differential 
grading decisions had nothing to do with differential crime levels and therefore, could 
not be considered as confounding the evaluation design. 
     
For example, whilst the CSS consists of four tower blocks and the comparison site 
three, the total number of flats in each (264 and 268) represents a very close 
approximation. Similarly, construction of all seven blocks began in the 1950s – albeit 
at either end of that decade. Both the CSS and comparison had been built and 
continue to be managed by the same RSL (BCC Housing Department). And the first 
major refurbishment of each took place in the early 1990s – including the wide 
disparity in the grades of CPTED invested at the two separate locations and the 
major impetus for this thesis. This is all fully detailed in Chapter Two. Most 
importantly and the ultimate reason for choosing the CSS and comparison as a 
pairing, whilst they had both received SBD awards, they lay at opposite ends of the 
spectrum in terms of the grades of CPTED treatment each had received. The 
inherent weaknesses in this selection were the facts that each site had received both 
CPTED treatment and SBD awards – it proving to be impossible to identify an 
‘uncontaminated’ comparison. However, these weaknesses delivered some 
unexpected positive outcomes – as detailed in the findings’ chapters.          
 
Sampling 
A key method employed in this study involved selection and interview of tenants from 
both the CSS and comparison site; together with professionals involved in the 
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refurbishment of the CSS and/or comparison, their management, or in the CPTED 
and SBD processes. All the tenants selected for interview had without exception 
completed the door-door questionnaire, conducted by the researcher by knocking on 
the doors of each of the 532 flats at both sites. This followed a very poor response to 
the postal questionnaire – detailed below. The results of the successful door-to-door 
questionnaire and extended interview exercises, are detailed in Chapter Five.   
 
Tenants’ sampling                                                                                                     
To ensure the results of this study possess adequate external validity, it was 
important that the tenants and professionals subsequently interviewed were selected 
in an appropriate way. For this purpose, a number of sampling techniques were 
employed: 
• Snowball sampling – a non-probability sampling technique whereby existing 
subjects recruit/suggest future subjects from amongst their peers/former 
peers. In this investigation this was useful in identifying and interviewing 
some of the professionals 
• Convenience sampling – a non-probability sampling technique where 
subjects are selected according to their accessibility and proximity to the 
researcher. This applied to all the tenants questioned and interviewed and to 
the majority of professionals interviewed.  
• Opportunity sampling – a non-probability sampling technique that uses the 
knowledge and experience of the researcher to identify the sample. 
Especially relevant in this investigation where the researcher used his own 
contacts involved in the refurbishments of the CSS and comparison.    
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Non-probability or purposive sampling was used for the qualitative tenant interviews 
(22 in total), where participants were selected because of their willingness to be 
questioned and relevance of their length of tenancy, location of their flat within the 
block and crime experience (if any). 
 
However, before this sampling took place, it was necessary to first complete the 
tenant questionnaires. Following a failed exercise in postal questionnaires, this was 
achieved by knocking (often repeatedly over a period of 12 weeks duration) on the 
entrance doors to each of the 532 flats at the seven tower blocks of the CSS and 
comparison. As a result, 286 tenant questionnaires were completed for all seven 
CSS and comparison tower blocks: 148 at the CSS; 138 at the comparison site. 
Unoccupied flats and those tenants unwilling to respond to the questionnaire are not 
represented in these figures. This produces a response rate of 56.06 per cent at the 
CSS; 51.49 per cent at the comparison – and slightly lower than at the CSS. A 
breakdown of the age categories of tenants, household size and length of tenancy is 
provided in Chapter Five. Furthermore, it is believed this demonstrates how these 
findings form a sample in a particular situation at a particular time and are 
representative, or typical of all tenants at both the CSS and comparison. 
 
Professionals’ sampling                                                                                            
In the first instance, the majority of professionals were selected by the researcher 
with the knowledge that they worked in the relevant sector and were interested and 
willing to be interviewed (convenience sampling). Three were recommended by other 
professionals (snowball sampling). All twelve were evenly divided (four each) on the 
basis of their having considerable experience in one of the following three 
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disciplines: Involvement in the refurbishment of the CSS and/or comparison site; as 
DOCOs; or management of a high-rise housing scheme.  
 
Crime categories investigated 
For the purposes of this thesis, six different crime categories were originally 
identified as appropriate for investigation: residential burglary, robbery, assaults and 
woundings, vehicle crime, criminal damage and ‘other’ crime. However, over time the 
categories have expanded to include the following: 
• residential burglary, non-residential burglary, aggravated burglary and 
attempts 
• robbery, assault with intent to rob and theft from the person  
• assaults, woundings, GBH (grievous bodily harm) and homicide  
• all forms of vehicle crime 
• criminal damage and arson 
• all ‘other’ recorded crime.  
Hereafter, these categories are known simply as burglary, robbery, assaults, vehicle 
crime, criminal damage and ‘other’ crime.  
 
The rationale for choosing these six categories has a number of strands. First, to 
include all recorded offences that come under the substantive heading. Second, 
such inclusivity assists in rebutting any claim that important categories of offence 
(e.g. attempts) have been missed. Third, all six crime categories were now 
deliberately and sufficiently wide to ensure that no ‘masking’ was taking place. 
‘Masking’ refers to where a substantive crime is recorded under a less serious 
heading and thereby the incidence of the former is reduced. Historically, ‘masking’ 
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can be traced back to the creation of the Metropolitan Police in 1829. Police 
Commissioners and Chief Constables were repeatedly called before their ‘Watch 
Committees’ (consisting of Justices of the Peace and elected councillors) to explain 
(and if necessary, negate) increases in crime. Consequently, any form of ‘sleight of 
hand’ that placed a crime in a lesser category was often utilised by senior police 
managers (Radzinowicz and Hood, 1968); Stevenson, Cox and Channing (2017). 
 
Investigating the 18 years’ crime data set and more specifically, analysing the MO 
information supplied by WMP, minor questions could be asked in four of the six 
crime categories. However, in the second (robbery and theft from the person) there 
were a few instances of force being used or threatened (thereby constituting the 
crime of robbery) and yet the recorded classification was that of theft from the person 
– a relatively minor offence.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the overall aim was to provide a wide spectrum of 
crime types – not limited solely to those most susceptible to the CPTED and SBD 
approaches e.g. property crime. Similarly, there was a desire that the data should 
provide a large enough number of offences to permit both a detailed crime analysis 
and realistic measurement of changes at both the CSS and comparison. 
 
The limitations associated with the analysis of these offences, are magnified by the 
accuracy of the recorded crime data for the offence in question. As the original data 
supplied by WMP covered a time period of 18 years, consideration was necessarily 
given to repeated changes in definition, Home Office accounting rules, police beat 
designation and the recording of such information during these near two decades. 
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Nevertheless, such changes in recording can be expected to have affected both the 
CSS and comparison to a near equal extent. It should also be noted that once the 
onsite 24/7 staffed concierge at the CSS went live in November 1992, its immediate 
presence may have encouraged a greater willingness to report crime by those 
tenants residing within its four tower blocks. 
 
Those crime types that were not specifically examined (primarily because the 
incidence of each was relatively small) include: bilking (making off without payment), 
driving offences, drug dealing/cultivation, firearms offences, fraud, handling stolen 
goods, harassment, kidnapping, possessing offensive weapons, racially-aggravated 
offences and sexual offences. These offences are, however, included under the sixth 
category heading of ‘other’ crime. 
 
Data sets used and harvesting 
The data sets used and harvesting can be split into four distinct parts: the police-
recorded crime data; questionnaires for the 532 households at both the CSS and 
comparison; interviews with a cross-section of the 286 tenants who had opened the 
door and agreed to answer the questions posed in the questionnaires; and 
interviews with a cross-section of professionals involved in the refurbishments or 
subsequent management of the CSS or comparison, or with the application of 
CPTED or SBD on social housing refurbishment projects. Local BCC Housing 
Department officials indicated that access to email by tenants at both the CSS and 
comparison, was especially low. Consequently, and knowing that e-mail surveys 
have response rates lower than postal surveys, this method of soliciting tenants’ 




Police-recorded crime data 
A request was made to WMP for recorded crime data covering the period 1988–
2014 (thereby including the period pre- and post-refurbishment). It asked that all 
crime data held in respect of the CSS and comparison be included and anonymised, 
with the exception of the actual flat numbers – requested in order to facilitate 
whether ground floor flats (or those on any specific floor) were being targeted by 
offenders. Data fields included: full location details, offence, date of the offence, date 
reported, police crime reference number, MO, description, category description, 
property stolen, make, model and colour (for motor vehicles) and crime status. 
 
The data provided by WMP amounted to a total of 1458 recorded offences covering 
the 18 years period 1997 through to 2014 at both the CSS and comparison site. 
However, WMP were unable to provide data for the period 1988-1996 as requested, 
stating that such data was no longer available. There were subsequent suggestions 
that this data might still be held on an older hard drive. However, with the exception 
of three years of crime data covering the period 1992-1994 at solely the CSS and 
which came to light at late notice, the earlier crime data has never materialised. 
 
Police crime data coming to light at late notice                                                                         
Crime data came to light at relatively late notice for the CSS alone and covering the 
essential years 1992-1994 – when the refurbishment was being completed and the 
two years immediately thereafter. This data had been produced as an assessment of 
the effectiveness of SBD at the CSS by the local police DOCO and at the request of 
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the sub-divisional commander. The hard copy is dated 7 November 1994 and was 
produced in the linked-page printer format that was the norm during the mid-1990s. 
Most importantly, it includes all the same criteria headings included in the 18 years of 
recorded crime data originally provided by WMP. Namely: crime reference number, 
offence description, date(s) and time(s) of offence, MO and property details.   
 
Tenant questionnaires                                                                                      
The self-completion tenant questionnaire was originally considered the most 
appropriate means of harvesting data from a large constituency – 532 tenant 
households. Such questionnaires are generally perceived as less time consuming 
and more cost-effective than telephone or face-to-face interviews. Self-completion 
also permits anonymity, increased openness and encourages participation and 
honesty – especially where sensitive issues (for example being a victim of crime) are 
being discussed. However, they are also prone to reduced control over the question 
order, individual context and respondents misunderstanding the questions.  
 
The first draft followed extensive background reading, including assessment of the 
existing research and review of methodological recommendations for conducting 
such surveys. Questions considered relevant were adopted and amended, in order 
to make them more appropriate for the investigation. In addition, the questionnaire 
was deliberately designed to produce anonymised information (no names, gender, or 
ethnicity questions posed), whilst simultaneously maximising the information 
produced in terms of tenant history, experience of crime, fear of crime and ASB. In 
view of the notable differences between the CSS and comparison (in particular a 
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higher grade of CPTED measures installed at the former – most especially the front 
entrance doors to each flat, communal entrance doors and 24/7 staffed concierge 
scheme), questions were simple, straightforward and closed, with predetermined 
response sets predominantly used. A 5-point Likert scale (Trochim, 2007) was 
utilised for most closed questions, ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ 
and with a neutral ‘neither agree or disagree’ central point. In addition, a few open-
ended questions were included to ensure the questionnaire would capture more 
specific in-depth data in respect of crime in the area. 
 
To enhance content validity, this draft questionnaire was subject to a piloting 
process. Consequently, in addition to repeated recommendations from the SV team, 
a hard copy of the questionnaire was given to a cross-section of 11 colleagues of the 
researcher, asking for their observations. Confidentiality of their answers was 
assured and each was encouraged to raise any pertinent issues regarding the 
research, content or structure of the questionnaire. All 11 responded, delivering 
highly relevant suggestions (especially in relation to simplifying the language used) 
many of which were incorporated into successive redesigns of the questionnaire. 
This piloting exercise helped to ensure the questions were clear, meaningful and 
designed to maximise the production of measurable responses, with the overall 
purpose of enhanced content validity. Furthermore, this directly influenced the style 
of questioning that was ultimately adopted for the extended, one-to-one interviews 
(see below). The final version of the questionnaire was then printed for distribution 




To ensure guarantee of receipt, the questionnaire was delivered by hand with the 
researcher visiting each of the 264 flats in the four tower blocks at the CSS and the 
268 flats in the three blocks of the comparison. Each questionnaire was 
accompanied by a consent form and postage paid return envelope, addressed to the 
PGR office at the university, together with an introductory letter – again carefully 
edited with the aim of attracting the reader’s interest and response. This letter 
included a brief précis concerning the investigation, before setting out confidentiality 
issues, questionnaire completion and postal return. Copies of the covering letter and 
consent form are provided as Appendices 3 and 4. 
 
Self-completion questionnaires are generally perceived to engender low response 
rates and indeed, such a threat was the pre-eminent concern during this part of the 
investigation. Nevertheless, it came as a great disappointment that at both the CSS 
and comparison, this produced a very poor response rate with only 18 (3.4 per cent) 
completed and returned. Consequently, advice was sought from the SV team who 
suggested that because of the passage of time, including both ‘phases’ would give 
data from two very distinct time periods that could influence opinions about crime 
and safety. It was therefore necessary to repeat the exercise courtesy of an in 
person, flat-to-flat ‘knocking on doors’ exercise. This advice was accepted and the 
necessary arrangements made and authority sought from BCC Housing Department.  
 
With an additional question added to the schedule (in respect of their knowledge of 
the SBD award – see Appendix 2), the flat-to-flat questionnaire phase was 
undertaken over a 12-week period during the spring of 2016 – a highly demanding 
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exercise involving repeated visits to the tower blocks and individual flats. These visits 
always took place on weekdays and during daylight hours, to ensure tenants were 
put at ease – an issue reinforced by university identification being displayed and 
shown to each tenant household. Those questioned were either the first person to 
open the door or a member of the household who self-nominated. This resulted in 
286 questionnaires being completed producing a response of 53.8 per cent. Perhaps 
more importantly, the tenant questionnaires completed as a result of knocking on the 
doors to each flat led to the identification of those tenants willing to be further 
interviewed at length. None of the original 18 returned questionnaires had provided a 
positive response to this question. 
 
During this flat-to-flat questionnaire phase, the same covering letter was given to 
each tenant, informing them that their responses would be treated in strictest 
confidence and they could not be traced from the answers provided. This procedure 
was repeated during the following interview phases and with both the tenants and 
professionals (see below). In accordance with ethical considerations and regulations, 
the names of interviewees have been kept confidential and those quotations that 
appear in this thesis and derived from the interviews are fully anonymised. 
 
A database was established on a secure, standalone and non-networked computer 
to permit storage of the research data. This database included repeatedly updated 
SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) and Microsoft Office Excel files, 
in which the harvested data was inputted. Used primarily for the quantitative 
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statistical analysis, these recording systems also provided thematic analysis of the 
answers provided by the tenants and professionals.   
 
Having established their age category, length of tenancy and size of household, the 
tenants’ perceptions of safety and security inside their flats, in the communal areas, 
grounds and surrounding streets were also solicited – together with their willingness 
to venture out at night and the forms of transport used (including car ownership). 
They were asked to rank in terms of perceived effectiveness the physical security 
systems installed in their tower blocks: entrance doors and windows; ground floor 
communal entrance doors and fob-reader, access-controlled, electronically operated 
communal entrance doors; CCTV system; security guards; and ‘other’ (their 
suggestions). The tenants’ perceptions of crime in the local area, in the inner-city 
district of Nechells and Birmingham as a city were also asked. Finally, their 
willingness to be further interviewed at length was solicited.                                                              
 
Potential biases in those who agreed to respond might take a number of forms. For 
example: for many of the tenants their command of spoken English was poor; those 
from distinct cultural or religious backgrounds might be unwilling to answer the door, 
especially where gender (either theirs or that of the questioner/interviewer was an 
issue); or those traumatised by crime experiences may have been unwilling to be 
interviewed or indeed respond to callers at the door.  
 
The actual breakdown of questionnaire responses was as follows: 
CSS (66 flats per block) 
Queens Tower – 38 questionnaires completed (57.6%) 
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Home Tower – 39 questionnaires completed (59.1%) 
High Tower – 36 questionnaires completed (54.5%) 
South Tower – 35 questionnaires completed (53.0%) 
 
Comparison site (90, 88 and 90 flats per block) 
Severn Tower – 46 questionnaires completed (51.1%) 
Thames Tower – 47 questionnaires completed (53.4%) 
Medway Tower – 45 questionnaires completed (50.0%) 
  
The results of this flat-to-flat tenant questionnaire phase produced valuable results 
that led to the following courses of action: 
• Data used to populate the SPSS and excel spreadsheets 
• Identifying those tenants willing to be further interviewed 
• Complementing the subsequent responses given in both the tenants’ and 
professionals’ interviews. 
 
All completed questionnaires were given an identifying code before being inputted 
and analysed using SPSS. Numerical data were analysed using descriptive statistics 
(frequencies, cross-tabulations and correlations). In contrast, the qualitative data was 
subject to a coding frame and thematic analysis. Significance tests were carried out 
across a wide range of comparisons and based on the chi-square statistic using a 
0.01 significance level. Further information in respect of results analysis and 




Tenants’ interviews                                                                                                       
A specific question contained in the tenant questionnaire asked whether they were 
willing to be further interviewed at length and in more detail. In total, 22 tenants at 
both the CSS and comparison were further interviewed – although more than twice 
that number (56) had originally volunteered for this purpose. Consequently, the 22 
were selected on the basis of representing a cross-section (in terms of age, 
household size, length of tenancy, location of their flat within the block; experience of 
crime and/or ASB); and as tenants from across all seven tower blocks. 
 
In a similar vein (albeit a lesson learnt from first piloting the questionnaires amongst 
a group of friends and colleagues), a semi-structured style of interviewing was 
adopted – as set out in the interview schedule (see Appendix 5). This meant that 
whilst new information provided during the previous questionnaire phase now 
influenced the style and type of questions asked, their overall number was reduced 
in order to improve the flow of information – one that permitted the interviewees to 
deliberate and expand on their responses. 
 
The invitation to be interviewed was made by phone – the individuals in question 
having provided their contact details when they volunteered to be further interviewed. 
Prior to the interview each participant was given an information sheet (see Appendix 
3) that: introduced the researcher; explained the purpose and nature of the research 
including their selection; confidentiality issues; length of the interview; that it would 
be recorded; brief description of the study; research aims; methods used; and 
envisaged outcomes. The purpose of the written consent form (see Appendix 4) was 
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also explained to each tenant interviewee, which they were then asked to sign 
immediately prior to the interview commencing. 
 
In practice, male tenant interviewees were willing to be interviewed inside their flats 
on a one-to-one basis. However, and with the researcher/interviewer being male, 
female tenants were less amenable to being interviewed alone. To mitigate this 
situation, the offer was made to meet in a neutral environment, or that they be 
interviewed when a relative or friends of theirs were present. Prior to the interview, 
each tenant was informed that they could withdraw at any point. All interviews were 
audio recorded electronically (with the prior consent of the interviewee) and it was 
further explained how a subsequent transcript would be completed, together with the 
university’s policy on the length of time such transcripts would be kept prior to 
destruction, as set out in the consent form. At no point did the researcher disclose 
that he was a retired police officer.  
 
Professionals’ interviews                                                                                      
The professionals were selected for interview, largely on the basis of previous and/or 
existing personal contact, and their roles in relation to the CSS or comparison site. 
Other professionals were identified through snowball sampling and similarly known 
to be or had been operating in the fields of CPTED, SBD or housing management. 
Many of these professionals appeared (and repeatedly claimed) to be far more 
objective if not “liberated” from their former career restraints. They too were provided 
with the information sheet and asked to sign the interview consent form (see 
Appendices 3 and 4). As with the tenant interview schedule, a less prescriptive, 
semi-structured style of interview schedule (see Appendix 6) was adopted and for 
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the same purpose: to enable all the professionals to speak for themselves and 
without hindrance.         
 
The Professionals Professional Background 
Number One Former housing professional 
Number Two Former architect 
Number Three Former housing surveyor 
Number Four Former housing manager 
Number Five Former police DOCO 
Number Six Former police DOCO 
Number Seven Former police DOCO & manager 
Number Eight Former police DOCO 
Number Nine Former housing manager 
Number Ten Former planner 
Number Eleven Former housing manager 
Number Twelve Former housing professional 
 
Table 5: Roles of Professionals interviewed 
 
In total, a series of 12 semi-structured face-to-face interviews were conducted with 
these professionals. All had been involved with the refurbishment of the CSS and/or 
comparison, or were DOCOs, or involved in the subsequent management of the two 
sites (see Table 5 below). Each interview was audio recorded electronically with the 
participant’s consent, in order to permit a more free-flowing style. A transcript of each 
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recording was subsequently created in hard copy, written form and the original digital 
recording immediately destroyed thereafter. 
 
In both the questionnaire and interview phases the researcher’s previous experience 
in interviewing offenders, police officers and witnesses (both in the UK and abroad), 
proved to be highly beneficial in this part of the investigation. In particular, the ability 
to put the interviewee at ease and acting as a neutral arbiter, whilst simultaneously 
avoiding leading questions, interviewer bias and being prepared to listen – often with 
deliberate pregnant pauses. This permitted the interviewee to speak freely, without 
prompting or hindrance and solicited inordinate additional detail and information. 
 
Analysis conducted 
Located at the heart of this study lie four separate caches of information obtained for 
analysis: the quantitative recorded crime data supplied by WMP in respect of both 
the CSS and comparison; the quantitative information provided by the tenants at the 
CSS and comparison during the questionnaire phase of this study; the qualitative 
responses provided by the tenants at the CSS and comparison selected for 
extended interview; and the qualitative responses provided by the professionals 
involved in the refurbishment or subsequent management of the two sites, or as a 
DOCO who had worked on similar refurbishment projects. 
 
Crime analysis 
A key element of this study is the analysis of recorded crime data supplied by WMP 
and covering 18 years between 1997-2014 at both the CSS and comparison. Such 
data was provided in an anonymised format with no tenant or gender details. 
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However, and as requested it does include the flat number, crime as recorded, dates 
and times of commission together with the full MO description. In addition (albeit at 
late notice), three years of detailed recorded crime information covering the period 
1992-1994 came to light – but only for the CSS. This data is considered to be of 
great importance because it includes the final year of refurbishment (1992) at the 
CSS and charts the sudden drop in crime as the front doors to each flat were 
installed, the fob-reader electronically-operated communal entrance doors activated 
and the 24/7 staffed concierge went live – together with the two following years 
during which the sustainable effectiveness of the crime prevention measures can be 
assessed.      
    
Thematic analysis 
A series of themes can be identified as emanating from the interview transcripts. 
These are examined in depth within chapters five (tenants) and six (professionals). 
For the purposes of this methodology, a number of repeated themes can be 
identified across the interview transcripts. These include: higher grade CPTED at the 
CSS; lower grade CPTED at the comparison; value of the Four Towers Tenants’ 
Association; association with former prime minister Harold Macmillan; over-
engineering of the Mul-T-Secure doors; durability of the communal entrance doors; 
value and loss of the 24/7 staffed concierge at the CSS; minimum standard SBD; 
necessity to feel safe not only within the individual flat, but also in the communal 
areas and grounds; importance of being able to get out of the flat in an emergency; 
reliability of the lifts and other services within the block; and council ownership of the 






Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2002) illustrate a number of internal validity threats 
including: 
• Causal order – where there is a debate as to which came first: Intervention or 
outcome? 
• Differential attrition – figures for the experimental area (the CSS in this thesis) 
are ‘lost’ at the comparison site 
• History – an event simultaneous with that of the Intervention causes the effect 
• Instrumentation and testing – measuring the outcome or changes to it 
• Maturation – when the pre-existing tendency continues 
• Regression to the mean – where post-application, natural fluctuations are 
mistook as resulting from the Intervention 
• Selection – where the result reflects pre-existing differences between (in this 
study) the CSS and comparison. 
 
Internal validity issues: selection, history and maturation 
Changes in crime rates over time may result from factors other than the introduction 
of CPTED and SBD. Three major threats to the internal validity of the findings within 
this investigation were considered: selection, history and maturation. The ‘selection’ 
of the comparison site was not perfect, because (as previously detailed) similar 
‘treatment’ had been applied at both locations – and was periodically reapplied. The 
‘history’ effect forms another threat. An event other than CPTED and SBD may have 
taken place during the period under study and thereby influenced the outcome (the 
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crime rates). Indeed, the incidence of crime might be influenced by other factors for 
example: 
• Policing initiatives e.g. high visibility policing, targeted police operations, or 
other changes in policing tactics such as increased use of ANPR, or ‘stop and 
search’ under PACE (Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984) 
• Economic and social factors e.g. higher or lower levels of unemployment; 
increased prices for commodities such as food, fuel or vehicles; local 
regeneration schemes; large sporting events; etc. 
• Home Office and local changes in recording practices and counting rules for 
certain types of offences 
• Improved vehicle design incorporating new forms of security such as car 
alarms and immobilisers, reducing the theft of same or producing new forms 
of MO e.g. ‘car key burglary’. 
 
Maturation 
Maturation can be identified as another potential threat to validity, where the 
reduction or increase simply reflects a continuation of pre-existing trends for the 
crimes being analysed. Steps taken to minimise these issues/threats include: 
awareness that the selection of the CSS and comparison were not perfect; that 
during such a long period (history) of analysis, other events and Interventions were 
inevitable and their Impact considered; a similar necessity to consider the effects of 
maturation; and cross reference with local and national crime trends.  
 
Construct validity issues: police crime data 
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Construct validity refers to the degree to which a test measures what it claims, or 
purports to be measuring. The main threat it faces involves the accuracy of police-
recorded crime data and its adequacy in reflecting the true rate of crime. Police-
recorded crime statistics are generally accepted to act as a good measure of trends 
in well-reported crimes. However, they do not include crimes not so reported or 
where the police choose not to record them. The 2007/08 British Crime Survey 
suggested as much as 58% of all crime is not reported to the police. And whilst 93% 
of theft of motor vehicles are likely to be reported (for insurance purposes), levels of 
reporting for assaults (including domestic violence) measured an especially low 35% 
during this investigation (2007-08 British Crime Survey). The quality of the crime 
data recorded by the police provides another issue. Chapter Four, Crime Analysis, 
discusses the reason for merging the offence of robbery with that of theft from the 
person into a single crime category – on the basis that many of the former (a serious 
crime) are repeatedly classified as the latter (far less serious). Indeed, according to 
the Guardian (2014) the UK Statistics Authority was so concerned that following its 
review of police data it removed its ‘gold standard’ status. 
 
In addition, ‘the dark figure of crime’ (Biderman and Reiss, 1967) includes that which 
is unreported or otherwise unknown and questions the effectiveness and efficiency 
of official recording systems. For a crime to be recorded requires three elements: a 
person who knows it has been committed; reporting to the relevant authority; and 
accepted by that authority as a having contravened the law (Coleman and Moynihan, 
1996). If any of these three elements are missing or fail, the crime will go 
unrecorded. Nevertheless, according to Mosher (2002) public awareness of crime 





Each phase of this investigation has been conscious of the necessity to produce 
evidence regarding the effectiveness of the CPTED and SBD approaches – using 
the 5Is as the research framework. Analysis of the crime data alone (whilst valuable) 
is insufficient – and thus the desire and necessity to assess this in the context of the 
quantitative and qualitative data emanating from the tenant questionnaires and the 
interviews with both tenants and professionals. Furthermore, use of the 5Is enables 
a more detailed and nuanced analysis of the CPTED measures employed at the 
CSS and comparison. 
 
This case study approach includes three findings chapters: Crime Analysis; Tenants’ 
questionnaire and interview data; Professionals interview data. The higher grade 
CPTED measures employed at the CSS, are compared to the originally lesser grade 
at the comparison – with measurable results in terms of the reduction in police-
recorded crime achieved across a broad range of crime categories and burglary in 
particular. Furthermore, on completion of refurbishment all seven tower blocks 
satisfied the minimum criteria necessary to achieve SBD awards.    
 
Ethical considerations 
This research investigation has been conducted in a manner that complies with 
standard ethical procedures. For this purpose, these include: those authored by the 
University of Huddersfield’s SREP; British Society of Criminology’s Code of Ethics 
for Researchers in the Field of Criminology (2006); and British Psychological 
Society’s Ethical Principles for Conducting Research with Human Participants 
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(2014). Such requirements included: obtaining informed consent from all those who 
took part; relaying information about how they could withdraw from the project at any 
time of their choosing; handling all information provided in strict confidence and 
anonymity; and reporting on the subject matter responsibly. No special health and 
safety or sensitivity issues were understood to exist in relation to those taking part – 
the police, LA personnel, or the public. 
 
Prior to conducting this thesis, the researcher had gained full approval from the 
University of Huddersfield’s School Research Ethics Panel (SREP). His application 
detailed the proposed methods used in the study, together with a covering account 
of the aims and objectives of the investigation. The application also included draft 
letters of invitation, questionnaires, interview schedules and consent forms. 
Collectively, the aim was to satisfy the SREP that those chosen to be questioned 
and interviewed would not suffer unnecessary invasions of privacy, leading 
questions, or labelling. 
 
From the very outset of this investigation, the researcher was conscious of the 
necessity to ensure data was collected, analysed and stored in accordance with the 
requirements of relevant legislation and other procedures. These included the 
Human Rights Act (1998), Data Protection Acts (1998 and 2018), Public Interest 
Disclosure Act (1998), General Data Protection Regulation (2018) and other 
restrictions relating to information sharing. 
 
WMP required a Data Processing Agreement was put in place in order to facilitate 
the sharing of police-recorded crime data (including personal data) and to comply 
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with the Data Protection Act 1998. All such personal data was securely stored 
(encrypted and password protected), analysed and in due course will be destroyed – 
in accordance with the data sharing protocols agreed with the Data Protection Officer 
at WMP. On completion of the thesis, all police data will be destroyed as required. 
Other data will be stored securely for five years before being destroyed. 
 
Having entered the police crime prevention discipline and become a DOCO in 1992, 
the researcher was the longest serving practitioner and manager in these disciplines 
in UK policing when he retired in 2011 following 33 years’ service and maintained 
subsequently in near identical professional roles. Consequently, he is only too aware 
that his advocacy of CPTED and SBD demonstrates an automatic bias in favour of 
these approaches – and this despite the fact that recommendations made in respect 
of the 1989-92 refurbishment of the CSS predate his Involvement in the discipline. 
As a consequence, he has attempted to maintain a critical and detached observation 
of CPTED and SBD during the course of this investigation – witness his questioning 
of the supposed evidence of the effectiveness of these approaches, beginning in the 
Introduction and maintained throughout this thesis. 
 
Additional issues 
It also became apparent early during the door-to-door tenant questionnaire process 
detailed previously, that requiring tenants to nominate (and grade) a fifth security 
element for inclusion was too confusing. Consequently, the category of ‘least 
important’ does not appear in Tables 59 and 60 in Chapter Five below. Nevertheless, 
tenants often nominated a fifth element – especially at the CSS where ‘return of the 





Mobilisation of the tenants was self-generated at the CSS. Whereas, at the 
comparison the absence of an organised group meant that attempts to motivate and 
consult the tenants proved very difficult and impossible to sustain (see Chapter Six 
which also discusses multiple-mobilisation of the council and police professionals). 
Consequently, consultation, accountability and the ability to build collaborative 
capacity were self-evident at the CSS. In the context of important practice 
knowledge, the existence of a body representing the tenants is both highly 
advantageous and points to the risks and blockages encountered at the comparison 
where no such group existed. 
 
Context of evaluation points to this investigation being an external, independent, and 
one-off academic exercise. Whilst the methodology of evaluation indicates this is a 
qualitative, action-comparison investigation using police-recorded and tenant self-
reported crime data, together with both quantitative qualitative data obtained from 






Figure 5: Following the 2018-2020 major refurbishment of the CSS, all the balconies are now 
enclosed and protected at ground floor level by outward-opening fire-doors. The location of the 

















This first of the three ‘findings’ chapters, Crime Analysis, is devoted to an 
examination of the police-recorded crime data. It involves a detailed study covering 
an especially extensive timeframe of close to 25 years for the period 1992-2014. In 
this and the subsequent findings chapters, the research aims will remain at the 
forefront of the investigation. 
 
Crime data methodology used in the current study 
As detailed in Chapter Three, Methodology, this investigation uses a case study 
approach based on the 5Is (Ekblom, 2011a), comparing measures of crime in each 
of the four CSS tower blocks, with those of the three blocks at the comparison site. 
The overriding aim of this study has been to explore whether CPTED principles 
Implemented via the SBD process would lead to sustainable reductions in crime. In 
this context, indications within the crime data for identification would include: 
1. Reductions in crime following the refurbishments of the early 1990s. 
2. Different levels of reduction at the CSS and comparison. These might be 
attributable to varying standards of target hardening, technological innovation 
and/or environmental elements employed at each location. Or, a poor match 
between Intervention and location i.e. poor Intelligence/Intervention process; 
or poor Implementation/Involvement – all difficult to isolate and distinguish 
almost three decades later. 
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3. A crime preventive effect that was long term despite the presence of adaptive 
offenders, changing technology, the wearing-out/limited maintenance of 
physical security, complacent tenants, etc. 
 
Data used in the study 
 
Table 6: Police-recorded crime totals p.a. at CSS 1992-1994 and 1997-2014 
 
The recorded crime data supplied by WMP covers much of a quarter-century 
timeframe. Chronologically, this begins with data for the years 1992-1994 – albeit in 
respect of the CSS alone. This data was only discovered towards the end of this 
investigation and is considered to be of great value. This is because it charts the 
high level of recorded crime, particularly residential burglary, immediately before and 
after the refurbishment was fully completed (and understood to have been even 































but eliminated once the higher grade CPTED doors to the flats and electronically-
operated communal entrance doors had been installed – together with the on-site, 
24/7 staffed concierge going live. It therefore sets the scene for the pattern of police-
recorded crime and analysis for the following quarter-century. 
 
 
Table 7: Police-recorded crime totals p.a. at comparison 1997-2014 
 
The bulk recorded crime data supplied by WMP for both the CSS and comparison 
(see Tables 6 and 7) covers a considerable 18-year time-frame, but only 
commences in 1997 – five and two years respectively after completion of the CPTED 
and SBD Interventions at those two sites. The explanation given by the police for the 
absence of such data prior to this period, was that it had been recorded on an older 
hard drive that had not been used since 1996. This issue was highlighted by WMP 
































that it might be located. Nevertheless, it was presumed that the data covering the 
years 1988-1996 would remain undiscovered and analysis would be limited to the 
18-year, post-refurbishment timeframe – and supplemented by the 1992-1994 data 
for the CSS alone. 
 
As a result, data analysis in this chapter comprises two distinct Impact sections. 
First, a quantitative analysis of the crime data for the CSS for the years 1992-1994. 
This period spans the months prior to completion of the refurbishment in 1992 
through to post-refurbishment in 1993 and 1994. Second, a quantitative analysis of 
the police-recorded crime data covering the 18 years from 1997 to 2014 in respect of 
both the CSS and the comparison. The analysis is then used to consider whether the 
CPTED/SBD Interventions delivered a sustainable Impact that can be identified over 
these 21 years and whether sustainability was in greater evidence at the CSS which 
initially received the higher-grade Intervention. Most importantly, it is acknowledged 
that challenges within the available data over an unusually long timespan for crime 
prevention research, meant that this investigation was essentially one of exploratory, 
hypothesis generating and not hypothesis testing.  
 
Following considerable deliberation, six different crime categories were chosen for 
this thesis. Burglary – essentially residential, although aggravated burglary, non-
residential burglary and all attempts were included to ensure no ‘masking’ was taking 
place (meaning, crimes being recorded under a less serious classification). Robbery 
and theft from the person (once again a realised fear of ‘masking’ – see below). 
Assaults, woundings, GBH and homicide. All forms of vehicle crime. Criminal 
damage and arson. And all ‘other’ recorded crime. ‘Other’ crime types (examined as 
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a collected group under this heading) include: bilking (making off without payment or 
gasoline drive-offs), driving offences, drug possession/dealing/cultivation, firearms 
offences, fraud, handling stolen goods, harassment, kidnapping, possessing 
offensive weapons, racially-aggravated offences and sexual offences. The overall 
aim was to provide a wide spectrum of crime types – ones not limited to simply 
property crime which is widely perceived as most susceptible to the SCP, CPTED 
and SBD approaches. An additional aim was that the data should provide a large 
enough sample of offences to permit both an accurate analysis of patterns and 
measurement of the changes, at both the CSS and comparison. 
 
The limitations attached to the analysis of these offences are highlighted in Chapter 
Three, Methodology – particularly regarding the accuracy of the recorded crime data 
for the offence in question. As the data supplied by WMP covers periods of three and 
18 years, consideration was necessarily given to changes in definition and the 
recording of such information during this near quarter-century. Indeed, in April 1998 
new Home Office Counting Rules (HOCR, Home Office,1998) were introduced, 
followed in April 2002 by the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS, Home 
Office, 2002) and subsequently repealed in 2015. Nevertheless, there was an 
expectation that changes in recording would affect both sites in an equal manner – 
especially over the 18-year time period.  
 
1992-1994: Analysis of CSS police-recorded crime data 
The recorded crime data (Intelligence) for the years 1992-1993 indicates (Impact) a 
considerable reduction in crime took place between 1992 and 1993 (see Table 8). 




Table 8: Police-recorded crime as totals by crime category p.a. at CSS 1992-1994 
 
installation of the new entrance doorsets to each of the 264 individual flats, 
electronically-operated communal entrance doors, and the 24/7 staffed concierge 
going live. Furthermore, with no burglaries committed in 1993 and just a single 
attempt in 1994, a pattern of sustainable crime prevention appeared to have begun.   
 
Identification of the CSS and comparison is discussed in Chapter Three. But to 
briefly recap, the four tower blocks of the CSS (264 flats) are located on the opposite 
side of the Nechells Parkway dual-carriageway to the three comparison blocks (268 
flats – 532 in total). Both sites had been refurbished within three years of each other: 
1989-1992 and 1993-1995 respectively and therefore provided a close 
approximation. However, the fundamental difference and the key issue that 
























CSS Burglary CSS Robbery CSS Assaults CSS Veh Crime CSS Damage CSS Other Crime
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grade of CPTED measures when they were refurbished, compared to those at the 
comparison.  
 
The baseline conditions and changes in the aforementioned offence categories 
following completion of both refurbishment projects, were analysed by calculating 
yearly crime counts and rates – as well as percentage changes from year to year. 
The analysis included recorded crime data provided by WMP, used to produce crime 
counts and identify temporal changes in the level of crime at the CSS and 
comparison tower blocks, based on the number of flats in each block. There are, 
however, limitations in using residential populations to calculate crime rates, 
especially in respect of vehicle crime. Vehicle concentrations can differ from those of 
populations, and it is more problematic to create estimates for vehicles. This study 
recognised such limitations and presumed the same level of vehicle ownership per 
household across both the CSS and comparison, in order to generate crime rates for 
each tower block. For each crime type, mean crime rates were calculated for the 
individual blocks at the CSS and comparison for each of the 18 years under 
investigation. This enabled exploration of changes over time and of differences in 
those changes between the two sites. 
 
Offences prevented as a result of the CPTED and SBD Interventions, could be 
produced by proposing the counter-factual view: namely, what would have happened 
to the offences under scrutiny if CPTED and SBD had not been applied during the 
refurbishment processes? However, CPTED Interventions had in fact been applied 
at both the CSS and comparison – albeit with different intensity, quality and 
appropriateness pertaining to their year of installation, maintenance and renewal. As 
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a result, the lower grade CPTED incorporated at the comparison complied with the 
minimum requirement of SBD. Whereas, the higher grade CPTED at the CSS far 
exceeded SBD requirements for high-rise dwellings in the early 1990s (SBD, 1989).     
 
In this context, the lower grade CPTED incorporated at the comparison albeit 
necessary to achieve an SBD award, is interpreted as being associated with the 
baseline of expected crime outcomes over time against which to compare the 
‘special’ Intervention (detailed in Chapter Three) at the CSS. Under this approach, 
the expected number of offences at the CSS is generated by applying the changes in 
incidence of offending (per crime category) at the comparison during the evaluation 
time period, to the starting value of the incidence at the CSS tower blocks. 
 
The recorded crime data indicate that a sharp fall in recorded crime took place in the 
final quarter of 1992 and was maintained throughout 1993, 1994 and during the 18 
years between 1997 and 2014. The incidence of crime was much lower in all seven 
blocks (but especially at the CSS) when compared to the totality of the surrounding 
area – the WMP D Division as it was known until 1998 and the geographical area of 
north-east Birmingham in which both the CSS (action) and comparison blocks are 
located.  
 
Quantitative analysis of police-recorded crime data: CSS 1992–1994 
As previously indicated, the 1992-1994 police-recorded crime data for the CSS is 
considered to be of significant importance – in that it provides raw material to explore 
the link between the level of crime recorded prior to refurbishment being fully  
completed; the level of such crime during the two years immediately thereafter; and 
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Total recorded crimes:  26 32 25 19 102  
 
Table 9: Crime incidence in six categories at the CSS tower blocks 1992-1994 (no. of crimes in brackets) 
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the subsequent pattern of criminal behaviour – as evidenced in the 18 years of data 
for both the CSS and comparison. More specifically, the data covers the seminal 
years of 1992 (19 recorded burglaries) during the final quarter of which CSS 
refurbishment was completed), 1993 (no recorded burglaries) and 1994 (one 
recorded burglary). Any benefits emanating from the CPTED measures incorporated 
between 1989-1992 are investigated in the recorded crime data. Sadly, these crime 
data do not include the three comparison tower blocks, somewhat diminishing its 
value, but not obliterating it – especially because comparison refurbishment was not 
completed until 1995. 
 
The crime analysis was conducted for 102 offences reported at the CSS during the 
three years 1992, 1993 and 1994. Table 9 above details the yearly police-recorded 
crime totals for the six categories of offence at the CSS. This produces the following 
incidence of crime. In 1992: burglary, 0.0720; robbery, 0.0038; assaults, 0.0151; 
vehicle crime, 0.1094; criminal damage, 0.0227; ‘other’ crime, 0.0682. In 1993: 
burglary, 0; robbery, 0; assaults, 0.0076; vehicle crime, 0.0795; criminal damage, 
0.0038; ‘other’ crime, 0.0189. And in 1994: burglary, 0.0038; robbery, 0.0038; 
assaults, 0.0114; vehicle crime, 0.0227; criminal damage, 0.0114; ‘other’ crime, 
0.0151. However, the rates are small and variations over time could reflect no more 
than random fluctuation (Boyle, 2016). In addition, they do not illustrate the 
considerable reduction in reported crime that began once the refurbishment was 
completed: in 1992, 55 recorded crimes; in 1993, 29 (47.3 per cent reduction); and in 
1994, 18 (67.3 per cent reduction compared to 1992). Consequently, whilst the 
average annual incidence of police-recorded crime for the three years is 0.1288 
crimes per dwelling per year, when broken down into specific years the results are: 
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0.2083 crimes per dwelling per year in 1992; 0.1098 in 1993; and 0.0682 in 1994 – 
thereby demonstrating a considerable downward trend post-refurbishment. 
 
1992-1994: CSS Burglary 
The pre-eminent crime and the one most often associated with the incorporation and 
effectiveness of CPTED measures and the SBD award, is that of residential burglary 
(Armitage, 1999). Analysis of the 19 recorded crimes of residential burglary, non-
residential burglary and attempt burglary (hereafter simply referred to as ‘burglary’) 
that took place during 1992 is illuminating – especially because during the whole 12 
months of 1993 not a single such crime was reported (100 per cent elimination). And 
in 1994 just a single attempt (94.4 per cent reduction). See Tables 8 and 9 above 
and Table 10 below). 
 
 

























Of the 19 burglaries recorded in 1992, only one took place at Queens Tower, with 
the remainder fairly evenly split across the other three blocks: Home, seven; High, 
six; and South, five. Mining down into these data for 1992, the detailed MOs provide 
extensive detail. Three of the offences relate to non-residential burglaries: of a 
chained storage area on the ground floor in Home Tower; the refurbishment workers’ 
Portakabin in the grounds of Queens Tower; and of the concierge office itself in 
Queens Tower (in August) before it went ‘live’ on a 24/7 basis in November. Two of 
the remaining 16 offences were attempt residential burglaries. Whilst amongst the 14 
substantive residential burglaries there is repeated reference to the entrance doors 
to each flat being ‘forced’, ‘smashed’, ‘kicked-in’, ‘catch released’ or ‘insecure’ (eight 
in total). Use of the word ’insecure’ means that no physical force was used and often 
denotes that the door was left unlocked (personal witness as a police officer for 33 
years). No aggravated burglaries were reported.  
 
Furthermore, because these residential burglaries took place during the months of 
January-October 1992, this reflects the documented BCC Diary of Works (1992) that 
shows how replacing the main front entrance doors to each of the individual flats at 
all four CSS blocks (beginning with Queens Tower – one recorded burglary during 
1992) was not completed until the final quarter of that year. Indeed, after October 
1992 no (credible) forced-entry burglaries via the new Mul-T-Secure entrance doors 
(to each flat) are recorded at the CSS in any of the subsequent years for which 
recorded crime data has been provided (21 years’ worth of accumulated data). And 
in November 1992 the 24/7 staffed concierge also went live. This is a significant 
finding in terms of the thesis remit regarding both durability (of the security measures 
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employed, specifically the new entrance doors to each flat) and sustainability over 
the very long term – almost a quarter-century as detailed below. 
 
1992-1994: CSS Robbery 
For the purposes of this study, the offences of robbery and theft from the person 
have been merged under a single offence category (hereafter simply referred to as 
‘robbery’). This is to ensure that the former has not been classified as the latter 
(when in fact force was used) and thereby missed from the total number of recorded 
robberies. Only when reading through the MO descriptions does it appear that some 
robberies are reclassified in this way. Whereas in reverse, assaults, woundings and 
GBH are often classified at the higher level of seriousness (including attempted 
murder), because should an individual be charged with the offence ‘plea bargaining’ 
(downgrading) remains common practice (33-year career-long personal witness) 
once the case gets to court. Other than as previously described, this investigation 
has not attempted to eliminate these inconsistencies and therefore such limitations 
need to be taken into consideration. 
 
However, for the three years 1992-1994, no thefts from the person were recorded by 
the police as taking place at the CSS and just two robberies – one in 1992 and one 
in 1994, producing an incidence of 0.0038 robberies per dwelling in each of those 
years (see Tables 8 and 9 above). Analysis of the MO description indicates that the 
robbery in 1992 took place ‘in the street’ outside South Tower and that the offender: 
“Thrust object into back of IP (injured party) stole property from IP’s rear trouser 
pocket and escaped into the tower block.” Similarly, whilst the 1994 robbery is 
attributed to a specific address inside Queens Tower, the MO description reveals: 
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“Offender approached IP (injured party) and husband in street snatched handbag 
from IP’s shoulder knocking IP into husband who fell and cut his head on floor.” As 
no further information is provided (and no offender arrested) it can only be presumed 
that the address provided is that of the two victims and not the location of the crime. 
Furthermore, in view of the precise locations provided within the recorded crime 
data, it could be argued that neither of these two robberies should be attributed to 
the CSS. 
 
1992-1994: CSS Assaults 
Mirroring the previous crime category of robbery, this broad offence heading was 
established for the purpose of ensuring all forms of assault were included – together 
with a single instance of homicide. Nevertheless, sexual offences were deliberately 
excluded on the basis that they constitute an entirely separate offence category with 
a different array of causes. They are instead included under ‘other’ crime. Similarly, 
threats and threatening behaviour are excluded as legally, actual physical contact 
constitutes an assault and that otherwise, the category would become too much of a 
catch-all and unwieldy. Consequently, this heading includes common assault, 
assault occasioning actual bodily harm; wounding (with or without intent) GBH and 
homicide. Hereafter, this category is referred to as ‘assaults’.  
 
Analysis of the crime data indicates that during this three-year period, nine such 
offences were recorded for the CSS: four in 1992, two in 1993 (50 per cent 
reduction) and three in 1994 (25 per cent reduction). See Tables 8 and 9 above. 
Under this heading, recorded offences are evenly distributed across the blocks with 
no more than one offence per block in any year. There is no apparent 
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pattern/connection between these offences. In 1992, the most serious of the four 
recorded crimes was a murder that resulted from injuries sustained during a 
domestic dispute between the occupants and within their flat in South Tower. This is 
the only homicide recorded in any of the crime data provided by WMP. The 
remaining three offences consist of a wounding with intent committed inside a flat at 
Queens Tower. An assault occasioning actual bodily harm within a flat at Home 
Tower and a further assault committed on the car park at High Tower. The two 
offences in 1993 involve a family assault occasioning actual bodily harm inside a flat 
at South Tower; and a wounding with intent at Home Tower. Whilst in 1994 the three 
recorded offences consist of a wounding with intent inside a flat at Queens Tower; 
an assault occasioning actual bodily harm at Home Tower; and a further such 
assault on a victim leaving High Tower. 
 
1992-1994: CSS Vehicle crime 
This constitutes another broad offence category, deliberately created in order that all 
incidents of vehicle crime could be captured. Types of crime included under this 
heading are theft and attempt theft of motor vehicle, taking without the owner’s 
consent (TWOC or ‘joy riding’), theft and attempt theft from motor vehicle, vehicle 
interference and criminal damage to motor vehicle. It was presumed that the cars are 
parked in the designated car parks for each of the CSS tower blocks, although on 
occasion the location description indicates that the vehicles were left in the street 
outside the block. As a descriptive detail and unlike the ground floor communal areas 
and lifts of the CSS blocks post-refurbishment, there is no external CCTV coverage 
at any of these car parking areas – a deliberate policy decision by BCC Housing 
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Department and maintained across the city on all its social housing developments 
(see Chapters Five and Six for extensive commentary on this issue). 
 
Vehicle crime is the only category demonstrating a sizeable (albeit temporary) 
increase at the CSS, post-refurbishment (see Tables 8 and 9 above). In 1992 such 
offences numbered seven; twenty-one in 1993 (200 per cent increase – and the 
reverse to the total elimination of burglary at the CSS in that same year); and in 
1994, fell back to six. The high level of vehicle crime in 1993 (the first whole year 
following completion of the refurbishment and incorporation of the CPTED elements), 
attracts immediate interest. These 21 crimes are evenly distributed across the CSS. 
However, 13 are coded as ‘TDA’ (Take and Drive Away or TWOC) five of which took 
place on the car park at Queens Tower. The remaining offences include: one theft of 
motor vehicle and one attempt; four thefts from motor vehicle and one attempt; and 
one criminal damage to motor vehicle. Most importantly, this incidence does not take 
account of actual car ownership per dwelling. And although such a question was 
contained in the tenant questionnaire used in 2016 (see Appendix 2) this was posed 
more than two decades after the crime recorded in this sub-chapter had taken place 
and therefore has little if any relevance. 
 
In view of the large increase in vehicle crime during 1993, causal association/ 
interpretation might suggest the burglars responsible for the 19 recorded offences in 
1992 (and none in 1993) had been displaced into vehicle crime. However, there is no 





1992-1994: CSS Criminal damage 
This is another deliberately broad offence category, designed to include all forms of 
criminal damage (with the exception of damage to vehicles which is covered under 
the previous heading) together with arson and arson with intent to endanger life. 
Analysis of the crime data reveals that ten such offences took place at the CSS 
between 1992-1994. More specifically, six offences (five at High Tower) in 1992; one 
in 1993 (83.3 per cent reduction); and 3 in 1994 (50 per cent reduction). See Tables 
8 and 9 above. 
 
Closer analysis of this data reveals there are no instances of arson during the three 
years in question. Those of criminal damage demonstrate no pattern of behaviour 
apart from the 5 offences that took place at High Tower in 1992 – which again 
appear unrelated. Meanwhile, the one recorded offence at Queens Tower during 
1992 might have been more accurately recorded as an attempt residential burglary, 
with the following MO contained within the WMP-supplied crime data: ‘Went to 6th 
floor flat, inserted screwdriver type instrument into Chubb lock, damaged lock 
mechanism, damage value £30’. 
 
1992-1994: CSS ‘Other’ crime 
This category of ‘other’ crime includes all recorded offences not covered within the 
five categories above. ‘Other’ crime includes a wide spectrum ranging from 
possession of cannabis via bilking (making off without payment), driving offences, 
drug dealing/cultivation, theft of gas, handling stolen goods, and sexual offences. 
However, this grouping falls short of that for the years 1997-2014 which is far more 
extensive – because new offences have been added to those that are ‘recordable’ 
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combined with the capacity for a more diverse spectrum of offending behaviour over 
18 years. Such ‘other’ offences totalled 27 or 26.47% of all offences recorded at the 
CSS (see Tables 8 and 9 above). In 1992 ‘other’ crimes numbered 18; in 1993, five 
(72.2 per cent reduction); and in 1994, four (77.8 per cent reduction). These police- 
recorded crimes were not examined in detail, either because their incidence was 
relatively small and/or a need to concentrate on a limited number of high-volume 
crime types – not necessarily those believed to be most susceptible to the CPTED 
and SBD approaches. 
 
1992-1994: CSS summary of recorded crime 
The considerable reduction in recorded crime at the CSS coincided with completion 
of the refurbishment and the higher grade CPTED Interventions that were installed at 
this location. In particular, by November 1992 the Mul-T-Secure doors to each 
individual flat had all been fitted and the 24/7 concierge system went live (including 
the two-way intercom system to and from the fob-reader, access-controlled 
communal entrance doors) and individual flats – fully detailed in the narrative 
Chapter Two). From that point onwards and with the exception of vehicle crime (in 
1993) all other crime categories began to fall considerably. However, and as 
previously stated, the absence of crime data for the comparison site over this period 
means that whilst these findings are suggestive of a substantial fall in crime at the 
CSS (and provide no evidence of a selection/regression effect), they do not 
constitute hard evidence. Nevertheless, they go against the trend of increased 
residential burglary across the city of Birmingham during the early 1990s and which 
did not begin to fall until two years later. Of greatest significance, the police-recorded 
crime data of totem offence of burglary was all but eliminated. Moreover, with the 
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24/7 concierge now operational it might have been expected more crime would have 
been reported.  
 
1997-2014: Analysis of CSS and comparison police-recorded crime data 
As previously indicated, a key element of this case study approach involves analysis 
of the 1,459 police-recorded offences from across the CSS and comparison sites. 
Tables 11 and 12 below set out for the CSS 1992-1994 and comparison 





























































































































Table 12: Police-recorded crime totals across six categories at the comparison 1997-2014 
 
Tables 11 and 12 provide some degree of nuance to Tables 6 and 7 above, albeit 
producing a complex picture. Consequently, Tables 13-20 below tease out the detail 
by addressing each of the six crime categories over 18 years at both the CSS and 
comparison. The three years of data 1992-1994 for the CSS are included in Table 11 
in order to provide context for the later figures. 
 
1997-2014: CSS and comparison burglary 
 
Table 13 below includes the burglary totals at both the CSS and comparison for the 
18 years 1997-2014. For the first 18 years following refurbishment, burglary at the 
CSS never totalled more than 5 police-recorded crimes per year – with an average of 
2.2 burglaries p.a. Whereas, between 1997-2003 at the comparison, the totals 
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the rate of burglary at the comparison never exceeded that of the CSS and during 
the final five years (2010-2014) no such crimes were recorded by the police. 
However, 5 burglaries were recorded at the CSS during 2011 – the highest annual 
total during the 23 years post-refurbishment. 
 
 
Table 13: Police-recorded Burglary totals p.a. at CSS and Comparison 1992-1994 and 1997-2014 
 
In greater detail, during the early years of analysis, burglary was especially 
infrequent at the CSS – relative to the comparison. In total, 40 such offences were 
recorded producing an incidence of 0.0084 burglaries per dwelling per year. At the 
comparison site the figure was 60 offences with an incidence of 0.0124 burglaries 
per dwelling per year. In this context, the ratio of incidence – produced by taking the 
CSS incidence and using the control incidence as the divisor (0.0084 divided by 
0.0124) is therefore 0.6774. And because this figure is less than one it demonstrates 















































































Mining down still further into the crime data, there are additional differences in the 
incidence of burglary taking place on a tower-by-tower basis. Once again, these are 
small differences and as such cannot be distinguished from random fluctuation. 
Nonetheless, they are suggestive. For example, at Queens Tower the lowest figure 
for any block (CSS and comparison) of seven burglaries (0.0059 burglaries per 
dwelling per year) was recorded over the 18-year timeframe. A potential explanation 
for this low incidence might relate to the 24/7 staffed concierge enquiry desk and 
control room located on the ground floor of Queens Tower. Its sheer presence may 
have produced additional guardianship (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Reynald, 2009). 
Indeed, monitoring the CCTV cameras, two-way audio communication and electronic 
control of the communal entrance doors at all four CSS blocks, might have assisted 
in this regard. However, at all CSS locations, ground floor flats appeared to be more 
prone to being burgled – especially at Queens Tower and thereby contradicting the 
value of such immediate guardianship. Of the seven burglaries recorded for this 
block, four were committed against ground floor flats close to the 24/7 staffed 
concierge offices during the years 2003, 2006, 2008 and 2009. This represents a 
higher incidence than at any other tower – CSS or comparison. But once again and 
considering that these are very small crime figures, this may be attributable to 
random fluctuation. 
 
At the comparison site, the total of 60 burglaries over 18 years is precisely 50.0 per 
cent higher than at the CSS and produces an incidence of 0.0124 crimes per 
dwelling per year. Once again, yearly fluctuations can be identified and as with all 
the crime categories, there is a consistently higher (and unexplained) incidence of 
206 
 
burglary at Thames Tower. At the comparison and following the 1993-1995 
refurbishment, burglaries numbered between zero and 11 (in 2002) recorded 
offences per year. Other years of high incidence were 1998 (eight offences) and 
1999 (nine offences). However, from 2003 (two offences) onwards the incidence all 
but mirrored that at the CSS and during the final five years of 2010-2014, no 
burglaries were recorded in each of those years. This may be attributable to new 
PAS 24 standard compliant front entrance doors having been installed during 2003 
and the comparison site blocks now being linked to a central station type control 
room from where the communal entrance doors were linked and opened – like at the 
majority of Birmingham’s remaining tower blocks. 
 
Burglary incidence at the CSS, comparison, Birmingham, England and Wales 
 
Table 14: Average incidence of Burglary per dwelling p.a. 1997-2014 at the CSS, 
Comparison, across the City of Birmingham and in England and Wales   
 
Table 14 sets out the average incidence of residential burglary at the CSS, 
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is especially noteworthy, as over 18 years this was lower at the CSS than at the 
comparison, in Birmingham as a whole, and across England and Wales. And whilst 
the comparison had a higher incidence than in England and Wales, it too recorded 




Table 15: Police-recorded Burglary totals p.a. at CSS and comparison 1992-1994 and 1997-2014 
 
However, the most prominent difference between the CSS and the comparison in the 
context of burglary, concerns the use of force to gain entry (see Table 15 above). At 
the CSS and during the whole 18-year time period, incidents of forced-entry are 
limited to the windows of ground floor flats (5 burglaries in 18 years) and balcony 
windows (3 burglaries in 18 years). The MO descriptions ‘use of key’, ‘insecure 








































































can only be gained from the flats via the unique fire-escape system. This suggests 
that offenders are themselves residents in the CSS blocks, or have been allowed 
access to the balcony-to-balcony linked fire-escapes by tenants (see Appendix 7). 
Once more, these are very small numbers and consequently the caveat of random 
fluctuation is again raised. Most importantly, forced-entry of the new Mul-T-Secure 
front entrance doors (complete with multi-point locking, hinge bolts and frame 
armour) to each of the 264 flats at the CSS, appears in the MO description of eight 
recorded burglaries, but with no credible explanation. 
 
At the comparison, forced-entry is described in 17 residential burglary MOs. Of major 
interest, where force was used the description usually includes how the door was 
broken through with ‘bodily force’, ‘kicking’ or ‘use of a screwdriver’ or similar 
jemmying instrument. An explanation for this important difference might relate to 
those same Mul-T-Secure entrance doors at the CSS which proved to be physically 
durable and not subject to poor maintenance over the following 23 years. And 
simultaneous to completion of installing these new doors, the 24/7 staffed concierge 
went live – controlling all visitor access into the CSS blocks by way of electronic 
release of the ground floor communal doors, audio intercom link and CCTV cameras. 
Installed prior to the advent of the PAS 24 standard in 1999, the new balcony doors 
and windows at the CSS proved to be less durable in preventing burglary – although 
the metal grilles and gates on the ground floor balconies denied access to the fire- 
escape staircases by those attempting entry from outside the  
blocks. In contrast, at the comparison only a second key-operated lock (most often a 
BS 3621 mortise deadlock) was added to the existing 44mm thick wooden doors. 
This proved to be ineffective in preventing access, and examination of the crime data 
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discloses that the forced-entry of these doors was a much-repeated MO until the 
doors were replaced. 
 
1997-2014: CSS and comparison Robbery 
As previously explained, for the purposes of this study the offences of robbery and 
theft from the person have been merged under a single offence category. Under this 
 
Table 16: Police-recorded Robbery totals p.a. at CSS and Comparison 1992-1994 and 1997-2014 
 
heading, 101 offences were recorded by the police as having taken place at both the 
CSS and comparison site, during the 18 years for which data was provided (see 
Table 16 above). Further analysis of these figures indicates the recorded offences 
are almost equally divided between the CSS (49 offences) and comparison (52 
offences). In terms of offences per dwelling, for the 264 flats at the CSS, this 























































































Whereas, for the 268 dwellings at the comparison, the figure is a marginally higher at 
0.0108 such offences per dwelling p.a. The ratio of incidence is therefore 0.9444. 
 
However, these last figures need to be understood in the context of particular 
caveats. For example, grouping these two offences in this way means that a ‘snatch’ 
or similar MO where no force or threat of force (essential elements for the offence of 
robbery) will nevertheless be included in this category. And second, unlike the crime 
of residential burglary, robbery and theft from the person are not automatically 
related to the confines (the target enclosure) of a specific flat. They may take place: 
on the landing outside; in other communal areas like the stairs, lifts or reception; in 
the grounds, car park or in the adjacent streets – information repeatedly missing 
from the recorded crime MO description. Nevertheless, they are often recorded 
against a specific flat number – most especially where the victim is also a tenant of 
that flat. Further analysis of the crime data suggests that over 18 years at the CSS, 
only one offence (of ‘Robbery Personal Property’) took place inside a flat; 6 on the 
stairs, lifts or landing areas; 5 at the entrance or in the lobbies; 4 in the grounds; 8 in 
the car parks; 7 in the surrounding streets; and for the remaining 18 there is 
insufficient detail to identify the exact location. 
 
At the CSS, robbery remained consistently low (Impact) between 1992 and 1994 (no 
more than one offence in each of those years). Between 1997 and 2014 this pattern 
was largely repeated, except in 1999 (eight recorded offences) and 2005 (seven). In 
1993, 2006, 2013 and 2014 no robberies were reported. At the comparison site, a 
similar pattern of low incidence (no more than four recorded offences in a single year 
– 2006) with the exception of 2001 (nine offences) and 2003 (seven). Thames Tower 
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recording the highest number of offences (20, seven of which took place in 2003). 
The total at Severn was 16 and Medway 9 offences – only slightly higher that the 
incidence at the CSS. In total, 9 offences can be specifically associated as having 
taken place within a flat; 2 on the stairs, lifts or landing areas; 2 at the entrance or in 
the lobbies; 1 in the grounds; 10 in the car parks; 1 in the surrounding streets; and 
for the remaining 27 there is insufficient detail to identify the exact location. On 
occasion, perpetrators displayed particular violence or threat of violence during the 
attack (four instances of actual GBH, 11 threatened). But in the overwhelming 
majority of instances, victims were either pushed to the ground, or had their property 
snatched from them – by an assailant on roller blades on one reported occasion! The 
theft of the victim’s mobile phone increasingly features (as these became a more 
commonplace possession at the beginning of the twentieth century) in the 
description of robbery or theft from the person, in respect of the bulk crime data from 
1997-2014. 
 
One issue emanating from the detailed crime analysis under this heading, is the 
identification of repeated ‘hot-spots’ (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1995) and 
‘pinch-points’ (Clarke, 1999) most especially the car parks (when people approach or 
leave their vehicles; at the communal entrances into the blocks; in the lobby areas; 
and on the landings immediately outside the flats. At the CSS, one particular hot-
spot is the snaking (sinuous) public footpath with poor sight lines between Queens 
and Home towers that leads to and from a bus stop. This has acted as a repeat 
location for robbery (7 police-recorded offences in 21 years). Meanwhile and 
perhaps surprising in view of its isolated location away from the other three blocks 
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and adjacent to a group of shops and railway station (Duddeston), over 21 years the 
CSS South Tower suffered just four police-recorded robberies.  
 
1997-2014: CSS and comparison Assaults 
As previously described, this broad offence heading includes all forms of assault 
apart from sexual offences. Nor are threats and threatening behaviour included. This 
heading does include common assault (24% of all assaults); assault occasioning 
actual bodily harm (71%); wounding (with or without intent) and GBH (5%). See 
Table 17 below. Analysis of the crime data indicates that over an 18-year period, 187 
offences were recorded for the CSS. Whilst at the comparison the figure is 220 
offences. In terms of offences per dwelling, for the 264 flats at the CSS, this 
produces an incidence of 0.0394 assaults per dwelling, per year. Whereas, for the 
268 flats at the comparison, the incidence is 0.0456 such offences per dwelling per 
year. This in turn produces a ratio of incidence of 0.8640. 
 
 























































































At the CSS, analysing the location and MO data for each recorded offence, discloses 
that 57 of these assaults took place inside a flat. By contrast, those occurring on the 
stairs, lifts, landing areas, entrances or in the lobbies, grounds, car parks, or in the 
surrounding streets numbered only 10 in total over an 18-year period. However, for 
the remaining 120 recorded offences, the location and MO details are insufficient to 
determine exactly where the assault took place. The overwhelming majority of these 
offences are believed to have occurred inside the flat – simply because the address 
is provided and from the MO description many of these recorded crimes (64.32%) 
appeared to be domestic-violence related, or the victim knew the assailant. Indeed, 
this last figure is almost certainly much higher: it is just that the domestic relationship 
between the victim and assailant cannot always be discerned from the anonymised 
details contained within the police-recorded crime data supplied. As a result, it was 
impossible to be location-specific about these 120 recorded offences. 
 
Further scrutiny of the crime and MO data indicates that weapons included bodily 
force (punching, slapping, kicking and stamping), broken bottles, knives, a mug and 
on one occasion the victim being subject to burning. Nevertheless, from the crime 
data supplied by WMP it was impossible to discern an accurate distinction between 
those that relate to domestic-violence and those that do not, or the characteristics of 
either. 
 
At the comparison, 83 of these assaults took place inside a flat. As at the CSS, those 
recorded as occurring on the stairs, lifts, landing areas, entrance or in the lobbies, 
grounds, car parks, or in the surrounding streets, numbered a relatively small 22 
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(precisely 10%) in total over the 18-year period. But in the remaining 115 recorded 
offences, the location and MO details are insufficient to determine exactly where the 
assault took place. As at the CSS, the majority of these offences appear to have 
occurred inside the flat (the address is provided and once again, many might be 
attributed to domestic violence). However, it is impossible to be location-specific from 
the crime data provided. As distinct from the instances of robbery and theft from the 
person, the only real measurable hot-spot (Impact) at which assaults, woundings and 
GBH can be identified as taking place, is inside the flats. From the limited MO data, 
this again points to a high level of domestic violence – which as far as can be 
ascertained appears without exception to take the form of male-on-female assault 
(there being no comment to the contrary in the MO data supplied). 
 
1997-2014: CSS and comparison Vehicle crime 
 

























































































Vehicle crime constitutes another broad offence category including theft of motor 
vehicle, taking without the owner’s consent (TWOC or ‘joy riding’), theft from motor 
vehicle, attempt theft from motor vehicle and criminal damage to motor vehicle. 
Analysis (Impact) of the crime data indicates that the figures disclose a higher rate of 
incidence at the CSS than the comparison. More specifically, at the CSS, 185 
offences recorded over 18 years produces an incidence of 0.0389 of offences per 
dwelling per year, for each of the 264 flats. Whilst at the comparison, 168 offences 
produce an incidence of 0.0383 offences per dwelling per year, for each of the 268  
flats. The ratio of incidence is therefore 1.0157 and confirms that vehicle crime was 
higher at the CSS following refurbishment – 21 recorded offences in 1993. Falling 
back in 1994 (one offence) and 1997 (zero offences), double figure totals were 
recorded in eight years: 1998 (16), 1999 (17), 2000 (19), 2002 (13), 2003 (10), 2004 
(16), 2005 (12) and 2008 (17). At the comparison, double figure totals for vehicle 
crime were recorded in six years: 1998 (18 offences), 1999 (17), 2000 (15), 2002 
(15), 2003 (14), 2004 (15) and 2011 (12). However, in this crime category the total 
number of offences over 14 years was lower at the comparison. See Table 18. 
 
However, these incidence figures are further complicated by vehicle ownership per 
flat – estimated at 29.17 per cent of all households for the CSS and 26.4 per cent for 
the comparison (information gleaned from the tenant questionnaires examined in 
Chapter Five). As such ownership and security features would change repeatedly 
over an extended time period (commented on in Chapter Six), together with the 
inclusion of crimes committed against vehicles parked in the surrounding streets, this 




1997-2014: CSS and comparison Criminal Damage 
Of the five specific crime categories under investigation, only burglary and robbery 
disclose a lower incidence than criminal damage. Analysis of the crime data (see 
Table 19 below) suggests a slightly higher incidence at the CSS compared to the 
comparison site, with 70 offences recorded for the former and an almost identical 67 
at the latter. In terms of offences per dwelling, for the 264 flats at the CSS, this 
 
Table 19: Police-recorded Criminal damage totals p.a. at CSS and Comparison 1992-1994 and 1997-
2014 
 
produces an incidence of 0.0146 offences of criminal damage per dwelling per year. 
Whilst for the 268 dwellings at the comparison, the figure is 0.0138 such offences 
per dwelling per year. This in turn delivers a ratio of incidence of 1.058. Deeper 
analysis indicates the overwhelming number of offences, 99, are recorded as taking 
place either immediately outside or within the individual flats. The remaining 38 























































































Amongst the 22 offences of arson, these are equally divided with 11 of each taking 
place at the CSS and comparison. However, 13 of the total involve unattended 
vehicles in the car parks and are therefore excluded from this category and appear 
instead as vehicle crime. Of the remaining nine, 4 took place at the CSS (producing 
an incidence of 0.0008 arsons per dwelling per year) and 5 at the comparison 
(0.0010 arsons per dwelling per year), including one each of the most serious 
offence of arson with intent to endanger life. Nevertheless, in excess of 90% of the 
offences under this heading relate to simple criminal damage – primarily windows 
being smashed, graffiti and doors being kicked and damaged (overwhelmingly 
recorded as committed inside the blocks). 
 
1997-2014: CSS and comparison ‘Other’ crime 
 
Table 20: Police-recorded ‘Other’ crime totals p.a. at CSS and Comparison 1992-1994 and 1997-
2014 
 
The category of ‘other’ crime (see Table 20 above) embraces all recorded offences 






















































































than those at the CSS between 1992-1994 – due to a greater scope over 18 rather 
than 3 years and changes in both Home Office Counting Rules (1998) and the 
introduction of the National Crime Recording Standard (2002). Consequently, 
recorded offences range from possession of cannabis (9 offences) via bilking 
(making off without payment), driving offences, drug dealing/cultivation, firearms 
offences, fraud, handling stolen goods, harassment, kidnapping, possessing 
offensive weapons, racially-aggravated offences, sexual offences. ‘Other’ offences 
total 361 of all those recorded. They were not examined in detail, either because 
their incidence was very small and/or due to the need to concentrate on a limited 
number of high-volume crime types – those believed to be most susceptible (or 
potentially susceptible) to the CPTED and SBD approaches. With a total of 160 
‘other’ offences at the CSS the incidence is 0.0337 per dwelling per year. Whilst, 201 
such offences at the comparison provide an incidence of 0.0417. This produces a 
ratio of incidence of 0.8082. 
 
Double figure instances of ‘other’ crime were recorded at the CSS in 1992 (18 
crimes) and in seven of the 18 years between 1997-2014 years: 2003 (11), 2005 
(13), 2006 (15), 2007 (11), 2008 (20), 2009 (10) and 20013 (14). At the comparison, 
double digit figures were recorded in 10 years, the highest (17) in both 2002 and 
2007. Nevertheless, in the final three years single figures were recorded (Impact) in 
2012 (4), 2013 (4) and 2014 (6 recorded ‘other’ crimes). 
 
Accumulated data comparisons: 1992-1994 and 1997-2014 
Table 21 below brings together the yearly police-recorded crime figures for the six 
categories offence to produce accumulated totals for both the CSS and comparison 
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over 18 years. Visually and with the notable exception of burglary, crime totals at 
both the CSS and comparison appear very similar. However, despite no burglaries 
being recorded at the comparison during the final five years under analysis, the 18-
year total number of offences is 50 per cent higher than at the CSS. Conversely, had 
the crime analysis examined the first five years of 1997-2001 (7 recorded burglaries 
at the CSS, 27 at the comparison) the difference would have been close to 400 per 
cent higher at the latter.  
 
 
Table 21: Crime totals at the CSS and Comparison for the 18 years 1997 - 2014 
 
In two of the crime categories, vehicle crime and criminal damage, there is a higher 
incidence at the CSS. Vehicle crime: 185 at the CSS; 168 at the comparison site. 
And criminal damage: 70 such instances at the CSS; 67 at the comparison. With the 
crime category of robbery, the difference is very slight: 49 recorded crimes at the 






















difference in ‘Other’ crime: 160 crimes at the CSS; 201 at the comparison. Less so 
but still significant (17.65 per cent higher) in respect of assaults: 187 at the CSS; 220 
at the comparison. But it is the focal crime of burglary that demonstrates the greatest 
difference, albeit based on relatively small accumulated crime totals over 18 years. 
 
How has crime changed at the CSS and comparison during the period of 
interest? 
Having been presented with the 1992-1994 police-recorded crime data for  
the CSS, it was possible to chart the considerable reduction in police-recorded crime 
that appears to have begun during 1992 immediately after CSS refurbishment was 
completed. Analysis of this crime data indicated the reduction began during the final 
quarter of 1992, became established in 1993 and in full effect by 1994. Furthermore, 
this reduction can be identified across five of the six police-recorded crime 
categories (as detailed above) with the notable exception of vehicle crime. The latter 
demonstrated a marked increase (tripled from 7 to 21 reported crimes) during 1993, 
before falling back to slightly below its 1992 level in 1994. However, the key crime 
indicator is that of burglary (see Tables 13-15 above). From 19 recorded offences in 
1992, this fell to zero in 1993 followed by one attempt burglary in 1994. The 
subsequent average of 1.05 offences p.a. over 20 years delivers an 89.2 per cent 
reduction in burglary compared to the 1992 total. Sadly, no such data has been 
obtained to reflect what happened at the comparison site during and immediately 
after its refurbishment in 1995. But given general evidence of the effectiveness of 
SBD-based Interventions (e.g. Armitage, 1999 and especially Armitage and 





The data indicates that crime decreased substantially at the CSS following 
completion of the refurbishment in 1992. And that during the subsequent 22 years, 
this reduction was largely sustained. Unfortunately, no such data has been 
discovered for the years of refurbishment at the comparison (1993-1995) and the 
1997-2014 data does not commence until two years thereafter. Nevertheless, 
examination of this data discloses a 11 per cent higher level of police-recorded crime 
at the comparison from 1997 through to 2014. Indeed, until 2005, the rate of burglary 
at the comparison was in excess of 350 per cent higher than at the CSS (36 reported 
crimes compared to 10), after which the difference levelled off as periodic 
enhancements of the CPTED measures at both sites were implemented. And 
between 2010-2014 there were no police-recorded burglaries at the comparison, 
compared to 11 at the CSS. Questions then arise as to how and why the reductions 
were brought about and then sustained at the CSS? Why reductions at the 
comparison were originally lower? And the extent to which this can be attributed to 
the different grades of CPTED measures incorporated through the delivery 
mechanism of SBD at both sites? 
 
As a potential explanation for the crime drop at the CSS, the higher grade of CPTED 
measures implemented at the CSS – in excess of the minimum standards required 
by the recently launched (1989) SBD award scheme, is highly plausible (see Farrell 
et al, 2011; Tseloni et al, 2017). This is especially true in respect of the absence of 
forced-entry by way of the new Mul-T-Secure main entrance doors to each individual 
flat that were installed during 1992. Indeed, the block-by-block sequence of 
installation can be plotted against the reduction in burglary that took place during that 
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year, resulting in no burglaries taking place during the final two months of 1992. 
Furthermore, during the 1997-2014 time frame the forced-entry of these same 
entrance doors appears in the MO description of eight recorded offences, yet with no 
credible explanation. These top-of the range doors were of steel-framed, composite 
construction fitted with multipoint locking systems, hinge bolts and frame armour that 
repeatedly defied the efforts of the fire service and specialist police departments to 
gain entry. Indeed, after 27 years of durability, they were only replaced in 2018 
during the most recent refurbishment process. 
 
What does appear is burglary executed via the balconies and accessible by means 
of the previously detailed unique emergency fire-escape system. Prior to the door 
and window standards PAS 24 and BS 7950 being specified by SBD in 1999 
(Armitage, 2013 and personal witness), balcony doors and windows had been 
replaced with uncertificated (and by twenty-first century standards) less secure 
PVCu units. Three burglaries executed by way of these balcony doors and windows 
were recorded at the CSS during the same 18-year time period. 
 
The electronically-operated communal entrance doors (with each tenant being 
provided with a fob-access key) were another more intensive/higher grade form of 
CPTED measure incorporated at the CSS. Moreover, electronic control of these 
doors was also managed from the onsite offices and control room of the new 24/7 
staffed concierge scheme that went live in November 1992. Its remit included 
controlling access to visitors (assisted by CCTV cameras and two-way intercom link) 
and denying entry to those with no legitimate reason. By extension, this might be 
expected to reduce the capacity for criminal activity by non-residents and therefore, 
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could plausibly be observed as contributing to the reduction in crime. Furthermore, 
qualitative testimony by the tenants (see Chapter Five) supports this hypothesis. 
However, the CCTV cameras did not extend to the external areas, including the car 
parks and may assist in explaining why vehicle crime increased considerably more at 
the CSS in 1993, fell back as much in 1994 and amongst all the recorded crime 
categories has demonstrated the greatest incidence (Impact) during the 18-year 
period – higher than at the comparison site over the same timeline. 
 
Effects of specific CPTED measures at the comparison 
As detailed extensively in Chapter Three, Methodology, from amongst the 213   
remaining tower blocks in Birmingham (BCC, 2017), it was impossible to identify a 
comparison that had first, not been refurbished in the 1990s; and second, at the 
same time received at least some CPTED treatment. However, it was known how 
during the 1993-1995 refurbishment of the of the comparison, those blocks had 
received a lower grade (Intervention and Implementation) of CPTED. In particular: no 
24/7 staffed concierge was established; no fob-reader, access-controlled door entry 
system was installed; and the front doors to each of the 268 individual flats were not 
replaced. Instead, a second locking system (most often a five-lever mortise deadlock 
to the standard BS 3621) was fitted to each door. These measures were sufficient to 
comply with the minimum standard required at that time to attain an SBD award (a 
requirement by BCC Housing Department since SBD was launched in 1989 
(personal witness). However, in hindsight perhaps it was inevitable that this lower 





The higher incidence of burglary at the comparison, when compared to the CSS, is 
detailed above. However, this was not consistent over time and having reached a 
highpoint of 11 recorded offences in 2002, reduced and between 2010-2014 no 
offences were recorded. This took place in the wake of new entrance doors to each 
individual flat at the comparison being installed in 2003. Furthermore, whilst there 
were four forced-entry burglaries via the front door at the comparison in 1997, 
thereafter, this MO became increasingly less common with the last such (attempted) 
offence taking place in 2008. 
 
Indeed, whilst the comparison suffered a higher incidence of burglary over the 18 
years under analysis, from 2010 onwards the incidence was consistently lower at the 
comparison, when compared to the CSS. It must, however, be remembered that 
these are very small figures and consequently, the warning of insufficient statistical 
resilience a constant challenge. The remaining five crime categories appear to be 
less affected by CPTED Interventions. Assaults, in particular increased between 
1997 and 2014, however, this was almost certainly because common assault was 
only created a statutory offence in 1988 (Criminal Justice Act, 1988 – and appears 
not to have been recorded until 1999); changes in Home Office Counting Rules 
(1998) and the introduction of the National Crime Recording Standard (2002). 
Vehicle crime has proved to be one of the most enduring crimes at both the CSS and 
comparison, with offences at each location only reducing from 2011 onwards. 
Perhaps this is symptomatic of the relatively low socio-economic status of the 
tenants, translating into their ownership of older vehicles with poorer security. And 
whilst the environmental elements of CPTED (most especially the creation of 
defensible space and territoriality) were incorporated at both the CSS and 
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comparison (albeit to a similarly lower grade of CPTED at the latter), there was no 
external CCTV surveillance at either site.   
 
Alternative explanations to the CPTED and SBD effects 
Regardless of the CPTED and SBD Interventions employed at both the CSS and 
comparison, there are a number of confounding factors that could have contributed 
to the identified changes in crime rates e.g. changes in the age, gender and/or 
household size of tenants; employment/unemployment of tenants; and benefits 
payments. Indeed, in 2015 the latter (when the deduction of housing benefits at 
source was changed to payments made directly to the tenants) was a reason used to 
justify closure of the onsite 24/7 staffed concierge scheme at the CSS, due to fears 
that it could no longer be funded (see Chapters Two, Five and Six). Furthermore, 
because there exists an indication that the trend in reduced levels of crime began 
before the years for which crime data had been supplied for example Farrell et al, 
(2013); Tseloni et al, (2017) it could be argued that the changes are due to other 
factors. The following paragraphs explore the challenges of investigating this further. 
 
Data provided by the Office for National statistics (ONS, 2018) indicate that police-
recorded burglary in England and Wales reached its highpoint in 1992/1993, which 
all but coincides with reductions at the CSS. However, at the CSS (and increasingly 
over time at the comparison) a lower level of burglary was sustained over the 18-
year time frame. Aggregated across the city of Birmingham both are lower than the 
average rate of residential burglary (see Table 14 above). Perhaps most importantly, 
the incidence of residential burglary was consistently lower at the CSS until 2009. 
And of greatest significance, a ‘credible’ MO of forced-entry via the main entrance 
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doors to each flat, though recorded, is highly unlikely to have taken place. 
Furthermore, it is now known that following the considerable cuts to police funding 
that began in 2011, residential burglary was thereafter regularly recorded over the 
telephone and without a police officer or PCSO (police community support officer) 
visiting the scene. More specifically, amongst the 40 residential burglaries recorded 
at the four tower blocks of the CSS (264 flats in total), over a period of 18 years, the 
findings from this part of the analysis were different to those of the comparison (268 
dwellings, 60 offences of burglary). 
 
Nevertheless, these figures are relatively small, originating from seven tower blocks 
containing a total of 532 dwellings. A more extensive investigation would necessarily 
examine the recorded crime data from the remaining 213 tower blocks (BCC, 2017) 
in Birmingham and as this research project has discovered, it has proved impossible 
to secure such bulk crime data for the years prior to 1997. Even if such data could be 
located, its reliability is often questionable and subject to realignment of police area 
boundaries, changes in the law, Home Office Counting Rules (1998), the introduction 
of the National Crime Recording Standard (2002) and reporting procedures. 
Moreover, because more than half the tower blocks in Birmingham have been 
demolished during the past three decades (many due to compounding crime issues), 
ignoring the crime data from those blocks would have the tendency of skewing the 
more favourable results from those remaining 213.  
 
As previously indicated, changes in crime rates over time may be due to factors 
other than the introduction of CPTED and SBD Interventions. The crime reduction 
outcomes, for example, may have benefited as a result of ‘high visibility policing’ by 
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police officers and/or PCSOs that ran alongside and regardless of CPTED and SBD. 
Consequently, the effects of DOC Interventions, changes in policies, increased or 
decreased unemployment or changes in the imprisonment or release of prisoners, 
may have had a contributory effect in reducing crime at both the CSS and 
comparison. 
 
Returning to the research aims of this investigation, it is also necessary to research 
the counterfactual inference, namely: would the crime have decreased differentially 
without the CPTED and SBD Interventions at the CSS, relative to the comparison? 
OR both relative to the rest of Birmingham? As previously detailed, there is a major 
problem in this hypothesis, in that both the CSS and comparison had experienced 
CPTED and SBD Interventions – albeit of different grades/intensities. Indeed, when 
this study began in 2012, two decades had passed since a programme had begun 
(at the CSS) to refurbish those high-rise tower blocks BCC had decided not to 
demolish. As part of those refurbishments, the tower blocks had received at least 
some CPTED treatment. Fortunately, the level of ‘contamination’ at the comparison 
was known in that only the barest minimum of CPTED treatment necessary to 
achieve a SBD award had been applied during the 1993-1995 refurbishment. In 
particular, the front doors to the flats at the comparison had not been replaced and 
their security merely augmented through the installation of a second key-operated 
five-lever mortise deadlock – which the tenants reported as highly ineffective. 
 
Finally, despite an original intention, it was soon realised that this study did not have 
the capacity to investigate displacement of crime and diffusion of benefits (Johnson, 
Guerette and Bowers, 2014) at either or between the CSS, comparison site and 
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surrounding area – largely due to the access to data and complexities of such an 
undertaking. Nevertheless, this study is aware of making inferences about the main 
effect e.g. displacement from the action area leaking crimes into the comparison 
area and how that could mimic an Impact effect. Furthermore, because its primary 
interest lies in the sustainability of crime prevention at specific sites, displacement of 
crime/diffusion of benefits is an important issue that future research could address. 
 
Measuring change relative to the comparison 
During the majority of years under analysis, the level of recorded crime (as detailed 
above) at the CSS was more often lower than at the comparison. This was especially 
true in relation to burglary, although during the final five years of analysis (2010-
2014) the comparison consistently out-performed the CSS in terms of zero recorded 
burglaries over five years at the former. Consequently, and mindful of these very 
small figures, the total number of recorded burglaries at the CSS (40) was both 
smaller than the comparison (60) and lasted in excess of 20 years (if the data for 
1993 and 1994 is included) when compared to the incidence of burglary in 1992. 
This indicates that over the 18-year timeframe, there were exactly 50 per cent more 
burglaries recorded by the police at the comparison. 
 
Nevertheless, to describe this as a ‘sustained’ reduction is far more problematic. It 
may simply mean staying at the level reached immediately after the Intervention had 
its initial effect. However, if the only element preventing the comparison from 
demonstrating a similar pattern of reduction (albeit of two years less duration 
because refurbishment took place later) is a spike in burglary in one particular year, 
the role of the comparison is itself questionable. To further complicate matters, 
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between 2010-2014 when the comparison outperformed the CSS in terms of 
burglary reduction, this may be attributable to the new PAS 24 standard compliant 
entrance doors that were installed at each comparison site flat in 2003 and the offsite 
central station style of electronic concierge that subsequently went live. Once again, 
this points to the difficulties in identifying a comparison that received no CPTED 
Intervention, especially over the very long term. This was addressed in Chapter 
Three, Methodology and once again in Chapter Seven, Discussion.        
 
In respect of the remaining five crime categories, the crime analysis is less emphatic. 
Over 18 years, robbery, vehicle crime and criminal damage exhibit slightly higher 
totals at the CSS than the comparison. Whereas, assaults and ‘other’ crime 
(categories generally believed to be less susceptible to CPTED and SBD 
interventions), recorded higher totals at the comparison than the CSS. However, due 
to changes in Home Office (1998; 2002) definition and recording of both assaults 
and ‘other’ crime, these crime categories expanded considerably from the turn of the 
century. As a result, perhaps it is wise not to conclude a great deal from these 
numbers – especially in the context of the very long term.  
 
Ultimately, the Impact analysis points to a crime reduction benefit of 89.2 per cent in 
respect of police-recorded burglary being sustained at the CSS over a 20-year 
timeline (if the figures for 1993 and 1994 are included and presuming there was no 
exceptional increase during 1995 and 1996 for which no data is available). To at 
least some extent, this reduction can be attributed to the CPTED and SBD 
Interventions incorporated during the 1989-1992 refurbishment – most especially the 
new front entrance doors to the individual flats. However, given the problems with 
230 
 
the lower grade CPTED at the comparison and number of potential factors that could 
have influenced crime levels, the results in respect of the other five crime categories 
are inconclusive and should be treated with caution. 
 
 
Emerging issues and limitations in the data analysis 
This chapter provides the results of an analysis exploring changes in the levels of 
crime and their MO after the Implementation of CPTED and SBD measures, at 
seven tower blocks located in the inner-city district of Nechells, Birmingham. Results 
indicate that the 1989-1992 introduction of CPTED and SBD Interventions coincided 
with a significant and sustained reduction in burglary at the CSS, compared to the 
comparison. However, it does not necessarily follow that CPTED and SBD 
interventions were the drivers behind the changes in respect of the other five 
recorded crime categories. When examined more closely, those changes were 
varied across both the CSS and comparison tower blocks and over time, which 
provides support to the consideration that at least in part changes were due to other 
factors as detailed previously. 
 
A further consideration is how the onsite 24/7 staffed concierge in operation 
throughout these 18 years at the CSS, provided a conduit for the recording of crime. 
Whereas, at the comparison such a facility never existed and as one professional 
explained when interviewed (see Chapter Six), the overwhelming majority of the 
tenants could not afford home contents insurance which thus became an additional 
potential reason not to report crime. If this was an accurate hypothesis, it would lead 




As detailed earlier in this chapter, additional police-recorded crime data was also 
discovered for the years 1992-1994 at the CSS alone – but not for the comparison. 
The absence of data prior to 1992 at the CSS and before 1997 at the comparison, is 
discussed in Chapter Three, Methodology. A similar discussion concerned the issue 
of ‘contamination’ at the comparison – in that those blocks had themselves during 
the 1993-1995 refurbishment experienced the minimum intensity of CPTED 
necessary to attain an SBD award for each block. 
 
A major problem encountered by this study (and the majority of investigations 
exploring the effects on crime) is the attribution of change to the intervention 
(Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002). Declaring that reductions in recorded crime 
were the direct result of introducing CPTED and SBD Interventions, is highly 
unscientific and evidence deficient. Furthermore, changes in crime and crime trends 
may be the result of ‘limitations to experiment’ e.g. a poorly chosen or contaminated 
comparison, or to changes in the recording of crime. Indeed, there exists a wide 
spectrum of other factors that might cause changes in crime rates, most especially 
during the course of a very long period under investigation – as was inherent within 
this study. 
 
Furthermore, numerous Interventions lie outside the scope of police responsibility. 
For example, non-crime central or local government initiatives e.g. urban 
regeneration. Or macro-economic issues, like those that followed the collapse of the 
banks in 2008 and the consequent recession causing economic downturn, factory 
closures, higher unemployment, etc. Changes in legislation regarding scrap metal 
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dealers, number plates and number plate providers and improved security measures 
for vehicles, are believed to have influenced the level of auto crime. Crawford et al. 
(2005) believed this decreased the opportunities for theft of motor vehicles. 
However, a few years later an apparent lack of vigilance on the part of vehicle 
manufacturers appears to have fuelled the increase in a new type of burglary where 
offenders have decided to break into people’s homes to steal the keys (often easily 
cloned electronic ignition ’keys’) before driving away in the now stolen vehicles – 
also known as ‘car key burglary’.  
 
Car key burglary has not been identified at either the CSS or comparison, most 
probably because it would be difficult for car thieves to associate a parked car with 
any particular dwelling in a tower block. And perhaps of even greater significance, 
because the residents of such dwellings do not have the financial means to purchase 
the makes and models of brand-new cars most often targeted by such thieves. On a 
similarly positive note, none of the crime data examined for either the CSS or 
comparison refers to ‘distraction burglary’ – where (most often) one offender talks to 
the householder at the front door, whilst a second enters, searches and steals items 
from the dwelling. With a single entrance door to each flat and electronically-
operated communal entrance doors this would be a difficult offence to commit at 
either site. And this may have also contributed to the absence of any incidence of 
aggravated burglary (where the offender is equipped with a firearm, imitation firearm, 
explosive or weapon of offence) in the police-recorded crime data covering 21 years.  
 
Summary of findings                                                                                              
This first of the findings chapters has been devoted to an in-depth Impact analysis of 
233 
 
police-recorded crime data (raw Intelligence within the 5Is) for the years 1992-1994 
at the CSS alone and 1997-2014 at both the CSS and comparison. The bulk dataset 
covers an especially long timeframe of 18 years. However, sadly it does not include 
the years when the refurbishments (in 5Is terms, Intelligence guided Interventions 
necessitating Implementation and Involvement by BCC council officers, architects, 
contractors and DOCOs), were taking place at the CSS (1989-1991) and comparison 
(1993-1995). The earlier data does include the final year of refurbishment at the CSS 
(1992) and provides some indication of the high levels of crime being committed at 
both sites prior to refurbishment. 
 
Ultimately, this chapter illustrates that describing a preventive connection (the 
impact) between CPTED and SBD with actual crime prevented, is not easy to 
achieve. The level of difficulty is intensified in being unable to isolate the 
effectiveness of specific CPTED and SBD Interventions, during a period of months or 
years. Furthermore, and by their very nature, CPTED and SBD tend to deliver 
measurable results in the medium to long term. Consequently, attributing preventive 
value to (for example) main entrance doors or windows (let alone security lighting or 
defensive planting) is inherently difficult – albeit in some part possible in the instance 
of this study due to its analysis over the very long term. However, this longevity also 
causes its own problems, it terms of data collection and the extended capacity for 
contamination caused by external Interventions. 
 
In contrast, Pawson and Tilley (1997) indicate that a more effective approach might 
be to concentrate on how any reductive effect might have been engineered e.g. 
enhanced security provided by the high quality, top of the range Mul-T-Secure 
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individual entrance doors at the CSS, compared to simply augmenting with new 
security hardware the existing doors at the comparison tower blocks. And indeed, 
the incidence of burglary at the CSS when compared to the comparison (especially 
at the latter during the first decade post-refurbishment) lends support to the value of 
the technically superior (and more durable) multi-point locking doors and the 
‘Domestic burglary drop and the security hypothesis’ (Tseloni et al, 2017).  
 
 
Figure 6: Gated-off connecting corridor on the twelfth storey of each CSS tower block. These gates 
were installed during the 1989-1992 refurbishment at the request of the Four Towers Tenants’ 
Association to prevent use of the connecting corridors by anti-social elements. They are unlocked 
by the caretakers when one of the lifts on either side of the block breaks down. And do not 
compromise fire safety, because each side of the block incorporates compartmentation with its 




Finally, the different architectural styles of the two sites are also worthy of 
consideration – in the context of any potential influence on crime and interaction with 
the CPTED measures Implemented and SBD delivery process. The four CSS tower 
blocks appear redolent of the 1950s architectural style (if not pre-Second World War 
1930s), whereas those of the comparison have the ‘brutalist’ look of the 1960s – 
even following their mid-1990s refurbishment that attempted to ‘soften’ their 
aesthetic appearance. It is possible to speculate that this may have made a 
difference to the sustainability of impact, if not the intensity, quality and 
appropriateness of the CPTED Interventions that it was possible to recommend and 
how effectively they could be implemented and maintained. Research on the effects 
(on residents, offenders and service providers) of the ‘look’ of buildings would be an 

















Findings: Tenants’ perceptions of crime, ASB, safety and 
security 
 
Chapter Four provided analysis of the police recorded crime in respect of the CSS 
and comparison site. This second findings section chapter examines both the 
quantitative data gathered from the 286 tenant questionnaires (out of a potential 532 
flats) and the qualitative data gleaned from the subsequent responses provided by 
those 22 tenants chosen and who agreed to be interviewed at length. 
 
Quantitative analysis of tenants’ questionnaire data 
The methodology is detailed in Chapter Three. But to recap and in brief, the 
questionnaire was designed to solicit tenants’ experiences of crime, ASB, safety and 
security as a resident of their tower block. Additional questions addressed their 
perceptions of safety inside the home, internal areas of the tower block, external 
areas, surrounding streets, the district of Nechells and Birmingham as a whole. The 
draft questionnaire was repeatedly revised and redesigned in order to improve its 
comprehension and ease of understanding by the tenants. Before being distributed, 
it was piloted courtesy of eleven colleagues of the researcher (all of whom had an 
involvement with DOC) and following which further amendments were incorporated.  
 
The original delivery by hand for self-completion produced a poor response rate of 
only 3.4 per cent. Consequently, the exercise was repeated courtesy of a much 
repeated ‘knocking on door exercise’ that delivered a response rate of 53.8 per cent 
– 148 questionnaires completed at the CSS; 138 at the comparison. Response rates 
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as a percentage of all homes are given below. As a result, quantitative data was 
provided to compare and assess against the police-recorded crime data examined in 
the previous chapter. This was believed necessary in order address the ‘dark figure 
of crime’ – Coleman and Moynihan (1996); Walsh and Hemmens (2014) and the 
debate relating to the difference between police-recorded crime and (in the context 
of this investigation) tenant self-reported crime. 
 
The questionnaire was deliberately designed to address the research questions, 
namely: has there been a net reduction in recorded crime at the CSS compared to 
the comparison site? Has any such net reduction been sustained over a period of 25 
years? What impact have the individual elements of design had on crime in the study 
area? Which (if any) specific crime prevention interventions have influenced 
reductions in crime and how effective were they? 
 
Qualitative analysis of the tenants’ extended interview data 
Once again detailed in Chapter Three, 22 of the tenants providing answers to the 
questionnaire had also volunteered, were selected from a larger sample and agreed 
to be further interviewed at length. The interviews were digitally recorded with the 
permission of the interviewee and a written transcript subsequently made. Qualitative 
analysis of the tenants’ interviews reveals a wide and diverse variety of opinions in 
respect of crime, ASB, safety and security issues at both the CSS and comparison. 
Some themes are specific to either the CSS or comparison e.g. the loss of the 24/7 
staffed concierge at the former; and for many years post-refurbishment the poor-
quality entrance doors at the comparison. Statements taken from these in-depth 
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interviews also assist in illuminating both the police-recorded crime data and the 
tenant questionnaire data. 
 
Crime categories 
As detailed in Chapter Four, Crime analysis, six different crime categories were 
chosen for this research project. The first of these was burglary – essentially 
residential, although non-residential burglary, aggravated burglary and attempts 
were included to eliminate any ‘masking’ effects (meaning, crimes being recorded 
under a less serious classification). The second category was robbery – including 
assault with intent to rob and theft from the person. Assaults – including common 
assault, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, woundings, GBH and homicide 
became the third. Whilst all forms of vehicle crime the fourth chosen crime category. 
Criminal damage – including arson constituted the fifth. And all ‘other’ recorded 
crime the sixth – offences which individually numbered smaller totals. Hereafter, 
these six crime categories are simply referred to as burglary, robbery, assaults, 
vehicle crime, criminal damage and ‘other’ crime.  
 
Five of these six crime categories were deliberately chosen because they provided a 
spectrum of offences – ones not limited to simple property crime which is often 
perceived as more susceptible to the SCP, CPTED and SBD approaches. An 
additional aim was that the data categories should provide a large enough sample of 
offences, to permit both analysis of patterns and measurement of those changes that 





Description of sample 
This section covers the three headings of household size (number of persons living 
in each flat); tenant age-range (of the person being questioned); and the length of 
tenancy at each flat. 
 
Tenants’ household size 
 
Table 22: Tenants’ household size at both the CSS and comparison – percentage at each site 
Table 22 illustrates the household size of tenants residing at the CSS and 
comparison when the questionnaire exercise was completed in 2016. At the CSS 
27.7 per cent (41) tenants lived alone, at the comparison 31.2 per cent (43); at the 



















Living Alone 2 or more 3 or more 4 or more persons
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cent (44); at the CSS 23.0 per cent (34) lived in a three-person household 26.1 per 
cent (36); and at the CSS 13.5 per cent (20) lived in a four-person household 10.9 
per cent (15) at the comparison. As indicated throughout this investigation, these 
figures are based on the 286 questionnaire responses and demonstrate tenant 
households that were largely similar in number at both sites. Tenants were not 




Table 23: Tenants’ age-range at both the CSS and comparison – percentage at each site 
 
Table 23 sets out the tenant age-range (of the person being questioned) as follows: 
36.5 per cent (54) at the CSS, and 28.3 per cent (39) at the comparison were 18-30 
years of age; 31.8 per cent (47) at the CSS and 33.3 per cent (46) at the comparison 


















18-30 years 31-45 years 46-60 years 61 years & over
241 
 
(32) per cent at the comparison between 46-60 years of age; whilst 8.1 per cent (12) 
at the CSS and 15.2 per cent (21) at the comparison were aged 61 and over. 
Consequently, it can be seen that the number of tenants aged 61 years and over 
questioned at the comparison was 75 per cent higher at the comparison. Whereas, 
the number of those questioned between 18-30 at the comparison was 72.22 per 
cent of those at the CSS. No one under the age of 18 appears in these statistics 
because no such individual was interviewed on ethical grounds of legal propriety. 
 
Tenants’ length of residency 
 


























Since 1990 or before 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016 onwards
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Table 24 details the length of tenancy. Unsurprisingly, more than three decades later 
only 2.7 per cent (4) of the tenants questioned at the CSS, and 1.5 per cent (2) at the 
comparison had moved into their flats during 1990 or in the years before; 1.4 per 
cent (2) at the CSS and 1.5 per cent (2) at the comparison, had taken up occupancy 
between 1991-1995; 8.8 per cent (13) at the CSS, and 3.6 per cent (5) at the 
comparison, had moved in between 1996-2000; 14.2 per cent (21) at the CSS, and 
7.3 per cent (10) had been a tenant at the comparison since between 2001-2005; 
18.9 per cent (28) at the CSS, and 17.4 per cent (24) at the comparison, had taken 
up residency between 2006-2010; 39.2 per cent (58) at the CSS, and 48.6 per cent 
(67) at the comparison, between 2011-2015; and 14.9 per cent (22) at the CSS, and 
20.3 per cent (28) at the comparison in 2016 and thereafter. Comparing the two 
sites, perhaps the greatest difference is that at the CSS 27.0 per cent (40) of those 
questioned have been long-term tenants since 2005 or earlier; whereas at the 
comparison the figure is 13.8 per cent (19) – less than half.   
 
Tenants’ experience of crime and ASB    
As outlined in Table 25 below, during the 18 years between 1997 and 2014 amongst 
the 286 questionnaire responses from tenants, 21.6 per cent at the CSS and 31.9 
per cent at the comparison said they had been the victim of crime or ASB whilst a 
tenant at their flat. By extension, 78.4 per cent and 68.1 per cent had not been 
victims. Amongst the victims, 43 reported the crime had occurred inside that 
dwelling; 4 in the communal areas (ground floor area, staircases, lifts or landings); 
29 in the grounds (including the car parks); and 16 had been the victim of ASB. It 
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should be noted that these figures are based on the memory/perception of the 
individual tenant at the time the questionnaire was completed. 
 
 
Table 25: Tenants’ overall experience of crime at both the CSS and comparison – percentage at 
each site 
 
Closer analysis indicates that the ratio of CSS to comparison victims to be as 
follows: inside the flat 15:28 (34.9 per cent at the CSS, 65.1 per cent at the 
comparison); within the communal areas 0:4 (all at the comparison); and in the 
grounds 17:12 (58.6 per cent at the CSS, 41.4 per cent at the comparison.  Overall, 
on the basis of those tenants completing the questionnaire, those at the CSS 
experienced 42.1 per cent of all crime, whilst those at the comparison experienced 






















Table 26: Police-recorded burglary and tenant self-reported burglary at the CSS 1997-2014 
 
Police data suggests that 100 residential burglaries were reported to and recorded 
by the police across the two sites during the 18 years from 1997-2014 (see Tables 
26 and 27). This amounts to 6.8 per cent of all recorded offences. Of these 100 
burglaries, 40 were reported as having taken place at the CSS (40 per cent) 
producing an incidence of 0.0084 crimes per dwelling per annum; compared to 60 at 
the comparison – 60 per cent and an incidence 0.0124. Analysis of this crime data 
indicates 84 per cent of these 100 offences were residential burglaries (32 at the 
CSS and 52 at the comparison). Non-residential burglaries accounted for a further 2 
offences each at the CSS and comparison. Attempted burglaries, 6 offences each at 















CSS - police recorded burglary CSS - tenant self-reported burglary
Burglary dwelling Burglary other building Attempt burglary Aggravated Burglary
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there were no examples of aggravated burglary – where the offender uses a firearm, 
imitation firearm, explosives or weapon of offence. 
 
Table 27: Police-recorded burglary and tenant self-reported burglary at the comparison 1997-2014 
 
Setting these figures against the tenants’ questionnaire data indicates similar rates of 
under-reporting of burglary and attempt burglary at both the CSS (6 offences over 18 
years) and comparison (7 offences over 18 years) with 13 tenants stating they had 
not reported the crime to the police. The most obvious explanations for this disparity 
might include (either individually or in combination): an unwillingness to report such 
crimes; lack of confidence in the police to investigate such crimes; absence of 
insurance; knowledge that the property stolen was itself the proceeds of crime; a 
belief that attempt burglary did not warrant such report (they had been lucky in 
escaping the substantive offence being committed. Also worth of note, none of the 















Comparison - police recorded burglary Comparison - tenant self-reported burglary
Burglary dwelling Burglary other building Attempt burglary Aggravated Burglary
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The ratio of 2:3 (CSS to comparison) burglaries in the police reported crime data, 
was therefore not replicated in the self-reported crime found in the tenant 
questionnaires. However, because the figures for these tenant-reported burglaries 
number less than one such offence per site per year, the capacity to draw objective 
conclusions is somewhat limited. Furthermore, two of the tenants (of more than 15 
years’ residence) interviewed at length were both victims of burglary – one a ground 
floor tenant at the CSS, the other at the comparison. The CSS tenant observed: “I 
thought my windows were locked, but they managed to get in and steal my 
valuables. Reported it to the concierge and the police arrived in an hour.” 
(Interviewee no. T1). Whereas, the tenant from the comparison stated: 
            I couldn’t afford insurance so there was no point in reporting it to the police. I   
            was also pretty sure who’d broken into my flat and he’s not a nice person. He  
            didn’t steal much, but then I haven’t got much, have I? (Interviewee no. T20). 
 
Robbery 
During the 18 years 1997-2014, police-recorded crime data for both the CSS and 
comparison indicates a total 101 crimes of robbery and thefts from the person had 
been reported (see Tables 28 and 29 below). These break down into the marginally 
different 49 at the CSS (48.5 per cent) and 52 (51.5 per cent) at the comparison 
producing an incidence of 0.0103 and 0.0107 such crimes per dwelling per annum 
respectively – in total 5.8 per cent of all such police-recorded crime over 18 years. 
Without exception, these offences appear to have taken place outside the blocks – 
either in the grounds or in the surrounding streets. ‘Appear’, because in the majority 




Table 28: Police-recorded robbery and tenant self-reported robbery at the CSS 1997-2014 
 
 



















CSS - police recorded robbery CSS - tenant self-reported robbery



















Comparison - police recorded robbery Comparison - tenant self-reported robbery
Assault with intent to rob Attempt Robbery Robbery Theft from the person
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exact location. The tenant victims questioned who self-reported were able to specify 
the location of their robbery and theft from the person. However, these amounted to 
just five from the CSS and two at the comparison. All seven disclosed that these 
offences had taken place outside the tower block – either in the grounds or 
immediately adjacent streets or footpaths. Only one from each site was interviewed 
at length. The CSS victim described: “I was walking from the bus-stop just as it was 
getting dark. He came up behind me, snatched my handbag and pushed me to the 
ground, before running off. I was too frightened to call the police.” (Interviewee no. 
T2). Whereas, the comparison victim recalled: “I was walking through the car park 
talking on the mobile when the bastard grabbed it out of my hand and gave me a 
load of abuse.” (Interviewee no. T15). 
 
Assaults                                                                                                                                    
As with the previous robbery crime category, reference to assaults includes a 
spectrum of offences: assault occasioning actual bodily harm); common assault; 
various offences of wounding; GBH and homicide (see Tables 30 and 31 below). 
However, it rarely featured in the responses provided by the tenants questioned and 
interviewed was rarely made – 4 at the CSS and 6 at the comparison (less than 3 
per cent in total). This causes a potential concern in that as detailed in Chapter Four, 
Crime Analysis, following new Home Office counting rules the number of police-
recorded assaults (many it can be inferred from the MO data relating to domestic 
violence at both the CSS and comparison site) increased considerably. As a 
consequence, it might be presumed that none of those subject to such assault were 
prepared to speak freely when interviewed – or have moved, or that some of those 
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questioned were especially reticent in this especially serious and difficult to 
investigate subject areas. 
                                                                                                                                   
Table 30: Police-recorded assaults and tenant self-reported assaults at the CSS                                                                                                                                      
 
Furthermore, the number of assaults over 18 years totalled 407 – 187 at the CSS 
(45.9 per cent, producing an incidence of 0.0394 crimes per dwelling per annum); 
220 the comparison (54.1 per cent, producing an incidence of 0.0456); and 
accounting for 26.8 per cent of all recorded crime. This is by far the largest single 
crime category, and yet is not reflected in the concerns raised by the tenants in the 
questionnaires or in the extended interviews. On closer inspection, 252 of these 
offences related to Section 47 assault (ABH) and until common assault was made a 
statutory offence by the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and coming into effect in 1991, the 
lowest grade of such offences that would appear in crime statistics. Under this 
heading would fall bruising and cuts – but not wounds, broken bones, or GBH (the 

















CSS - police recorded assaults CSS - tenant self-reported assaults
S. 47 assault with intent to rob Common assault Wounding GBH Homicide
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Nevertheless, the absence of commentary amongst the tenants’ questionnaire and 
interview data raises multiple issues – and this despite the researcher adopting a 
semi-structured, open-ended style of interviewing where the interviewee is 
encouraged to speak freely – as detailed in Chapter Three. 
 
 
Table 31: Police-recorded assaults and tenant self-reported assaults at the comparison 
 
In addition to the earlier potential explanation that many of these assaults may relate 
to domestic violence with an inherent reticence to talk about such crimes, as with the 

















Comparison - police recorded assaults Comparison - tenant self-reported assaults
S. 47 assault with intent to rob Common assault Wounding GBH Homicide
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necessarily follow the offence took place at the victim’s home address. Furthermore, 
390 assaults divided over 18 years works out at 21.66 crimes per year and an 




Table 32: Police-recorded vehicle crime and tenant self-reported vehicle crime at the CSS                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                                     
Tables 32 and 33 set out police-recorded and tenant self-reported vehicle crime at 
the CSS and comparison. At both sites, less than one third of tenants questioned 
during 2016 owned a vehicle – estimated at 29.17 per cent for the CSS and 26.4 per 
cent for the comparison. At the CSS, five of the tenants questioned said they had 




















CSS - police recorded vehicle crime CSS - tenant self-reported vehicle crime
Theft of motor vehicle Attempt TOMV
Taking without owner's consent Theft from motor vehicle2
Attempt TFMV Interfere with motor vehicle
Criminal damage to motor vehicle
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theft from motor vehicle; and three criminal damage to motor vehicle offences. At the 
comparison the total was seven: one theft of motor vehicle; one taking without 
owner’s consent (TWOC); three thefts from motor vehicle; and two offences of 
criminal damage to motor vehicle. 
 
Table 33: Police-recorded vehicle crime and tenant self-reported vehicle crime at the comparison 
 
Vehicle crime was one of only two crime categories examined where there was a 
higher incidence at the CSS (185 offences, 52.4 per cent, incidence 0.0389 crimes 
per dwelling per annum) than at the comparison (168 offences, 47.6 per cent, 
incidence 0.0348). This was especially the case at the CSS during 1993 – the year 
after the refurbishment (including the incorporation of higher grade CPTED 






















Comparison - police recorded vehicle crime Comparison - tenant self-reported vehicle crime
Theft of motor vehicle Attempt TOMV
Taking without owner's consent Theft from motor vehicle2
Attempt TFMV Interfere with motor vehicle
Criminal damage to motor vehicle
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crimes were recorded as having taken place at the CSS, producing an incidence of 
0.0833. However, during the 18 years between 1997-2014 some 353 vehicle crimes 
were recorded by the police as taking place at the combined locations – 91 of which 
were TWOC offences, 53 thefts of, 91 thefts from and 75 criminal damage to motor 
vehicles. However, only 7 of those questioned at the CSS and 11 at the comparison 
fell into the category of self-reported crime. Of significant importance, with so few 
householders who could trace their tenancy back to the years of refurbishment, 
perhaps it was unsurprising that none of the tenants interviewed at length were 
vehicle owners at that time. This points to a number of key issues in conducting such 
a study over the very long term: changes in tenants’ occupancy, their demographics, 
and (in this instance) vehicle ownership – because it appears an increasing 
proportion of tenants became car owners over time. 
 
In this last regard a tenant since 1985 at the CSS observed when interviewed at 
length: 
            When I first moved here very few people owned a car. And after all that  
            refurbishment work there were plenty of empty spaces to park in, whereas  
            now there are so many they park everywhere. (Interviewee no. T5). 
A similar observation was made by a tenant resident at the comparison since 1989:   
            People used to park wherever they could. There just weren’t enough  
            spaces. But things got better when they put fencing round the grounds and 
            made the car park bigger. (Interviewee no. T19).    
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This last statement also alludes to the reality of how the 1993-95 refurbishment at 
the comparison was not a single, one off event frozen in time. Subsequent 
measures, like erecting fencing around the grounds, extending the car parks and 
installing new entrance doors to each of the flats and communal entrance doors at 




Table 34: Police-recorded criminal damage and tenant self-reported criminal damage at the CSS 
 
Tables 34 and 35 illustrate police-recorded and tenant self-reported criminal damage 
crime at the CSS and comparison. Tenants questioned and interviewed at both sites 























CSS - police recorded criminal damage CSS - tenant self-reported criminal damage
Criminal damage Arson
Arson intent to endanger life Attempt arson with intent to endanger life
Destroy property Other criminal damage
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graffiti to the internal walls and doors. Indeed, analysis of the recorded crime data 
indicates that over the 18 years between 1997-2014, 137 such offences were 
reported to/recorded by the police – 70 at the CSS (51.1 per cent, producing an 
incidence of 0.0147 crimes per dwelling per annum) and 67 at the comparison (48.9 
per cent, incidence 0.0139). These include 22 instances of arson, 11 at each site. 
 
 
Table 35: Police-recorded criminal damage and tenant self-reported criminal damage at the 
comparison 
 
Amongst the tenants questioned and interviewed at both the CSS and comparison, 
criminal damage was the one category that indicated the greatest disparity between 
the police-recorded and tenant-reported crime statistics. Once again, tenant self-
















Comparison - police recorded criminal damage Comparison - tenant self-reported criminal damage
Criminal damage Arson
Arson intent to endanger life Attempt arson with intent to endanger life
Destroy property Other criminal damage
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questioned, they had been either the victim of criminal damage or had witnessed 
same (one at the comparison on more than three occasions). As one CSS tenant 
described when interviewed:   
            You just know the council and police won’t be interested in graffiti or  
            petty vandalism, so what’s the use in reporting it? It was different when we    
            had the concierge. They used to get onto it straight away and ensure the  
            doors (communal entrance doors) were kept locked. But now anyone can get  
            in and damage the place. (Interviewee no. T11). 
 
A tenant at the comparison had a more nuanced explanation for their decision not to 
report criminal damage:  
            There are so many problems living here. A little bit of vandalism is the least  
            of our worries. In any case, there’s nothing for the kids to do so no wonder 
            they damage the place – and they don’t live here. (Interviewee no. T16). 
 
‘Other’ crime 
Tables 36 and 37 below set out police-recorded and tenant self-reported ‘other’ 
crime at the CSS and comparison. The category of ‘other’ crime covered all recorded 
and tenant-reported crime not included under the previous five headings. Amongst 
the 361 police-recorded offences, the largest number was for theft other (122 
offences), followed by theft in a dwelling (58 offences), drugs offences (54), 
harassment (45), sexual offences (33), racially-aggravated offences (19), threats to 
kill (18), handling or receiving stolen property (10) and all other offences – all single 
figure totals at both sites (115). More specifically, 160 ‘other’ offences at the CSS 






























CSS - police recorded other crime CSS - tenant self-reported other crime
Theft other Theft in a dwelling
Drugs offences Harassment
Sexual offences Racially-aggravated offences


































Comparison - police recorder other crime Comparison - tenant self-reported other crime
Theft other Theft in a dwelling
Drugs offences Harassment
Sexual offences Racially-aggravated offences




annum); and 201 at the comparison (55.68 per cent, incidence 0.0417) were 
recorded by the police. However, tenant reported crime at the CSS accounted for 
only 16 offences and 21 at the comparison (less than 2.5 per cent in total). 
Furthermore, 8 (exactly 50 per cent) of these tenant-reported offences at the CSS; 
and 14 (66.6 per cent) at the comparison fell under the headings of theft. And 
perhaps of greatest importance, because ‘other’ crime covers such a wide spectrum 
of offences even under largest category of theft other, 122 police-recorded offences 
amounts to 0.97 offences per tower block per annum. It is therefore difficult at best to 
draw any conclusions from this level of recorded criminality. 
 
Summary across all crime categories 
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260 
 
Table 38 above demonstrates how the two highest crime categories (in terms of 
police-recorded offences) are assaults (187 at the CSS, 220 at the comparison) and 
vehicle crime (185 at the CSS, 168 at the comparison). However, in these two crime 
categories tenant-reported crime does not account for more 5.9 than per cent at the 
CSS and 9.1 per cent at the comparison. Whereas, under the crime category of 
burglary (40 recorded offences at the CSS, 60 at the comparison), 5 tenant-reported 
offences at the CSS amounts to 12.5 per cent and 2 at the comparison, 1.7 per cent. 
 
Differences between the police recorded and tenant reported crime totals can be 
attributed to a number of different causes. Chief amongst these are that 148 
questionnaires were completed for the CSS and 138 at the comparison, producing 
an overall response rate of 53.76 per cent – little more than half of all existing 
tenants at both sites. Those tenants questioned and interviewed may also have been 
unwilling to revisit the memory of specific crimes where they had been the victim. Or 
simply forgotten (or didn’t know) that they or someone other than her or himself in 
their household had been the victim of a crime reported to the police. But perhaps 
the greatest cause pointing to an apparent unwillingness to report crime at the 
comparison, was the long-term absence of community representation and the 24/7 
staffed concierge – as existed at the CSS for 24 years. As one long term tenant at 
the CSS and a resident since before the 1989-92 refurbishment observed: 
            When we had the tenants club (Four Towers Tenants Association) there was   
            a real community spirit with X and X (names redacted). But that’s long gone.  
            And when they closed the concierge… There’s no one to tell about what’s  





Within the tenant questionnaire (see Appendices 1 and 2) ASB was an element 
within questions 7 and 4 respectively relating to the tenant’s experience of crime. Out 
of 268 tenants questioned, only 16 reported to have been victims of ASB – evenly 
distributed with 8 at the CSS and 8 at the comparison (5.4 and 5.8 per cent 
respectively). Furthermore, all 16 did not self-report as victims, although 2 at the 
CSS and four at the comparison described the ASB as being abused verbally. The 
remaining 10 instances all related to noise – either from neighbours or persons 
whom they described as not being tenants of the tower block. And whilst the police 
are not mandated by the Home Office to record ASB, these figures can be set 
against those within the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW). Indeed, 
during the six years March 2012 to March 2018 experience of ASB fluctuated 
between 27 per cent and 33 per cent amongst those questioned (CSEW, 2020). 
Potential explanations for this disparity in experience of ASB by tenants at the two 
sites and nationally might include: different perceptions; world-weariness; unwilling to 
complain; avoidance behaviour by rarely venturing out; and enhanced tolerance.    
 
Nevertheless, amongst the 22 tenants who were interviewed at length, each of them 
comments on issues than can be interpreted as ASB – often verging on criminal 
behaviour. For example, a tenant of 12 years residency at the CSS observed: 
            I’ve had a noisy neighbour upstairs ever since I moved in. When we had the    
            concierge I used to tell them and he would turn the music down for a few    
            days. But since the concierge closed there’s no one to tell except the control  
            room and they don’t do anything. (Interviewee no. T11). 
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A tenant of 15 years at the comparison commented: 
            When we moved in we knew this wasn’t paradise… we just wanted a home.  
            But everyone keeps themselves to themselves. There’s the noise and bad  
            language… And you daren’t complain for fear they would take it out against  
            you or my wife. (Interviewee no. T17).  
 
Tenants’ perceptions of crime 
Issues concerning the fear of crime and safety were constantly repeated during both 
the questionnaire and extended interview stages of this research project. 
Perceptions of crime in the Nechells area in which their block was located compared 
to the City of Birmingham as a whole, revealed that only 2.0 per cent (3) of the 
tenants at the CSS (see Table 39) and none at the comparison (see Table 40) when  
 
 



















Table 40: Comparison tenants’ perceptions of crime in Nechells compared to rest of Birmingham 
 
questioned thought that crime was ‘very low’. Whereas 17.6 per cent (26) at the CSS 
and 18.9 per cent (26) at the comparison believed crime to be ‘very high’. However, 
12.8 per cent (19) at the CSS and 14.0 per cent (40 and more than twice as many) 
thought that crime was ‘high’. Furthermore, collectively the categories for ‘average’, 
‘low’ and ‘very low’ indicate that 46.7 per cent (69) of tenants at the CSS and less  
than half that number, 23.3 per cent (33) at the comparison were of the opinion that 
crime was ‘average’ or ‘low’ in Nechells compared to other parts of Birmingham. All 
these percentages are based on the total number of 286 tenants who responded 
during the questionnaire phase.  
 
One of the comparison tenants when subsequently interviewed at length observed: 
“These days I feel very safe inside my flat, but I don’t think Nechells is a safe  






























Tenants’ perceptions of prevalence of specific crime types 
 
 
Table 41: CSS tenants’ perceptions of prevalence of specific crime types 
 
At both the CSS and comparison, less than one third of all tenants (44 at the former, 
28 the latter) were prepared to express an opinion as to the prevalence (how 
common) in Nechells were five specific crime types: burglary, theft, vehicle crime, 
criminal damage and street robbery (muggings). Amongst those tenants who were 
prepared to rank these offences, street robbery and vehicle crime were believed to 
be especially high. Indeed, opinion was almost equally divided between the two sites 
that street robbery and vehicle crime were the most common crime types, with 
vehicle crime rated higher than street robbery (16.3 per cent compared to 13.3 per 
cent) of tenants at the CSS; whilst the reverse was disclosed (8.9 per cent compared 
to 7.3 per cent) at the comparison. Burglary was consistently judged to come third, 


































Table 42: Comparison tenants’ perceptions of prevalence of specific crime types 
 
Tenants’ own experiences of crime may have had some effect on their perceptions 
of same – especially at the CSS with its higher figure of police recorded vehicle 
crime relative to the comparison. For example, a long-term resident at the CSS (and 
former member of The Four Towers Tenants Association) whilst never a car owner 
herself expressed the following opinion when interviewed at length: “Four cars have 
been burnt out on the car park behind my flat, so I’d say vehicle crime was especially 
bad ‘round here.” (Interviewee no. T7). Whereas a tenant at the comparison 
observed: “It’s being mugged that I worry about – especially when it’s dark. After I 
park my car the walk to my flat is always an ordeal.” (Interviewee no. T16).   
 
Tenants’ perceptions of changes in crime over time in Nechells 
Tables 43 and 44 below describe how identical percentages of tenants at both the 
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Nechells area of Birmingham: 29.7 per cent (44) at the at the CSS and 29.7 per cent  
(41) at the comparison. Conversely, At the CSS, identical numbers of tenants, 15.5  
per cent (23) believed crime had ‘gone up a lot’ or ‘gone down a little’. Indeed, at the 
CSS exactly 25 per cent (37) believed crime had ‘gone down a little’ or ‘gone down a 
lot’. Whereas, at the comparison 36.9 per cent believed crime ‘had gone up a lot’ or 
‘gone up a little’. Whilst, only 15.2 per cent (21 – almost half as many as at the CSS) 
were of the opinion that crime had ‘gone down a little’ or ‘gone down a lot’.  
 
During the extended interviews, this disparity between the responses provided by 
tenants at the CSS and comparison can be similarly identified. For example, the 
following judgement was made by a tenant who had been resident at the CSS for 
more than 20 years: 
            When I first moved here… yes in the 1980s, crime was very bad. That was  
            until the new doors and the concierge changed things for the better. But in  
            any event, crime around here is a lot less now than it used to be.    
            (Interviewee no. T7). 
Compare this to a statement made by a tenant of more than 15 years residency at 
the comparison: “I don’t think crime has changed here that much since we moved in, 
but if it has it’s gone up… especially cars getting broken into.” (Interviewee no. T20).  
Meanwhile, a fellow comparison tenant, but of close to three decades duration 
observed: 
            This is a much safer place than it ever used to be. Anyone who moans these  
            days should have lived here when I moved in. Some people are never happy   
            and they’ll always complain. But I know there’s much less burglary here than  
            there used to be. (Interviewee no. T22). 
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Nevertheless, the questionnaire responses point to a pattern of opinion across these 
tenants’ perceptions, with those at the comparison in general believing that crime 
issues are worse – relative to those questioned at the CSS. 
 
Tenants’ perceptions of safety and security 
Tenants were questioned on a range of perceptions of safety issues including: safety 
inside their flat; safety of their flat when they went out; safety within the communal 
areas, grounds (including the car park to their tower block) and surrounding streets; 
and when going out after dark by way of a range of different transportation methods. 
   
Tenants’ perceptions of safety and security inside their flat – during the day 
See Tables 45 and 46 below for responses to a question asking how safe and 
secure tenants felt inside their flats during the day, 61.5 per cent (91) at the CSS felt 
‘very safe’; 35.1 per cent (52) ‘safe’; 1.4 per cent (2) ‘neither safe or unsafe’; 1.4 per 
cent (2) ‘unsafe’; and 0.7 per cent (1) ‘very unsafe’. At the comparison, 0 felt ‘very  
safe; 5.8 per cent (8) ‘safe’; 45.6 per cent (63) ‘neither safe or unsafe’; 34.8 per cent 
(48) unsafe; and 13.8 per cent (19) ‘very unsafe’. More pertinently, at the CSS 96.6 
per cent of tenants felt either ‘very safe’ or ‘safe’, whereas at the comparison the 
figure was only 5.8 per cent. Conversely, at the CSS only 2.1 per cent of tenants felt 
either ‘unsafe’ or ‘very unsafe’, whereas at the comparison the figure 48.6 per cent. 
These figures suggest a significantly higher perception of safety by tenants at the 
CSS when inside their flat during the day, when set against the comparison. This 
disparity is especially surprising in view of the absence of burglary at the comparison 




  Table 45: CSS tenants’ perceptions of safety and security inside their flat – during the day 
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potential explanation might be identified in the following statements provided by 
tenants subsequently interviewed at length. At the CSS: “I’ve always felt safe inside 
my flat… well ever since the big makeover, twenty-odd years ago.” (Interviewee no. 
T6). Whereas at the comparison a tenant observed: “This isn’t a safe area and that 
makes you think your flat isn’t safe – however good the doors and windows the 
council have fitted.” (Interviewee no. T21).  
 
Tenants’ perceptions of safety and security inside their flat – during the night 
The next question asked the tenants how safe they felt inside their flats during the 
night (see Tables 47 and 48 below). At the CSS, exactly 50 per cent (74) felt ‘very 
safe’; 41.9 per cent (62) ‘safe’; 6.1 per cent (9) ‘neither safe or unsafe’; 1.4 per cent  
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Table 48: Comparison tenants’ perceptions of safety & security inside their flat – during the night 
 
(2) ‘unsafe’; and no tenant claimed to feel ‘very unsafe’ inside their flat at night. At 
the comparison, no tenant felt ‘very safe; 1.5 per cent (2) said they felt ‘safe’; 18.8 
per cent (26) ‘neither safe or unsafe’; 49.3 per cent (68) unsafe; and 15.9 per cent 
(22) ‘very unsafe’. These figures broadly reflect the findings in respect of tenants’ 
feelings of safety during the day. For example, at the CSS 91.9 per cent (136) of 
tenants felt either ‘very safe’ or ‘safe’ at night. Whilst at the comparison 65.2 per cent 
(90) of tenants felt either ‘unsafe’ or ‘very unsafe’.  
 
Once more these responses suggest a significantly higher perception of safety by 
tenants inside their flat at the CSS, when compared to the comparison – at night in 
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responses of those tenants who agreed to be interviewed at length. One tenant at 
the CSS who had been resident for more than a decade observed: “Day or night I 
always feel safe once inside my flat. I know the door is very good and no one can get 
in.” (Interviewee no. T11). But compare this to a comparison site tenant of less than 
five years residency: “We was so happy to get a flat, but have felt never felt happy… 
you know safe here. Night or day, there’s no difference. The building isn’t safe.”   
(Interviewee no. T15).     
 
Tenants’ perceptions of safety and security of their flat when they go out 
Tenants were also asked about their perceptions of the safety and security of their 
flat when they went out (see Tables 49 and 50 below). Once again, CSS tenants 
consistently felt safer about leaving their flat than those at the comparison. More 
specifically, at the CSS 60.1 per cent (89) tenants felt ‘very happy’; 30.1 per cent 
(45) ‘happy’; 6.1 per cent (9) ‘neither happy or unhappy’; 2.0 per cent (3) ‘unhappy’; 
and 1.4 per cent (2) ‘very unhappy’. At the comparison, 11.6 per cent (16) of tenants 
were ‘very happy’; 14.5 (20) ‘happy’; 44.2 per cent (61) ‘neither happy or unhappy; 
20.3 per cent (28) ‘unhappy’’ and 9.4 per cent (13) ‘very unhappy’. Taken together, 
90.5 per cent of tenants at the CSS were either ‘very happy’ or ‘happy’ about the 
safety and security of their flat when they were out, compared to 26.01 per cent (36) 
at the comparison. Whereas, 3.4 per cent (5) tenants at the CSS were ‘unhappy’ or 
‘very unhappy’, compared to 29.7 per cent (41) at the comparison. 
 
A longstanding tenant at the CSS provided the following explanation during their 
extended interview:  




Table 49: CSS tenants’ perceptions of safety and security of their flat – when they go out 
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            I never felt safe in my flat before the makeover (refurbishment): there were so   
            many break-ins before then. But after that I’ve always been happy living here.  
            And it means that when I go out and lock the door, I know my things are safe.  
            (Interviewee no. T3). 
 
But compare the above to the following observation made by a tenant of less than 20 
years duration at the comparison, similarly interviewed at length: “Once the new door 
(front entrance door) to the flat was fitted I knew things were much better. But I still 
worry the flat will get broken into and I’ll lose everything again.” (Interviewee no. T13)     
 
Tenants’ perceptions of safety and security in the communal areas 
Tables 51 and 52 below set out how inside the communal areas (ground floor, stairs, 
lifts and landings) of their tower block, at the CSS 22.3 per cent (33) of tenants 
questioned felt ‘very safe’; 47.3 per cent (70) ‘safe’; 22.3 per cent (33) ‘neither safe 
or unsafe’; 6.1 per cent (9) ‘unsafe’; and 2.03 per cent (3) ‘very unsafe’. At the 
comparison, no tenants felt ‘very safe; 2.9 per cent (4) ‘safe’; 7.3 per cent (10)  
‘neither safe or unsafe’; 61.6 per cent (85) ‘unsafe; and 28.3 per cent (39) ‘very 
unsafe’. Consequently, at the CSS 69.6 per cent (103) of tenants felt either ‘very 
safe’ or ‘safe’ in the communal areas – compared to 2.9 per cent (4) at the 
comparison. Whilst conversely, at the comparison 89.9 per cent (124) of tenants felt 
‘unsafe’ or ‘very unsafe’ in the communal areas – compared to 8.1 per cent (12) at 
the comparison. These figures suggest a much higher perception of safety and 





Table 51: CSS tenants’ perceptions of safety and security – in the communal areas 
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At the CSS a much-repeated opinion was well demonstrated in the statement made 
by a female tenant interviewed at length: 
            When we had the concierge, we had the occasional problem with youths on   
            the landings. But since the concierge has gone, it happens all the time. I  
            never use the stairs and won’t go in the lift if there’s someone else in there –  
            unless they’re a woman. I just don’t feel safe anymore. (Interviewee no. T4). 
Three of the tenants interviewed at the CSS commented on how the connecting 
passageway on the twelfth-storey of each block had been gated at the request of 
The Four Towers Tenants’ Association during the 1989-1992 refurbishment 
(Intervention, Implementation and Involvement). As one long term tenant described: 
            We used to have a lot of problems with kids taking the lift to the top of one  
            side of the block, using that passageway to cross over to the opposite side  
            and then using the other lift or the stairs to come down. It was fun for them,  
            but the noise and banging for the rest of us was a real pain. When they gated  
            it off and the concierge started, those problems stopped. But what people  
            forget is that each side of the block is a separate tower with only one lift and  
            one staircase on each side. (Interviewee no. T9). 
Meanwhile, a longstanding tenant at the comparison observed: 
            I’ve never felt safe inside my block. Outside you can see all around you,  
            even at night. But in here… It’s always a relief when I get inside my flat and  
            lock the door, or when I get outside the block. (Interviewee no. T18). 
 
Tenants’ perceptions of safety and security in the grounds                                 
In the external areas (the grounds including tower block car parks), at the CSS 14.9 
per cent (22) of all tenants felt ‘very safe’; 39.9 per cent (59) ‘safe’; 35.1 per cent (52) 
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‘neither safe or unsafe’; 8.8 per cent (13) ‘unsafe’; and 1.4 per cent (2) ‘very unsafe’. 
Whereas, at the comparison, no tenants felt ‘very safe; 0.7 per cent (1) ‘safe’; no 
tenants ‘neither safe or unsafe’; 56.5 per cent (78) unsafe; and 42.8 per cent (59) 
‘very unsafe’ (see Tables 53 and 54 below). Of greatest interest, at the CSS 54.7 per 
cent (81) of tenants felt either ‘very safe’ or ‘safe’, compared to only 0.7 per cent (1) 
at the comparison. Whilst 99.3 per cent (137) of comparison tenants felt ‘unsafe’ or 
‘very unsafe’, compared to 10.1 per cent (15) of tenants at the CSS. 
 
These figures once again suggest a higher perception of safety inside the grounds 
and car parks at the CSS, compared to the comparison. Indeed, the issue of safety  
 
 
Table 53: CSS tenants’ perceptions of safety and security – in the grounds outside the tower block 
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Table 54: Comparison tenants’ perceptions of safety and security – in the grounds outside the 
tower block including the car park 
 
and security in the grounds and car-parks of the tower blocks was repeatedly 
referred to in the extended interviews with 22 tenants from both sites. A CSS tenant 
of less than five years residency commented: “I’m very grateful for having my own 
flat. But don’t feel safe when I go outside the flat – especially in the grounds. And 
when it gets dark, I always stay inside.” (Interviewee no. T12). 
 
Similarly, a tenant resident at the comparison for more than 20 years remarked: 
            When they fenced in the car-parks I thought that improved things. But… it   
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            make me feel any safer. If anything I now feel trapped. (Interviewee no. T15).   
 
Tenants’ perceptions of safety and security – in the surrounding streets 
Tenants were also questioned regarding their perceptions of safety and security 
when in the surrounding streets (see Tables 55 and 56 below). At the CSS 9.47 per 
cent (14) tenants felt ‘very safe’; 30.4 per cent (45) ‘safe’; 39.2 per cent (58) ‘neither 
safe or unsafe’; 16.9 per cent (25) ‘unsafe’; and 4.1 per cent (6) ‘very unsafe’. At the 
comparison, no tenants felt ‘very safe’ or ‘safe’; 0.7 per cent (1) ‘neither safe or 
unsafe’; 45.6 per cent (63) ‘unsafe’; and 52.2 per cent (72) ‘very unsafe’. Of seminal 
interest, at the CSS 39.9 per cent (59) of tenants felt either ‘very safe’ or ‘safe’ (a 
lower figure than in the previous safety questions). Whereas, at the comparison none  
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Table 56: Comparison tenants’ perceptions of safety and security – in surrounding streets 
 
of the 138 tenants questioned felt ‘very safe’ or ‘safe’. Conversely, at the comparison 
97.8 per cent (135) felt ‘very unsafe’ or ‘unsafe’, compared to 20.9 per cent (31) at 
the CSS. These figures suggest not only a higher perception of safety and security in 
the surrounding streets at the CSS, compared to the comparison: they also point to 
decreasing feelings of safety and security the greater the distance tenants are from 
their home. Furthermore, this difference is increasingly more pronounced with 
tenants questioned at the comparison, compared to those at the CSS. 
tenant interviewed was even stronger: “This is a very dangerous area in which to 
live. I only ever go out by car and if I could get a move to a flat in another area, I’d 
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Tenants’ willingness to go out after dark 
A more complex question asked about tenants’ willingness to go out after dark on 
foot, bicycle, private car, taxi, bus, ‘other’ – by train being the sole response to ‘other’ 
(see Tables 57 and 58 below). Going out after dark on foot: at the CSS, 3.4 per cent 
(5) of tenants said they did so ‘frequently’; 28.4 per cent (42) ‘occasionally’; 26.4 per 
cent (39) ‘almost never’; and 41.9 per cent (62) claimed to ‘never’ go out on foot after 
dark. At the comparison the figures were 2.9 per cent (4) ‘frequently’; 16.7 per cent 
(23) ‘occasionally’; 31.9 per cent (44) ‘almost never’; and 48.6 per cent (67) ‘never’. 
Going out after dark by bicycle produced the lowest figures across all these transport 
categories: at the CSS, 1.4 per cent (2) said they did so ‘frequently’; 2.0 per cent (3) 
‘occasionally’; no tenants said ‘almost never’; whilst 96.6 per cent (143) said they 
‘never’ went out by bicycle at night. At the comparison no tenants went out by bicycle 
‘frequently’; 2.9 per cent (4) said they did so ‘occasionally’; none said ‘almost never’; 
and 97.1 per cent (134) claimed to ‘never’ go out by bicycle after dark.  
 
Going out after dark by private car produced the highest number of positive 
responses at both sites. At the CSS, 12.2 per cent (18) of tenants said they did so 
‘frequently); 18.2 per cent (27) ‘occasionally’; 14.9 per cent (22) ‘almost never’; and 
54.7 per cent (81) answered that they ‘never’ went out by such means. At the  
comparison the figures were 4.3 per cent (6) ‘frequently’; 21.0 per cent (29) 
‘occasionally’; 15.2 per cent (21) ‘almost never’; and 59.4 per cent (82) tenants 
answered that they ‘never’ went out by private car after dark. 
 
Going out after dark by taxi. At the CSS, 0.7 per cent (1) tenants said they did so 
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never’; and 70.3 per cent (104) said they ‘never’ went out by taxi after dark. At the 
comparison, no tenants said ‘frequently’; 8.7 per cent (12) ‘occasionally’; 10.1 per 
cent (14) ‘almost never’; and 81.2 per cent (112) ‘never’. 
 
Going out after dark by bus. At the CSS, 2.0 per cent of tenants (3) said they did so 
‘frequently’; 22.3 per cent (33) ‘occasionally’; 21.6 per cent (32) ‘almost never’; and 
54.1 per cent (80) claimed they ‘never’ went out after dark by bus. At the 
comparison, 4.3 per cent (6) tenants said they ‘frequently’ went out after dark by bus; 
17.4 per cent (24) ‘occasionally’; 29.0 per cent (40) ‘almost never’; and 49.3 per cent 
(68) answered that they ‘never’ went out by bus after dark. 
 
Going out after dark by train. At the CSS, 5.4 per cent (8) tenants) went out 
‘frequently’ by train after dark; 16.2 per cent (24) ‘occasionally’; 23.6 per cent (35); 
‘almost never’; and 54.7 per cent (81); observed that they never went out after dark 
by train. At the comparison no tenants said they did so ‘frequently’; 7.9 per cent (11) 
‘occasionally’; 11.6 per cent (16) ‘almost never’; and 80.4 per cent (111) tenants 
claimed to ‘never’ go out by train after dark. 
  
Supplementary questions asked tenants whether they went out after dark less than 
they wanted to; the reason why; and whether they were afraid to go out during the 
day. At the CSS, 33.1 per cent (49) answered that they did not go out after dark. And 
at the comparison 46.4 per cent (64). However, at both sites less than half of these 
tenants replied that this was due to a fear of crime. Indeed, a majority of tenants at 
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both sites stated this was due to a lack of finances/no desirable venue to attend. 
None of the tenants questioned said they were afraid to go out during the day.   
 
Once again, the qualitative responses emanating from the extended interviews 
provided additional explanatory information – in this instance why tenants appeared 
to be unwilling to go out during the hours of darkness. At the CSS, tenants since 
1971, a wife and husband couple (now in their late 60s) occupying an eleventh floor 
flat, were suffering horrendous issues with damp and water seepage from the roof: 
most of their furniture was covered in clear polythene to protect it. Despite this ordeal 
and suffering a criminal damage attack back in 1981, they felt ‘very safe’ in their flat 
during daylight hours and ‘neither safe or unsafe’ at night. However, as lifetime 
residents of Nechells they now suffered a fear of crime and the husband provided 
the observation: “We used to walk to and from my sister’s place at the Fox (public 
house) but not anymore. It isn’t safe on the streets.” (Interviewee nos. T8 and T9). 
 
Both the questionnaire and interview data from these tenants supports the 
contention that however safe they may feel within their flat, once outside their 
perception of safety is manifestly diminished. Indeed, three of those interviewed at 
length made reference to the sound of screeching tyres coming from the surrounding 
streets throughout the night. The concerns of these tenants can by identified in the 
response of one comparison site resident:    
            I lie in bed at night and can hear the boy racers screeching round in the  
            surrounding streets. It keeps me awake, but I’m also aware it reminds me  
            this isn’t a safe part of town. Sometimes I get out of bed and watch the idiots  




Nevertheless, another tenant, a long-term resident of 41 years at the CSS, gave a 
far more positive perspective:  
            I’m very happy living here, always have been and I know many others are   
            too. It’s when they get outside that they get frightened… I used to be young,  
            immature, playing loud music. I didn’t get it then, but now I understand how   
            it’s unfair to the other tenants. (Interviewee no. T7). 
  
Tenants’ perceptions of security measures 
Tenants were questioned and asked to assess (in descending order of importance) 
the following security elements: security staff; CCTV; fob-access controlled door 
entry system; door and window security; another security element of their 
suggestion. At the CSS, 140 of the 148 tenants questioned were prepared to grade 
the security elements listed. Whereas at the comparison the figure was 131 of the 
138. Those not prepared to grade such elements in order of importance explained 
they possessed insufficient knowledge about these. It also became apparent early 
during the door-to-door questionnaire process, that requiring tenants to nominate 
(and grade) a fifth security element for inclusion was too confusing. Consequently, 
the category of ‘least important’ does not appear in Tables 59 and 60 below. 
Nevertheless, tenants often nominated a fifth element – especially at the CSS where 
‘return of the local 24/7 staffed concierge system’ was repeatedly mentioned.  
 
Security staff 
The issue of security staff (contracted company staff in marked vehicles who visited 





Table 59: CSS tenants’ perceptions of security measures at their tower block  
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at both sites, during the questionnaire and extended interview phases. Indeed, a 
repeated statement made by tenants was that they had never seen these guards 
visit their tower block. There was a broadly similar perception of such security staff 
by tenants at both sites. For example, when questioned only 21.4 per cent (30) of 
tenants at the CSS and 19.9 per cent (26) at the comparison believed security staff 
to be the ‘most important’ or ‘slightly important’ security measure. Whereas, 67.9 per 
cent (95) at the CSS and 58.8 per cent (77) at the comparison thought security staff 
were ‘not important’. These figures indicate the lowest level approval for any of the 
security measures suggested during the questionnaire process.    
 
Explanations for this apparent absence of confidence in security staff can be 
identified amongst those 22 tenants who were interviewed at length. For example, 
one tenant and a former security guard himself (albeit not at the CSS, comparison, 
or any other LA location) observed:  
            Having been in security I know how you have to make your points and swipe  
            your ID-pass. There’s no such points here and when they visit they just have  
            a quick walk through the ground floor lobbies and bin room then leave.  
            (Interviewee no. T12). 
Whilst a comparison tenant observed: 
            I’ve seen their van in the car park and one of the security guards walking  
            round the block. But they don’t really do anything except I suppose flying the  
            flag – their being here that is. Don’t think they have much of a deterrent  






Since April 2015, CCTV systems at both the CSS and comparison have been linked 
to BCC’s 24/7 offsite control room. At the CSS, 29.3 per cent (41) of tenants thought 
CCTV was the ‘most important’ or ‘slightly important’ of security features. Whilst 45.0 
per cent (63) believed CCTV to be ‘neither important or non-important’. At the 
comparison, 22.1 per cent (29) thought CCTV was the ‘most important’ or ‘slightly 
important’ security feature. Whereas, 38.9 per cent (51) believed it to be ‘neither 
important or unimportant.’ A further 25.2 per cent (33) tenants were of the opinion 
that CCTV was ‘not important’ – compared to 10.7 per cent (15) at the CSS.  
 
Once again, tenants’ responses during the extended interview phase provided 
potential explanations for the diverse opinions at both sites. One tenant at the CSS 
observed when interviewed at length:  
            Things have got a lot worse since we lost the concierge. They used to keep              
            all the video recordings, but since it closed if anyone’s attacked the police  
            always seem to say the cameras didn’t record it or they can’t find it.  
            (Interviewee no. T8). 
Another long tern CSS tenant offered the following opinion: “I could never 
understand why the council didn’t put CCTV cameras in the grounds and car parks. 
So many cars have been nicked or damaged over the years.” (interviewee no. T6) 
Whilst at the comparison a tenant since the turn of the century commented: “What 
we need here is a proper CCTV system that covers inside and outside the block. If 
criminals thought they’d get caught crime would go down.” (Interviewee no. T16). 
Indeed, in answer to a supplementary question asking what single additional security 
feature tenants would like to see installed at their tower block, 8.6 per cent (12) at 
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the CSS and 11.5 per cent (15) at the comparison expressed a desire for CCTV 
cameras covering the external areas of the block – including the car parks. 
 
Fob-reader controlled communal entrance door system 
Both the CSS and comparison tower blocks employ electronically-operated, electro-
magnetic communal entrance doors on the ground floor which are opened by a fob- 
reader system. In general terms, both systems work efficiently. However, when 
questioned the tenants repeatedly referred to how these doors could be propped 
open with a stone or brick, or were prone to tail-gating or threatening legitimate 
tenants and visitors, and thereby defeat such measures. More specifically, at the 
CSS 67.8 per cent (95) of the tenants when questioned thought the fob-reader 
controlled communal entrance door system was either ‘most important’ or ‘slightly 
important’; compared to an all but identical 67.2 per cent (84) at the comparison. 
Whereas, 10.8 per cent (18) of the tenants at the CSS and 12.0 per cent at the 
comparison believed this measure was ‘not important’. 
      
Tenants were also critical that when they forgot their fob card, they and their visitors 
were repeatedly kept waiting at the communal entrance doors after calling an 
operator at the off-site control room. The overarching contention made by tenants 
was that in the private sector, there would be no such delay and requested a video 
and audio connection between callers at the ground floor main entrance doors and 
the individual flats. They did not believe it was equitable that RSL tenants should be 
treated in an inferior way, a point similarly remarked upon by some of the 
professionals during the course of their interviews (see Chapter Six). Indeed, the 
professionals explained that the primary reason for not permitting tenants to allow 
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visitors to enter their block by electronic door release, was tenants being intimidated 
by those with criminal intent. There was also a repeated concern by tenants at both 
sites that the system facilitated entry by those with criminal or anti-social intent and 
with no right or reason to be granted access.  
 
One CSS tenant, when interviewed at length, described the fob-reader door entry 
system as follows: 
            You can’t get anyone in the control room (wherever it is in Brum?) to  
            answer the intercom. I’ve had visitors waiting outside the block 40 minutes to   
            get an answer. If they won’t answer the intercom, what chance is there 
            they’re watching the cameras. (Interviewee no. T7). 
Whilst at the comparison one tenant observed: “Why can’t we let in our own visitors? 
People won’t come and visit me because they know they’ll be waiting for ages. If we 
owned these flats, I’m sure we’d be treated better.” (Interviewee no. T17). 
 
Other concerns relate to how the doors could be “yanked open” (the precise 
expression used by five of the 12 CSS tenants interviewed at length) courtesy of 
those strong enough to do so. The following response was typical of those who 
commented on this issue: “When they were first installed the entrance doors were 
very good. But over time I think the magnets have worn out and now they can be 
yanked open by a strong man, or a strong woman.” (Interviewee no. T2). 
Meanwhile, another CSS tenant remarked: 
            The front door is the most important way of keeping out unwanted visitors.  
            Those doors are very good. But I’ve seen young guys pull open the main   
            entrance doors (communal). They aren’t very good and over time they’ve 
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            lost their strength. And the bin store doors are always being left open and 
            you can get into the whole block when that happens (Interviewee no. T1). 
 
The fear of being ‘tail-gated’ into the block was also mentioned by tenants from both 
sites during the questionnaires and extended interviews. As one CSS tenant 
observed: “I’m always on my guard about being followed into the block. I had a friend   
who was mugged at the entrance to her block and I’m frightened it might happen to 
me.” (Interviewee no. T8).  
 
Flat entrance doors and window security 
Entrance doors to each individual flat and window security scored heavily at both the 
CSS and comparison. Indeed, at the CSS 38.9 per cent (53) of the tenants and at 
the comparison 41.2 per cent (54) described these as the ‘most important’ security 
element – in both instances the highest figures for any such feature. Moreover, when 
the figures for ‘most important’ and ‘slightly important’ are added together, the total at 
the CSS is 66.4 per cent (93) of tenants and at the comparison 77.1 per cent (101). 
Those tenants who believed door and window security to be ‘not important’ totalled 
12.9 per cent (18) at the CSS, but only 3.1 per cent (4) at the comparison. Yet again, 
observations made by the tenants who were subsequently interviewed at length 
provided descriptive detail for these figures. One long term CSS tenant resident 
since before the 1989-92 refurbishment commented: “Once the new front door was 
fitted I felt really safe in my flat – and have done ever since.” (Interviewee no. T4). 
 
Like the professionals who were interviewed (see Chapter Six) the tenants believed 
in the value of target hardening both the individual entrance doors to each flat and 
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the ground floor communal entrance doors. One tenant, who had been a tenant at 
the CSS for 41 years put it succinctly: 
            The ground floor public doors are the first line of defence. But once you lock  
            your own door you know you’re safe. No one can get in. But then, I’ve never  
            suffered from crime, but I’ve known many who have.” (Interviewee no. T5).  
 
The standard of security of these new doors at the CSS exceeded that of PAS 24 
published seven years later in 1999. However, once installed there were repeated 
complaints from the West Midlands Fire Service and specialist police departments 
like the former Drug Squad, that even their hydraulic jacks could not overcome and 
open the front doors to an individual flat at the CSS. As another tenant observed: “If 
anything, these doors have been too good. There was that time when what’s his 
name left the gas on and even the firemen couldn’t get in. The explosion blew out all 
the windows.” (Interviewee no. T4). This points to a potential over-emphasis on 
security at the expense of safety. Nevertheless, this level of security also helps to 
explain how over close to a quarter-century, no credible forced-entry burglary was 
committed by way of these same top of the range Mul-T-Secure doors. 
 
At the comparison, amongst those tenants who recalled the 1993-1995 
refurbishment (2 out of 10 interviewed at length) both expressed the view that the 
security of doors remained an issue until new PAS 24 front entrance doors to each 
flat were installed during 2003. As one tenant at these tenants observed: “The doors 
(main entrance door to each flat) were rubbish until they were replaced about ten 
years ago. We were always getting robbed.” (Interviewee no. T14). By “robbed” the 
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interviewee is referring to burglary, but as Mawby (2001) observes victims’ 
perceptions of the crime of burglary will vary – both nationally and internationally. 
   
However, a tenant of less than 10 years at the comparison was far more explicit: “I 
wish I could lock the door from the inside with a key. That way I would feel really 
safe.” (Interviewee no. T21). This last opinion was repeatedly expressed by tenants 
to the author when he was working as a DOCO on low level developments (four 
storeys high or less) across the West Midlands. To have acquiesced to such tenants’ 
requests would have breached Fire Regulations (dwelling front door accessed from a 
corridor or landing).  
            
Window security was an issue at both the CSS and comparison, but only in respect 
of ground floor flats (and balcony windows at the CSS – see below). Police recorded 
crime indicates that 5 burglaries of ground floor flats took place at the CSS during 
the 18 years between 1997 and 2014. This low number of burglaries may result from 
BCC Housing Department’s policy (adopted and practised during the refurbishment 
of the CSS) of insisting that all replacement windows include one pane of laminated 
safety glass with inherent security elements.  
 
Another security element: return of onsite 24/7 staffed concierge at the CSS 
A unique element of the questionnaire process was that tenants were asked to 
nominate another security element to the four that were detailed. Amongst the 148 
tenants questioned at the CSS, 41.2 per cent (61) requested that the bespoke 24/7 
staffed concierge be reinstated. Indeed, amongst the 12 tenants from the CSS who 
were interviewed at length, the near identical expression used (on occasion 
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forcefully) by ten of their number was “Bring the concierge back”. The two tenants 
interviewed who did not express this view had been in residence for less than 18 
months and consequently, never witnessed the concierge scheme in operation. 
Furthermore, the 24/7 staffed concierge element had been deliberately excluded 
from the list of response options in order to rebut any suggestion of the researcher 
‘leading’ the tenants. 
 
When it first began operation in November 1992, the onsite 24/7 staffed concierge 
scheme at the CSS might have been perceived as a model for future RSL housing 
projects across the city and beyond. However, it is not known to have been 
replicated in the same high-quality format elsewhere (including the comparison), 
largely on grounds of financial cost (see Chapter Six). At the CSS, funding came 
from a levy placed on the rents paid by tenants. In 2015, changes to the manner in 
which housing benefit are paid directly to tenants rather than the RSL, meant that the 
onsite concierge scheme was reported to be financially unviable and it closed in 
March in that year. The CSS, comparison and many of the 213 (BCC, 2017) 
remaining tower blocks (and schools) across Birmingham, are now connected to an 
offsite control room from which visitor access via the communal entrance doors is 
controlled intercom links.  
 
Another security element: CCTV cameras to cover the grounds of the tower 
blocks – including the car parks 
After the bespoke 24/7 staffed concierge (specific to the CSS) the second most often 
nominated additional security measure (from tenants at both sites) was extension of 
the existing CCTV systems to cover the grounds surrounding the tower blocks – 
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including the car parks. At the CSS 7.4 per cent (11) of tenants recommended this; 
13.0 per cent (18) at the comparison. As one CSS tenant observed: “I don’t 
understand why the council never put CCTV cameras in the car parks. Surely it 
would help stop cars getting broken into?” (Interviewee no. T5). Whilst a tenant at 
the comparison commented: “We’re told CCTV cameras stop crime, so how come 
there are no cameras outside and in the car parks?” (Interviewee no. T18).     
 
Another security feature: CSS balcony-linked fire-escape system 
As part of the 1989-92 refurbishment of the CSS, each ground floor balcony was 
secured with metal grilles and a gate to ceiling height and both new doors and 
windows installed between each balcony and the fire-escape staircase. 
Nevertheless, the security of the balconies at the CSS and the five internal fire- 
escape staircase system within each tower block, was another concern by tenants. 
When questioned, only 6.1 per cent (9) of CSS tenants made reference to this issue 
– although three of those subsequently interviewed at length commented on same. 
In particular, one longstanding tenant observed:                                                                                  
            About 20 years ago, but after the refurb, I know that someone tried to get    
            into my flat via the balcony. They must have used the fire-escape stairs to get  
            onto my balcony, but all they managed to do was damage the door handle.     
            (Interviewee no. T10). 
Another CSS tenant commented: 
            I know people have got onto my balcony time and again. Items have been    
            moved and the door damaged, but they never got in. What gets me is how  
            they got into the fire-escape staircase? They may be other tenants, but I think  
            it’s more likely they got someone else to let them in.” (Interviewee no. T6).  
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Another security feature: multiplicity of concerns 
Tenants at both the CSS and comparison when questioned and interviewed at 
length, made reference to numerous other perceived security concerns – but only in 
very small numbers (no more than on 5 at both sites). These included: alarms on 
ground floor windows; electrically operated gates into the car parks; additional 
external lighting; video intercom link from their flat with callers at their tower block; 
and security of the refuge bin storage room doors. 
 
Agency involvement 
Within the questionnaires there was no specific question relating to tenants’ 
perceptions of the police, BCC or any other social agency. However, within the 22 
extended interviews the incidence of such observations (most especially in relation 
to crime and ASB) was far greater from tenants at the CSS than the comparison. In 
the context of the overall lower levels of recorded crime at the CSS, this may indicate 
a higher expectation regarding the role of social agencies (and the police in 
particular) in preventing and detecting crime and ASB. As one long term tenant 
(more than 20 years) at the comparison described: “The problem is that a lot of 
people in these blocks don’t bother reporting crime to the police. They haven’t got 
insurance and they don’t see the point.” (Interviewee no. T20). 
 
Only two of the tenants questioned and one of those interviewed was previously 
aware of police Involvement and the SBD award system. However, as a tenant at the 
CSS for more than 30 years, she was not alone in expressing a highly positive 
response when interviewed: 
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            I remember the award ceremony when the Chief Constable came and then   
            there was the visit by that lady minister from the government. I think the    
            police and the council have done a really good job here. It’s not perfect, but  
            then where is? (Interviewee no. T3). 
 
Six of the tenants interviewed raised the issue of vetting future tenants wishing to 
reside in their tower block. This was an unexpected response, although it was also 
raised by the professionals during their interviews (see Chapter Six). One 
comparison site tenant eloquently described the issue as follows: 
            People move into their flat and we don’t know anything about their  
            background. It’s only when the flat next door is broken into that your  
            suspicions are raised. Thankfully, that hasn’t happened (I think) since the  
            new doors were fitted, but it still makes you worry. We should have some say   
            in who comes to live here. (Interviewee no. T22). 
 
Summary of findings 
As detailed in Chapter Two, all seven towers were recipients of SBD awards 
(Intervention and Involvement) during 1993 at the CSS and 1995 at the comparison. 
Consequently, the perceptions of the 286 tenants questioned and 22 interviewed at 
length provide descriptive and interpretive detail to the crime analysis. Furthermore, 
two separate trajectories can be discerned. At the CSS, once the refurbishment was 
completed at the close of 1992 the tenants were the beneficiaries of a higher grade 
of CPTED safety and security system (most especially in terms of burglary reduction) 
that has largely been sustained for close to a quarter-century. Nevertheless, in 
recent years there have been indications that the measures installed between 1989-
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92 have lost their preventive value. According to the tenants, chief amongst these 
has been the removal after 23 years of the bespoke 24/7 staffed concierge system 
and its replacement with a remote, offsite 24/7 staffed central station control room 
serving multiple tower blocks and other facilities. At the comparison, tenants resident 
at the time of the 1993-95 refurbishment largely concurred that in the years 
immediately thereafter it had failed to deliver the improvements in security which 
(living in close proximity) they knew had been achieved at the CSS. In particular, 
they were critical of the additional security measures (Intervention and 
Implementation) employed on the front entrance doors to the individual flats. 
 
As with the previous findings chapter, Crime Analysis, using the 5Is to analyse the 
tenants’ quantitative and qualitative data produces a wide spectrum of interpretative 
information that can be used to draw conclusions – most especially about what 
works and does not work (in terms of durability and sustainability) over the very long 
term. Furthermore, whilst the quantitative questionnaire data adds substance from 
the perspectives of both victims and potential victims, the qualitative responses take 
this a stage further and assist in teasing out the underlying descriptions and opinions 
that accompany both the tenants’ quantitative data and crime analysis contained in 
the previous chapter. 
 
Under the heading of Intelligence – the tenants’ quantitative and qualitative data 
provide geographical and social context to the issues of crime, fear of crime and 
ASB at both sites. Much of this information is specific to the design and layout of the 
seven tower blocks. Similarly, descriptive detail concerning the crime problem has 
been produced relating to crime and offender type, MOs, flats targeted, crime scripts, 
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immediate and wider physical and social contexts. And whilst much of the crime 
evidence emanates from the previous chapter, this has been expanded courtesy of 
tenants’ self-reporting and their perceptions of crime, ASB, safety and the 
effectiveness of physical security measures. Immediate causes can be identified at 
the comparison where key elements of the 1993-95 refurbishment (most especially 
by not emulating the CSS and replacing the front entrance doors to each flat) failed 
to secure the target enclosures. However, such Intelligence also points to potential 
conflicts contained within the police-recorded crime data. For example, in the context 
of residential burglary, tenants’ questionnaire data and extended interview 
observations will almost certainly relate to a specific flat. And whilst vehicle crime 
can be presumed to have taken place in the car parks or immediately adjacent 
streets, robberies, assaults and criminal damage may have taken place elsewhere 
and away from the flat. 
 
Intervention – lies at the core of this investigation and can be most especially 
identified in the different grades or intensity of CPTED applied (Implementation and 
Involvement) during the respective refurbishments of the two sites. This feeds into 
the overall Intervention strategy, but whilst both refurbishments can be perceived as 
having met the minimum standards required by SBD at that time (the statement of 
correlation), in reality there was a conflict and the lesser standard of CPTED at the 
comparison meant it did not enjoy the immediate and sustained reduction in crime 
witnessed at the CSS. In particular and as an Intervention, at the comparison the 
aforementioned entrance doorsets to each individual flat failed to secure the target 
enclosure and prevent both burglary and other crime. Furthermore, at the 
comparison there was no tenants’ association (Involvement) and no 24/7 staffed 
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concierge was established as part of the refurbishment process – an absence of 
Intervention and Implementation. Much of the perceived explanation for the latter is 
detailed in the following Findings Chapter Six – Professionals’ perceptions of crime, 
ASB, safety and security. 
 
Implementation – of the CPTED measures can be identified in operating as a 
partnership between BCC Housing, Planning and Architecture departments, WMP 
DOCOs and at the CSS alone – The Four Towers Tenants Association (institutional 
and organisational contexts). Furthermore, these organisational arrangements had 
no legal remit (unlike for example fire regulations) and when work began to refurbish 
the CSS in 1989, police DOCOs had existed for little more than four years – together 
with specific training for this role (delivery and infrastructure). Under this 
Implementation heading several other issues can be identified. For example: 
targeting the problems of crime, fear of crime and ASB at both sites and tailoring 
(inaccurately as it subsequently transpired) to their perceived needs; lifecycles of 
action (SBD remains an ‘off-the-shelf’ Intervention with no time-related threshold of 
return inspection); basic execution process – CPTED Implemented via SBD; 
management, planning and organisational issues – all of which can be reduced into 
consultation, CPTED advice, negotiation, incorporation of same and the SBD awards 
conferred.        
 
Involvement – communication between the aforementioned parties was intrinsic to 
the partnership working that led to the incorporation of CPTED measures at both 
sites. In both instances, Intelligence actions can be identified in reported 
commentary from The Four Towers Tenants Association at the CSS, and their 
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demand that preventive measures be initiated. As a result, partnership working was 
structurally firmer at the CSS (council, police and tenants’ association) compared to 
the comparison where there was no organised Involvement by the tenants. Similarly, 
whilst mobilisation of the tenants was self-generated at the CSS, at the comparison 
the absence of an organised group meant that attempts to motivate and consult the 
tenants proved very difficult and impossible to sustain (see Chapter Six which also 
discusses multiple-mobilisation of the council and police professionals). Likewise,  
consultation, accountability and the ability to build collaborative capacity were self-
evident at the CSS. In the context of important practice knowledge, the existence of 
a body representing the tenants is both highly advantageous and points to the risks 
and blockages encountered at the comparison where no such group existed. 
 
Impact evaluation – as described in Chapter Four, no Impact analysis that could 
withstand academic scrutiny is known to have been conducted at either the CSS or 
comparison post-refurbishment. Indeed, the 1992 crime data for the CSS that was 
discovered towards the end of this investigation, results from an ad hoc Impact 
analysis conducted at the request of the local police superintendent early in 1993 
and before the SBD award ceremony took place. Consequently, this investigation 
amounts to the nearest equivalent of an Impact evaluation – albeit conducted a 
quarter-century after the refurbishments took place. 
   
Under the heading of aims, it should be recalled that refurbishment of both sites was 
conducted for a number of reasons – primarily relating to the age of all seven tower 
blocks and the necessity to replace old and worn-out fittings. Crime at both locations 
was perceived by the tenants (and professionals) as being facilitated by such worn 
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out measures like the entrance doors. Context of evaluation points to this being an 
external, independent, and one-off academic exercise. Whilst the methodology of 
evaluation indicates this is a qualitative, action-comparison investigation using 
police-recorded and tenant self-reported crime data – together with qualitative data 
obtained from those tenants and professionals interviewed at length.  
 
The Implementation of Involvement overview details both the successful measures 
and the causes of failure. In the first category, higher grade target hardening (in 
terms of preventing crime and reducing the fear of crime) was repeatedly evidenced 
as effective. At the CSS and following a 26-year life span, high quality main entrance 
doors were being replaced in 2018. Whereas, at the comparison, the addition of a 
second locking mechanism proved to be ineffective and the doorsets to each flat had 
to be replaced in 2003. In a similar vein, tenant responses indicate that protecting 
ground floor windows and balconies is equally important. 
  
Results of Impact evaluation disclose a significant reduction in burglary at the CSS, 
with the comparison playing catch-up a decade later when new doors were installed 
and other security measures incorporated. At the CSS there was a potential adaptive 
reaction by offenders, in that whilst residential burglary was all but eliminated, 
vehicle crime increased. Nevertheless, new entrance doorsets (factory constructed 
door, frame and security hardware) to each flat can be identified as both boosting 
Impact and designing in long term durable and sustainable crime prevention. Wider 
performance/selection measures indicate that the emphasis on high quality and 
appropriate target hardening delivers the greatest benefits in respect of residential 
burglary – less so with other forms of property crime committed outside the dwelling 
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and with minimal effect in respect of assaults and other offences against the person, 
wherever they take place. And from the tenants’ perspective, the preventive action 
appears to have possessed high legitimacy. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of 
tenants questioned and interviewed demanded higher levels CPTED measures be 
installed. Regarding learning and evaluation methodology, this findings chapter in  
 
 
Figure 7: Ground floor communal entrance door at Medway Tower, comparison site, controlled by 





particular is subject to the extremely long time period that this research project 
covers. For example, very few of the tenants who were living at either the CSS or 
comparison more than a quarter-century before, remain in residence. Nevertheless, 
whilst evidence relating to numerous 5Is elements are now lost to time, many have 
been identified. Indeed, their discovery and identification points to the immense 
















 Findings: Professionals’ perceptions of crime, ASB, safety 
and security 
 
This is the third of the ‘Findings’ chapters and examines (in the context of the 
research aims of this investigation) the qualitative data provided by the 12 
professionals who were interviewed at length. Each of these had been involved with: 
the actual refurbishment processes; delivery of CPTED treatment via the SBD award 
system; or subsequent management of the CSS or comparison site. Consequently, 
as with the tenants who were interviewed at length the aim was to solicit description 
and perceptive commentary that would illuminate and help to explain the crime 
analysis provided in Chapter Four. 
 
Qualitative analysis of professionals’ extended interview data  
Given some uncertainty over the range of issues that could emerge during the 
professionals’ extended interviews and because it would be difficult to predict the 
specific topics or direction of discussion, it was decided that (as with the tenant 
interviews), those with the professionals would be conducted on a semi-structured 
basis. This permitted a more open style of questioning, one where the interviewee 
was encouraged to volunteer information, in order to provide a more holistic 




Compared to the qualitative data gleaned from the tenants’ interviews, qualitative 
analysis of the professionals’ interviews reveals a sharper focus on crime and safety 
issues at both the CSS and comparison. This may result from their access to 
systematically collected and analysed police crime statistics, council repair reports, 
incident logs, etc. Furthermore, a repeated theme across this group was the 
necessity to invest in security measures in order to protect the safety and wellbeing 
of both the tenants and the properties that they were occupying. With occupancy 
rates of less than 70% (three of the interviewees quoted this figure without 
prompting) prior to refurbishment, there was a tangible fear that the exodus of 
tenants from these tower blocks might reach a point where maintaining them would 
become untenable – as was reported to have happened elsewhere in the city 
(mentioned by those same three professionals). Indeed, over the past quarter- 
century more than 250 of these high-rise blocks across Birmingham have been 
demolished on economic grounds (with crime a contributory factor) – statistics 
confirmed by nine of those interviewed. As of August 2020, 213 tower blocks remain 
with another ten in the clearance and demolition programme (BCC, 2017). 
 
The process of selection is detailed in Chapter Three, Methodology. But in essence, 
12 ‘professionals’ were selected for interview on the basis of a number of factors: 
their willingness to be interviewed; Involvement with the refurbishment process at the 
CSS and/or comparison site (four); Involvement with or knowledge of delivering the 
SBD award system (four); subsequent management of the CSS or comparison tower 
blocks (four). All became available for interview during the course of this 
investigation, or (in two instances) were recommended by those already selected 
(snowballing). By deciding to interview the same number of professionals from each 
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of these three categories, the objective was to solicit a cross-section of experience 
and opinion from different professions. 
 
The interviews took place over a 12-month period spanning 2017 into early 2018. 
The majority (ten) of these professionals had by that point retired and consequently, 
the majority of interviews were conducted in their homes or at a neutral location. 
Before commencing, each interviewee was first given an information sheet (see 
Appendix 4) explaining the background to the research project; the importance of 
their contribution; confidentiality, ethical guidelines; their right to withdraw at any 
point; and university rules relating to the storage of the data provided, retention and 
disposal. The interviews were digitally recorded with the permission of the 
interviewee and a written transcript subsequently made. And whilst a semi-structured 
style of interview took place, the researcher was ever mindful of the need to satisfy 
the research aims. 
 
Crime categories 
As detailed in Chapter Four, Crime analysis, six different crime categories were 
chosen for this investigation. The first of these was burglary – essentially residential, 
although non-residential burglary, aggravated burglary and attempts were included 
to eliminate any ‘masking’ effects (meaning, crimes being recorded under a less 
serious classification). The second category robbery – including assault with intent to 
rob and theft from the person. Assaults – common assault, assault occasioning 
actual bodily harm (ABH), woundings, GBH and homicide became the third. All forms 
of vehicle crime constituted the fourth. Whilst criminal damage – including arson 
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became the fifth. Finally, all ‘other’ recorded crime was the sixth category – offences 
which predominantly numbered far smaller totals. Throughout these findings 
chapters the six crime categories are simply referred to as burglary, robbery, 
assaults, vehicle crime, criminal damage and ‘other’ crime. 
 
The first five of these six categories were deliberately chosen to provide a spectrum 
of offences – ones not limited to property crime which is most often understood as 
more susceptible to the SCP, CPTED and SBD approaches. A secondary aim was 
that the data categories should provide a large enough sample of offences, to permit 
both analysis of patterns and measurement of the changes that took place over time 
at both the CSS and comparison. 
 
Professionals’ perceptions of specific crime types and ASB 
The 12 professionals interviewed were asked and encouraged to volunteer their own 
perceptions of crime, ASB, safety and security. The first such area of interest was 
that of burglary. Police-recorded crime data (detailed in Chapter Four) indicates that 
100 residential burglaries were reported to and recorded by WMP across the two 
sites during the 18 years from 1997-2014. This amounts to 6.8 per cent of all 
recorded offences. Of these 100 burglaries, 40 were reported as having taken place 
at the CSS compared to 60 at the comparison. Further analysis of this crime data 
indicates that 84 per cent of these 100 offences were residential burglaries (32 at the 
CSS and 52 at the comparison). Non-residential burglaries accounted for a further 2 
offences at each of the two sites. Attempted burglaries, 6 offences at each site. And 
perhaps of greatest significance, over the whole 18-year time period there were no 
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examples of the especially serious crime of aggravated burglary – where the 
offender uses a firearm, imitation firearm, explosives or weapon of offence. 
 
One of the repeated themes running through the interviews with these professionals, 
was the absence of knowledge in respect of what was physically required to prevent 
a crime like burglary, in the late 1980s and 1990s. Even the experienced CPTED 
practitioners (all former police DOCOs) volunteered that the knowledge base at that 
time (compared to the present) was very poor. The content of the Home Office Crime 
Prevention Centre Police Architectural Liaison Manual of Guidance (1987) tends to 
confirm that lack of a firm evidence base. Consequently, in light of the large volume 
of crime taking place at the CSS, the higher grade CPTED ‘target hardening’ 
installed was perceived as necessary to prevent “as much crime as possible.” 
(Interviewee no. P9). One former housing professional observed: 
            Back in the late 80s, once the Housing Committee had decided to refurbish  
            instead of demolishing the tower blocks, we realised the necessity to prevent    
            crime – especially burglary. As I remember, The Four Towers were beset by  
            burglary with void flats in particular a much-repeated favourite. We also knew    
            the police now had new crime prevention specialists in this field – the ALOs  
            (DOCOs) and that was important because (let’s be honest) we had no  




This absence of what would prevent residential burglary (and other crime) was 
confirmed by another former architect: “We were very much reliant on the police, not 
just for crime data, but for their knowledge of what crime prevention measures would 
work in practice.” (Interviewee no. P2). However, a former Force Crime Reduction 
Manager and DOCO explained: 
            Looking back, we were fumbling in the dark. Oscar Newman’s opinions had  
            reached the Home Office Crime Reduction Centre in Stafford, but there was    
            no clear understanding of concepts like defensible space and territoriality, or   
            of how to incorporate them in practice. That was left to the individual ALO or   
            CPDA (DOCO) who often met with hostility to Newman’s ideas from their  
            partners in local government. In the end, simple ‘tick the box’ target  
            hardening was often the only measure on which we could all agree.     
            (Interviewee no. P7). 
If nothing else, this suggests a degree of compromise by all parties concerned. 
 
A retired DOCO of more than 12 years’ experience in the role provided a different 
perspective: 
            Preventing domestic burglary was the key priority of our role – as you can  
            see in the SBD award. I think it was also very effective in preventing other  
            types of property crime… but much less so with offences against the person.    
            I’d say I’m proudest about the hundreds if not thousands of burglaries we  
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            prevented – ‘we’ because this was what they now call partnership working  
            and we built up some great working relationships with architects, planners  
            and many of the councillors and officers who worked for BCC. (Interview no.  
            P5).     
 
Police-recorded crime data for both the CSS and comparison illustrates how 101 
crimes of robbery and thefts from the person had been reported over the 18-year 
timeframe. Collectively, these amount to a marginally different 49 at the CSS (48.5 
per cent) and 52 (51.5 per cent) at the comparison. Together, these total 5.8 per cent 
of all police-recorded crime over 18 years. These offences appear to have taken 
place outside the blocks – either in the grounds or in the surrounding streets. 
‘Appear’ – because in most instances the detail contained in the crime report MO is 
insufficient to identify the exact location. Unlike many tenants who confused robbery 
(theft or attempted theft with force or threat of force) with burglary – for example “My 
flat was robbed” (meaning ‘burgled’, interviewee no. T1) all twelve professionals 
understood the difference between these different crimes. And all four former 
DOCOs interviewed appreciated the nuances between robbery and theft from the 
person (together with the reporting discrepancies) detailed in Chapter Three, 
Methodology. Nevertheless, one former housing surveyor explained: 
            Inside the tower blocks we were concerned about robberies taking place –  
            not in the actual flats, but in the communal areas like the hallways, stairs,  
            lifts and landings. The Tenants Association were very strong on this point.  
            That’s why BCC installed CCTV cameras in the ground floor areas, in the lifts  
313 
 
            and secured the counter of the concierge control room in Queens Tower.  
            (Interviewee no. P3). 
     
Amongst the former DOCOs a greater concern related to robberies committed 
outside the blocks – in the grounds, car parks and beyond. In particular, a sinuous 
(curving and snake-like) public footpath separates two of the blocks at the CSS and 
leads to a bus stop on the Nechells Parkway dual carriageway (see Figure 1) on the 
opposite side to which are located the three blocks of the comparison. Three of the 
former DOCOs commented on this footpath and one observed: 
            There used to be a pedestrian subway beneath Nechells Parkway, but it  
            became a crime generator and perhaps more importantly, generated fear of  
            crime. It was removed at the turn of the century and replaced by a pair of  
            pedestrian crossings. However, the adjacent public footpath between  
            Queens and Home Towers (CSS) then became a repeat location for robbery. 
            I’m not sure if we were consulted over its design, but it suggests not: it has a             
            curving design and you cannot see from one end to the other – poor 
            surveillance. (Interviewee no. P6).  
  
The total number of police-recorded assaults measured more than twice those for 
burglary and robbery – with 187 at the CSS and 220 at the comparison. Assaults 
were never voluntarily mentioned by any of the 12 professionals interviewed. When 
questioned on this issue, one of the former housing professionals explained: 
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            Because assaults don’t constitute property crime, don’t think we believed  
            our security measures would prevent assaults – but thinking about it this  
            was before we appreciated the full extent of domestic violence and how it  
            exists across all levels of society. (Interviewee no. P12) 
On the same theme one of the former DOCOs observed: 
            When SBD was first launched, I don’t think anyone imagined it had much of a   
            role in preventing assaults. That was 30 years ago and we now realise     
            CPTED can be a part of many crime reduction strategies. The most obvious  
            of these recently has been Domestic Violence Sanctuary Rooms, yet they’ve  
            only been around for about ten years and as yet they don’t exist in all local  
            authority areas. (Interviewee no. P8) 
 
Vehicle crime was one of only two categories examined where there was a higher 
incidence at the CSS (185 offences over 18 years) than at the comparison (168 
offences over 18 years). Amongst this total of 353 vehicle crimes recorded by the 
police as taking place at both sites – 100 of these were TWOC offences, 53 thefts of, 
88 thefts from and 83 criminal damage to motor vehicles. However, whilst it is 
generally accepted that vehicle ownership has increased over time, when the 
tenants were questioned in 2016 it was estimated that less than one third at each 
site owned a car: 29.17 per cent at the CSS and 26.4 per cent at the comparison. 
Consequently, at the time of their respective refurbishments, car ownership would 
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have been far lower – as evidenced by the following statements made by the 
professionals. First, a former housing manager: 
            Car ownership at these seven tower blocks and across the city has  
            increased and the size of the car parks has often followed suit. Tenants don’t  
            like having to park on the streets, but there’s no guarantee that their cars are  
            any safer in the grounds. (Interviewee no. P11). 
Whilst one of the DOCOs remarked: 
            Thirty years ago, few tenants at these high-rise tower blocks owned a car  
            and even now they can’t afford brand new models with top-notch security. It’s 
            hardly surprising that these cars have been regularly stolen over the years –  
            the majority I see by joy-riders. (Interviewee no. P6).  
 
Analysis of the recorded crime data indicates that between 1997-2014, 137 offences 
of criminal damage were reported to the police – 70 at the CSS (51.1 per cent) and 
67 at the comparison (48.9 per cent). In addition, 25 instances of arson were 
recorded by the police during this period. Amongst the professionals, the following 
observation from a former housing surveyor is inciteful: 
            The greatest problem with damage, criminal or accidental, is the cost of its  
            repair. Once the capital-spend had been used to refurb the blocks, there  
            was rarely any revenue funding for maintenance issues. So, for example,  
            within months of the refurb’ of The Four Towers (CSS) being completed,  
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            there was a road accident in which the bespoke metal fencing at Home  
            Tower (CSS) was badly damaged. To my knowledge, once it had been  
            decided that the damage did not constitute a danger, it was left unrepaired.  
            (Interviewee no. P3). 
 
It should be noted that until the late-1980s, it was Home Office policy that damage 
under £20 in value would be recorded on a ‘Minor Damage Form’ (personal witness 
as a serving police officer between 1978-2011). However, it that unusual for attempt 
burglaries to be classified as ‘Minor Damage’ and thereby escape official reporting to 
the Home Office. After the Minor Damage form was abolished there were repeated 
instances of crime managers using an alternative subterfuge to disguise attempt 
burglaries. Indeed, three of the four former DOCOs confirm this practice – one with 
the following description: 
            During my police career I experienced a number of times when a crime  
            manager would instruct that an obvious attempt burglary (for example, door  
            lock on an exterior door badly damaged by a screwdriver or chisel, or a  
            broken window) was not to be ‘crimed’ (recorded). On one occasion, the  
            excuse given was the damage had been caused by a stone flicked up by  
            the wheel on a passing car. This always seemed to happen when the  
            burglary figures were considered to be too high. Looking back, these were  
            rare instances – probably because they were the talk of the nick for months  
317 
 
            afterwards. (Interviewee no. P5). 
 
‘Other’ crime includes all police-recorded crime not included under the previous five 
headings. Amongst the 361 police-recorded offences, the largest number was for 
theft other (122 offences), followed by theft in a dwelling (58 offences), drugs 
offences (54), harassment (45), sexual offences (33), racially aggravated offences 
(19), threats to kill (18), handling or receiving stolen property (10) and all other 
offences – without exception single figure totals at both sites (115). Collectively, 160 
‘other’ offences were recorded for the CSS (44.32 per cent); and 201 at the 
comparison (55.68 per cent). This produces an average incidence of 0.04 crimes per 
dwelling per year. These crime figures engendered the following response from a 
former planner: 
            It’s only when you see those crime numbers that you realise how much  
            crime was all but inevitable. But then I suppose over 18 years and for what,  
            532 flats a crime rate of less than four hundredths per year is remarkably low.  
            (Interviewee no. P10).  
One of the retired DOCOs took a similar view, but with a different nuance: 
            Those figures demonstrate the true extent of ‘other’ crime. To police  
            colleagues who’ve been dismissive of the DOCO role, I’ve argued for many 
            years past the following: yes, we cannot design out all the opportunities for  
            crime. But there is now enough independent evidence that shows we can  
            prevent a lot of crime from taking place. And here’s the important point – that  
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            allows those same colleagues more time to concentrate on investigating  
            those offences it has been impossible to prevent. (Interviewee no. P7). 
 
The professionals took a largely dispassionate view of ASB, albeit with four of their 
number using the same description of “preparatory acts to crime.” As indicated in the 
previous chapter, because the police are not mandated by the Home Office to record 
ASB, one of the indices to set this against are the figures contained within the Crime 
Survey for England and Wales. One of the former LA professionals observed: 
            We knew this was a high crime area and that’s where we targeted our 
            efforts. In such circumstances ASB is a secondary concern. I know that  
            sounds unfair but it’s the reality. That said, you’d always hope that the  
            investment made in preventing crime would also help to prevent ASB.      
            (Interviewee no. P4). 
The former DOCOs took a similar view, epitomised in the following comment: 
            First and foremost, our role was to design out crime opportunities – most  
            especially those that facilitated domestic burglary. However, there’s a natural  
            overlap between crime and ASB. So, for example with tower blocks if you  
            can prevent entry into the blocks by those with no right of access, that will  
            reduce ASB by children and young people who are not residents and treat   
            the place as somewhere to hangout, create noise, commit acts of graffiti,  




Professionals’ perceptions of changes in crime over time 
Mirroring the manner in which the tenants were questioned and interviewed 
regarding their general perceptions of crime in the Nechells area and beyond, the 
professionals were similarly asked for their opinions on such issues. In general 
terms, they each commented how they believed property crime to be much lower 
now, compared to three decades before. And once again, when interviewed the 
questioning had been geared to answer the research aims of this investigation.              
               
Eight of the twelve professionals (two thirds of those interviewed and incidentally, a 
similar proportion to that of the tenants questioned) stated they had no real 
knowledge of specific crime types within the Birmingham district of Nechells in which 
the CSS and comparison are located. Each of the four who were prepared to 
comment did so with the caveat that they no longer possessed an inside knowledge 
of crime in the area. The sole former housing professional prepared to comment 
observed: 
            The refurbishment of The Four Towers (CSS) was very much the jewel in the     
            crown and when finished, the Tenants Association informed us time after  
            time that burglary and crime in general had fallen there. Severn, Thames and  
            Medway Towers (comparison site) were nowhere near as successful and we  
            put that down to the flat doors and the fact that there was no staffed  
            concierge. (Interviewee no. P1). 
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One of the former DOCOs offered his view on vehicle crime at the CSS and the 
potential for displacement of crime: 
            It’s interesting that whilst residential burglary all but disappeared as a crime  
            type at The Four Towers (CSS), vehicle crime increased considerably and it  
            would seem simultaneously. I used to call that crime displacement, but now  
            know better. All the same, it’s an interesting phenomenon and there may  
            be a link. (Interviewee no. P7).  
 
Compared to the tenants, all twelve professionals appeared to collectively possess a 
more objective opinion about the changes in crime over time in Nechells and 
beyond, as reflected in police-recorded crime data. For example, and as previously 
indicated all the professionals believed that the level and extent of property crime 
had significantly come down in recent decades. More succinctly, a former architect 
described: 
            It’s well documented that property crime has reduced considerably over the  
            last twenty-plus years. But what about domestic violence and the like? I’d    
            expect the number of assaults and woundings to have gone up a lot during  
            that time – because that’s what I read in the quality press. (Interviewee no. 2)  
Whereas and without prompting, two of the former DOCOs made reference to the 
‘security drop hypothesis’ in respect of motor vehicles, Farrell et al (2008); and 
domestic burglary, Tseloni et al (2017). One of these DOCOs commented: 
            Looking across your six crime categories I would expect most of the property  
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            crime offences to have reduced over the past 30 years – even in Nechells  
            which as you know had a reputation as a high crime area. That security  
            hypothesis work of Graham Farrell, ‘Machi’ Tseloni and their teams supports  
            this and now I think about it, may help explain why vehicle crime at The Four  
            Towers increased. Those tenants couldn’t afford cars with alarms and  
            immobilisers and so were easy to break into and steal. (Interviewee no. 8).     
 
Professionals’ perceptions of safety 
Once again, the professionals were questioned and interviewed in the same subject 
area as the tenants. None of the professionals had ever resided in the Nechells area 
of Birmingham and as they each readily admitted, their perceptions of safety came 
from their previous experience of working there. And again, whilst a semi-structured 
style of interview was followed, the researcher was always aware of the necessity to 
answer the research aims. 
                       
The professionals unanimously agreed that making tenants both safe and feel safe 
inside their flats had been a key priority. Indeed, there was a general agreement that 
the partnership working delivered mutual benefits to all those involved and most 
importantly, had led to increased safety and security for the tenants at all times of the 
day and night. However, none of the professionals had a rose-tinted view of the 
reality for tenants living in the blocks – as the following observation from a former 
housing manager explains: 
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            I used to speak with tenants at The Four Towers (CSS) every day and they  
            generally felt safe inside their flats. However, they also had a bird’s-eye  
            view of the surrounding streets. Many complained they were repeatedly 
            woken in the middle of the night by screeching tyres. It gets to them and 
            many were frightened to go out at night – and for some even during the day.  
            Across the dual-carriageway at Severn, Thames and Medway it was even  
            worse. They never had the concierge and I knew some were frightened to  
            leave their flats at any time of day. (Interviewee no. P9). 
At the CSS the majority of tenants felt safe inside their flats (both during the day and 
night) whereas at the comparison the reverse was true. One DOCO observed: 
            We didn’t know then but do now, how with the proper front entrance doors  
            you can make the residents safe when inside their flats. The problem starts  
            when they venture outside onto the landings, stairs, lifts, reception, grounds,  
            car parks, or surrounding streets. And without the concierge the fear of crime  
            increases. That may be why so many residents regret the demise of the  
            concierge. (Interviewee no. P8). 
These remarks demonstrate how in terms of community safety, making people fear 
safe in their own homes is only part of the process. They need to feel safe when they 
leave their homes and perversely, with a bird’s-eye view of events in the surrounding 




The description ‘communal areas’ refers to the ground floor entrance hallways 
(including the internal bin stores), staircases, lifts and landings. Those professionals 
that expressed a view contended that these areas were not as safe as the flats 
themselves, located behind another layer of security – their individual front doors. 
However, as a form of semi-private space (dependent on the ground floor exterior 
doorsets), one retired housing manager described the paradox as follows: 
            At The Four Towers (CSS) when the concierge system was running, I’d  
            have said that safety inside the blocks was pretty good. But then, I didn’t live  
            there and only ever visited in daylight hours. Now that the concierge has  
            closed I’d feel a lot more concerned. And at Severn, Thames and Medway  
            (comparison) until they installed proper security on the communal entrance  
            doors, I never felt safe inside those blocks. (Interviewee no. P9). 
One of the former DOCOs provided a similar perspective: 
            Describing the communal areas as semi-private space is all very well, but  
            safety issues therein are dependent upon the security of the main entrance  
            doors into the blocks. The on-site 24/7 concierge ensured trespass was kept  
            to a minimum. But now it’s managed from a remote site control room…  
            (Interviewee no. P5). 
 
On the spectrum of spatial definitions, post-refurbishment the grounds surrounding 
the tower blocks (which includes the car parks) might be described as semi-public 
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space. Each of the tower blocks at the CSS is now surrounded by brick walls and 
metal railings that assist in distinguishing between public and semi-public space – 
thereby reinforcing territoriality (Newman, 1973). Similar, if less aesthetic, treatment 
took place at the comparison. However, A retired housing professional provided 
another historical viewpoint: 
            Prior to refurbishment the area around these tower blocks was a very bleak  
            landscape, because between the road and the building there was usually  
            nothing more than grass. The Landscape Practice Group attempted to soften  
            the appearance by planting trees and shrubs and through the use of walls,  
            fencing and ceremonial gates. I think this worked and those metal rose  
            arbours at The Four Towers blocks, are covered in flowers each June. That  
            said, I wouldn’t describe the grounds as safe – especially at night.  
            (Interviewee no. P1). 
One of the now retired DOCOs offered a slightly different perspective: 
            I’ve never thought that the grounds of these high-rise blocks feel safe at  
            night. If anything, despite the enhanced lighting the soft landscape planting,  
            new walls, railings and gates provide plenty of cover for criminal activity and  
            directly raise the fear of crime. (Interviewee no. P6).     
 
As detailed in Chapter Five, a larger proportion of tenants at the CSS consistently 
felt safer than those at the comparison – inside their flats, in the communal areas, 
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the grounds and in the surrounding streets. A similar disparity can be identified 
across the perceptions of the professionals when comparing these different locations 
at the two sites. Furthermore, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the professionals 
expressed a general lack of confidence in respect of safety in the streets surrounding 
both the CSS and comparison. One retired housing manager described their 
perception in the following terms: 
            I’ll be honest, I wouldn’t want to live in that area and if I had to, I’d be very  
            loathe to go out onto the streets – especially at night. The irony is that I  
            genuinely believe crime in general has gone down in Nechells and across  
            Birmingham. But the news has plenty of stories about gun crime, drugs and  
            gang violence and you’d always worry about the safety of your family.  
            (Interviewee no. P4). 
One of the former DOCOs agreed: 
            The days when coppers lived on the streets they policed are long gone. Even  
            when I was a sprog (probationary constable) there were no resident beat  
            officers in Nechells: there were police houses, but they were all sold off in the  
            1980s. And safety on the streets around the two sites? I’d be very wary about  






Professionals’ perceptions of specific security measures 
Once again, the professionals repeated much of the praise and in contrast, many of 
the concerns of the tenants in respect of specific security measures. Inevitably, these 
opinions were based on the perceived effectiveness of the measure volunteered by 
the professional, or suggested by the researcher. And once more, the need to satisfy 
the research aims of this investigation were of paramount concern. 
 
The provision of security staff generated a wide spectrum of commentary – much of 
it negative. Furthermore, as one of the former housing managers observed, it is 
necessary to define the different types of security staff and their role: 
            I would distinguish between permanent, on site security staff – like those  
            employed by BCC at The Four Towers 24/7 staffed concierge control room.  
            And those contracted staff who roam from location to location across the city.  
            The former… much admired by the tenants because they were locally  
            based and knew each other. Whereas the latter, who I’m sure are very good  
            people, seem to spend much of their time driving between these locations  
            and consequently, rarely seen by the tenants or have the time to build up any  
            kind of relationship with them. (interviewee no. P11).        
One of the former DOCO’s held a similarly inciteful view: 
            The provision of security staff is not a CPTED measure is it and thereby  
            lies the problem. Like ‘high visibility policing’ the necessary number of  
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            security staff cannot be maintained in any one location and they’re reduced  
            to ‘fire-fighting’ as new crime and ASB hotspots develop across the city. Nor  
            do they have the long term sustainability of the best CPTED measures, a  
            situation made worse by rebidding exercises, new contracts and constantly  
            changing staff in these traditionally poorly paid roles. (Interviewee no. P7). 
 
As detailed in Chapter Two, the provision of CCTV at the CSS and comparison have 
followed different pathways during and since refurbishment in the 1990s. At the CSS, 
each block was equipped with internal CCTV cameras linked to the on-site 24/7 
staffed concierge system. However, at the comparison the refurbishment only 
included an unmonitored, standalone CCTV system producing monochrome images 
that were recorded in situ within each block. The CCTV systems at both sites were 
subsequently upgraded and from April 2015 all images produced monitored from 
BCC’s remote site central control room. A former LA housing professional remarked: 
            Confidence in the concierge scheme was all but universal amongst the  
            tenants and as recently as 2006 the Housing Committee approved a  
            £400,000 upgrade. Admittedly, this didn’t mean the cameras were extended  
            to cover the grounds and car parks, but all the landings could now be  
            surveilled, colour images produced and all of this was recorded digitally.  
            (Interviewee no. P11). 
However, the viewpoint of a former DOCO added a different perspective: 
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            CCTV is all very well, but it isn’t the magic bullet cure that many imagined 30  
            years ago. I remember going to public meetings where the residents were  
            clamouring for CCTV. But when I asked them who would monitor the  
            cameras the room went silent – especially when I pointed out how it wouldn’t  
            be the police. (Interviewee no. P8). 
 
In response to tenants’ worries regarding the ground floor, fob-reader, access- 
controlled, electro-magnetic communal entry doors at both the CSS and comparison 
site, five of the professionals echoed those concerns. More specifically, how the 
doors could be “yanked open” (see Chapter Five) by those strong enough to do so; 
the placing of a small stone between the edge of the door and its frame (to prevent it 
from closing fully and locking); or being ‘tail-gated’ into the block. One former 
housing professional summed up the frustrations of many tenants and professionals 
at both sites: 
            The communal entrance doors are the first line of defence. Since the demise     
            of the concierge, tenants are rightly concerned that those with no right of  
            entry are getting into the blocks by using force to pull open these doors or  
            otherwise gain entry, like threatening other tenants. (Interviewee no. P12). 
Whilst a former DOCO observed: 
            As a young copper I remember how the tower blocks across the city (and  
            presumably the country) were highly insecure. There was never any security  
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            to the ground floor communal doors and that’s why crime was rife. After the  
            flats were refurbished we witnessed a big reduction in crime, but more often  
            than not it didn’t last due to tail-gating, that use of a stone or brick, or the  
            door mechanism breaking down. (Interviewee no. P5).  
This illustrates how one security measure can compensate for inadequacies of 
another, but this only becomes apparent when the former is removed. Arguably, the 
whole package is necessary to maintain/sustain Impact. 
      
The former DOCOs provided crucial information in relation to target hardening, 
especially in respect of doors and windows. The PAS 24 standard for doors (and 
eventually windows) was not launched until 1999. Thereafter, the door/window 
frame, laminated safety glazing/double glazed unit and door/window furniture 
(including multipoint locking systems) were constructed as a holistic entity at the 
factory and brought to site in that form. This all but eliminated the capacity for poor 
door and window assembly (and durability), which facilitated burglary through use of 
jemmying type instruments like a screwdriver, chisel or spade. Doors and windows 
meeting these standards immediately became a mandatory requirement of SBD. 
Consequently, the opinions of the former police DOCOs in relation to the main front 
entrance doors and windows installed prior to these standards, provide inciteful 
observations: 
            The difference between flats and conventional housing types is profound.   
            Normally, with flats all you need to get right is their entrance door – the  
            exception being ground floor flats where the windows are also important.  
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            With conventional housing it was the rear door that was the weakest link:  
            those of the 2XG design with a plywood panel in the lower half were  
            notorious for facilitating burglary... Once the PAS 24 standard came in, our 
            job was made far easier. Because the combination of multi-point locking and  
            laminated safety glass (plus factory manufacture) meant it took considerable 
            effort, time and noise to get through those doors and windows. As a result,  
            the number of domestic burglaries plummeted. (Interviewee no. P7).  
 
Another retired DOCO provided additional historical commentary relevant to the CSS 
and comparison site: 
            You have to remember The Four Towers and Severn, Thames and  
            Medway were refurbished many years before the launch of PAS 24. In  
            retrospect, you were very lucky to get those top of the range Mul-T-Point  
            doors installed at The Four Towers. However, at Severn, Thames and 
            Medway finances were tight and the council most often kept the existing  
            doors and merely added – usually a BS 3621 five-lever mortise deadlock. 
            This complied with SBD minimum requirements and reduced burglaries.  
            However, it didn’t eliminate them and opportunists soon realised that with  
            sufficient force they could still get through those doors. And of course, the    
            great irony is that BS 3621 was developed to prevent the lock from being  
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            ‘picked’ or through the use of a skeleton key. Our burglars were never that  
            sophisticated, preferring sheer brute force. In fact, most often they simply  
            kicked in the door. (Interviewee no. P6).        
  
This last statement illustrates the limited sustainability of a security measure that 
turned out to have relied on perceived deterrence, rather than a fundamentally 
effective and durable physical mechanism to defeat the burglars. Whilst the final 
element illustrates that knowing the capabilities, limitations and typical MO repertoire 
of burglars at the time of selecting/designing the security measures – Intelligence in 
5Is process terms, Ekblom, 2011a) are important in achieving durability. This in itself 
opens a potential new debate in terms of sustainability versus durability. The latter 
relates to the ability of CPTED measures to maintain their effectiveness over an 
allotted timespan – close to 30 years with the ‘Mul-T-Secure’ doors at the CSS, 
thereby delivering long term sustainability in terms of reduced crime. 
 
A downside of a simplistic approach to sustainability/durability, can be identified in 
the narrow task of durably resisting burglary, but which by the same token caused 
problems of fire safety and law enforcement. Three of the professionals made 
reference to how if anything, the security of the entrance doors to each flat at the 
CSS was too secure – an opinion succinctly described by a former housing surveyor 
(and corroborating an incident detailed by a tenant in Chapter Five): 
            Once the refurbishment was finished, we had repeated instances of those 
            entrance doors being too secure. On one occasion the fire service were  
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            called when a tenant deliberately left the gas on and stated he was going to  
            take his own life. Even their hydraulic jacks couldn’t get past the hinge bolts  
            and frame armour and after 30 minutes the flat exploded and all the windows  
            were blown out. (Interviewee no. P3). 
 Whilst one of the now retired former DOCOs observed: 
            We received repeated complaints from specialist police departments (like the  
            drugs squad) stating they couldn’t affect a quick entry to make an arrest and  
            secure evidence at The Four Towers. That said, a detective from one of the  
            surveillance units who had no problem in gaining entry. He wouldn’t show us  
            how, but no damage was caused to the door. (Interviewee no. P5). 
 
The 24/7 on-site staffed concierge at the CSS (1992-2015) can be seen as 
instrumental in the Implementation/Involvement/Impact of sustainability at that site. 
And as a specific element of the bid, a former architect observed:     
            The 24/7 concierge scheme really attracted the attention of the DOE. Much  
            was made of how concierges were highly effective in Parisian blocks. But I  
            think what really swung it was how the Tory Housing Minister back in the 
            early 50s, one Harold Macmillan, had officially opened The Four Towers 
            (CSS) in 1953 (1954 in fact). Civil servants brought that to the notice of the 
            Conservative minister at the DOE in 1989 or 1990. (Interviewee no. P2).  
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On the basis of this statement, a fair assessment might conclude that the conditions 
for Implementation were a one-off coincidence with an apparent political dimension. 
However, a retired housing manager commented: 
            In retrospect, the concierge scheme at The Four Towers was always going  
            to be a one-off. It was paid for by way of a levy on the rents, which for the  
            vast majority of tenants meant housing benefits deducted at source. This was  
            an unsatisfactory arrangement and central government wouldn’t allow it to be  
            repeated. The final death knell fell in 2015 when central government stopped  
            housing benefits deducted at source and that meant the concierge was no  
            longer financially viable. (Interviewee no. P4). 
This last statement implies that the concierge became unsustainable because the 
financial context supporting it (deducting housing benefits at source) changed. 
       
The official opening of the newly refurbished tower blocks of the CSS in 1993, 
coincided with central government’s newfound confidence in CCTV as a deterrent to 
crime (Ditton and Short, 1998). Birmingham’s city centre public area CCTV system 
was one of only three such schemes in England at that time – the others being Kings 
Lynn and Newcastle-upon-Tyne (Brown, 1995). However, whilst the city’s Housing 
Department were persuaded to incorporate CCTV cameras within the four blocks as 
part of the 24/7 staffed concierge scheme, it was decided there would be no external 
CCTV coverage. It might be argued that this compromised sustainability across the 
whole site (albeit only vehicle crime appears to have been immediately affected – 
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see Chapter Four). Furthermore, the fact that the absence of a particular security 
measure at the CSS was associated with a higher crime level than that at the 
comparison, makes it less likely CSS crime would have reduced and is an instance 
of regression to the mean. One former DOCO observed: 
            I’m not surprised the level of crime in the car parks at The Four Towers is  
            higher than at Severn, Thames and Medway. The council should have  
            extended the CCTV system to cover the car parks. Without it, vehicle crime 
            was inevitable, especially when potential thieves couldn’t get inside the tower  
            blocks. (Interviewee no. P5). 
 
However, the previous observation fails to take account of the privacy and civil 
liberties concerns of the late 1980s – ones that remain valid to this day. They are 
eloquently made by an interviewee who was a housing professional at the time of 
both the CSS and comparison site refurbishments: 
            Back in the early 90s there was quite a bit of hostility to CCTV… this was 
            before the murder of James Bulger. Just putting CCTV cameras inside the  
            blocks was a radical decision by councillors and the Housing Committee. And  
            there was much criticism thereafter of the very few LAs across England who  
            installed CCTV cameras in outdoor residential areas. (Interviewee no. P12). 
            
335 
 
The unique and enclosed (an integral and internal part of the building) balcony-to-
balcony linked fire-escape staircases (five per tower block) at the CSS were also 
repeatedly mentioned by the professionals during their interviews. These are the 
only ones ever incorporated within any of Birmingham’s 464 tower blocks (Jones, 
2002) and not known to exist at any other location in the UK or beyond. According to 
four of the professionals, by the late 1980s these same fire-escapes were a repeated 
access point for burglary (see Appendix 7). As one of the retired DOCOs explained: 
            During the 1980s, opportunist burglars knew that the insecure fire-escapes 
            gave them direct access to the balconies. Before refurbishment the  
            windows and doors on these were metal framed, single glazed units of very  
            poor quality and inherently insecure. They could be easily forced and  
            burglars deliberately targeted the many vacant flats to steal the boilers and  
            copper piping. (Interviewee no. P6). 
 
During the 1989-1992 CSS refurbishment, the ground floor balconies were secured 
with steel grilles/gates and the metal framed windows and balcony doors replaced 
with ones of PVCu construction. However, as these predated the aforementioned 
standard PAS 24, the security of these balcony doors and windows contributed to a 
small number of burglaries (three) over the subsequent quarter-century. As one 
former housing surveyor explained: 
            Dr X headed our Materials Working Group for a decade during the1990s.  
            However, we relied on standards that looking back, were inferior to the  
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            ones introduced in later years. The PVCu windows and balcony doors at The  
            Four Towers (CSS) were a classic example in this regard. That said, once  
            the ground floor balconies had been secured it can only be presumed that  
            those breaking into the flats by way of the balcony doors or windows were  
            either other tenants, or had been given access to the fire-escape system by  
            tenants. (Interviewee no. P3). 
Whilst displacement and diffusion of benefits are not within the scope of this thesis, 
were burglars (and other offenders) to conduct tactical displacement i.e. discover 
other vulnerabilities and change MOs to exploit these, that would invariably 
compromise the sustainability of the Intervention.  
 
Much of the research conducted during the course of this investigation took place 
before the Grenfell Tower tragedy in June 2017. However, a former housing 
manager had during the course of their interview made reference to the multiple fire-
escape system at the CSS: 
            During the planning stages for the refurbishment, the future of the unique fire-  
            escape system at The Four Towers had come under consideration. We  
            knew that it was facilitating a lot of crime. However, the design of each block  
            with a single lift and staircase in each of its two parts, meant the five fire-  
            escapes per block would have to be maintained. That’s why the best solution  
            was to use railings on the ground floor balconies to prevent access into the  
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            enclosed fire-escape staircases. (Interviewee No. P4). 
The persistence of Implementation/maintenance of the security measures was thus 
dependant on the persistence of the fire-escapes which had actually created the 
vulnerability. The lifetime of the fire-escapes in turn was a legacy of the fundamental 
architecture of the buildings. However, this points to a critical issue – namely that of 
the conflict between issues safety and security. Until the Grenfell Tower tragedy, the 
fire-escape systems at the CSS were generally perceived as an anachronism. That 
attitude changed after June 2017 and continues to evolve. 
  
Each of the twelve professionals interviewed made highly favourable comments 
regarding the value of partnership working. Two of the most pertinent are now 
provided. One of the former DOCOs (who had also been a force crime reduction 
manager) observed: 
            Partnership working is very much in vogue these days. But compared to 30  
            or 40 years ago we’ve come on in leaps and bounds. People forget how the  
            professions used to keep themselves to themselves. They behaved like the 
            medieval guilds protecting their own little niche – and the police service was  
            no different. Back in the mid-80s the creation of the ALO/CPDA (DOCO) role 
            was one of the first examples of the police service reaching out to other  
            professions – like architects and planners. And when DOE Circular 5/94 was  
            published in 1994 there was no going back, except… (Interviewee no. P7).     
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A former architect provided the following especially relevant response to the previous 
statement:  
            As a young architect back in the 60s I can recall speaking to a police 
            sergeant and asking him what design features he found helpful. His answer  
            was recessed doorways and he explained that at night they were the perfect  
            spot to watch what was going on in the street, without being noticed yourself.  
            However, these days I don’t think the police DOCOs would agree about  
            recessed doorways. My bigger point is I remember the sergeant’s advice  
            because we had no professional contact with the police regarding building 
            design and crime prevention until the late 1980s. (Interviewee no. P2).   
  
Professionals’ highlighted concerns 
The professionals also referenced a number of issues considered to be pertinent to 
this investigation. For example, unrepaired damage was mentioned by all four former 
DOCOs. This also points to how revenue funding is a basic Implementation 
dimension of sustainability (Ekblom, 2011a). And the necessity for DOCOs to think 
about the financial sustainability of their proposals. The following observation was 
typical of the responses from across the professionals and their disciplines, albeit 
here made by a former DOCO: 
            I’m pretty sure we hadn’t heard of Broken Windows theory at the time of The  
            Four Towers and Severn, Thames and Medway refurbishments. However, I 
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            recall saying to council officials how they needed to ensure there was 
            sufficient revenue funding to keep the projects in pristine condition once they 
            were finished. To their credit, they always said that that would be difficult to  
            achieve. (Interviewee no. P6). 
Meanwhile, a former housing manager observed: 
            Revenue funding, even for serious issues, had always been tight. I like to  
            think we were always aware that if an area looked run down, that would 
            encourage people to think the same and behave accordingly. We just didn’t  
            call it Broken Windows theory. (Interviewee no. P4).     
 
Three of those interviewed also confirmed that financial constraints were all but non-
existent in respect of refurbishment at the CSS, thereby helping to explain the higher 
grade CPTED elements that were incorporated at that location – in contrast to the 
comparison. One of the professionals, a former architect, provided the following 
reflection in respect of the CSS: 
            Because this was the first scheme we submitted to the DOE we included  
            costings based on the highest quality products – like those Mul-T-Secure  
            front doors. We were all pleasantly surprised when they were approved.  
            (Interviewee no. P2). 
Compare the above response in respect of the CSS, to one about the comparison: 
            By 1993 the financial regime was much tighter. The DOE had got wind of  
340 
 
            how Secured by Design didn’t require the high-quality entrance doors used  
            at The Four Towers. That’s why we just added an extra lock to the existing  
            doors – with the agreement of the police, although a few years later the doors  
            had to be replaced because the flats kept getting broken into and the tenants  
            were justifiably complaining. (Interviewee no. P3). 
  
The CPTED environmental elements and symbolic barriers were also repeatedly 
remarked upon by the professionals. A former DOCO observed: 
            We’ve always known that these symbolic barriers were the weakest tool in  
            the tool-chest – in terms of effectiveness. And at both The Four Towers and  
            Severn, Thames and Medway, this has been borne out in respect of vehicle 
            crime. No real defensible space was created, because the gates are purely 
            symbolic.... and the changes in road surface colour and texture in the car  
            parks don’t seem to have had any deterrent effect. (Interviewee No.8). 
Drawing down from the 5Is, in the above instance by ‘effectiveness’ the DOCO is 
referring to basic Impact, not sustainability of Intervention (the measure’s causal 
mechanisms still work); Implementation (e.g. maintenance, funding); Involvement 
(people still use the locks, etc); and ultimately Impact (the effect on crime continues). 
This is contextual change, but can it be said to have curtailed sustainable Impact? 
This is difficult to contend, since the original car parks were never secure. Moreover,   
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there appears to be no Impact/sustainability on crime or the fear of crime in the 
above statement. Meanwhile, a former planning professional commented: 
            I think the planting of shrubs and trees softened the immediate  
            landscape and if nothing else, created an environment where fear of crime  
            had been reduced. That might be a false sense of security, but it’s a  
            vast improvement on how it looked before. (Interviewee no. P10) 
                                                                                                                   
A previous observation, about how the absence of a higher grade of CPTED at the 
comparison during its refurbishment, had immediate implications in terms of 
facilitating crime, was echoed by four more professionals. Furthermore, one of these 
(a former DOCO and manager) also provided a highly significant prognosis 
concerning the very long term: 
            In this designing out crime role you soon realised how there was a once in a   
            30 years chance to get things right. Once the development was built that was   
            it. The only exception to that rule I discovered was counter-terrorism HVM  
            (hostile vehicle mitigation) measures, but even then the financial costs were  
            all but prohibitively expensive. (Interviewee no. P7). 
 
Summary of findings 
As discovered within the previous findings’ chapters, using the 5Is to analyse the 
professionals’ qualitative responses produces a vault of interpretative data that can 
be utilised to make recommendations in respect of the most durable and sustainable 
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CPTED measures over the short, medium and very long term. Use of the 5Is also 
assisted in satisfying the research aims of this investigation. Moreover, these 
qualitative responses produce authoritative commentary and understanding of the 
crime analysis and tenants’ data contained within the two previous chapters. 
 
Within the task stream of Intelligence, the professionals’ qualitative data provides 
interpretative commentary regarding crime, fear of crime and ASB at both sites. 
Furthermore, all twelve professionals were able to draw upon their experience of 
working in districts across the city and beyond. More specifically, the four who were 
former DOCOs utilised their 30 plus years as serving police officers. Whereas the 
eight LA professionals possessed a wealth of experience from their career-long work 
across a swathe of different specialisms in local government and elsewhere. The 
professionals’ perceptions of crime, ASB, safety and the effectiveness of physical 
security measures add to this Intelligence. At the comparison, immediate causes can 
be identified with the 1993-95 refurbishment – in particular the failure to replace the 
front entrance doors to each flat (as had been done at the CSS) which meant the 
target enclosure was insufficiently secured. Intelligence also alludes to the accuracy 
of the information contained within the police-recorded crime data. For example, 
residential burglary will always relate to a specific flat. Similarly, vehicle crime would 
be expected to have taken place in the car parks or immediately adjacent streets, 
whereas robberies, assaults and criminal damage may originate at locations away 
from the flat. Unlike the tenants, the professionals (and the DOCOs in particular) 




As part of the task stream of aims, the refurbishment of both sites took place largely 
due to the age of all seven tower blocks and the necessity to replace fittings (doors, 
windows, heating and refuse disposal in particular – see Chapter Two) whose 
durability had expired. Professionals (and tenants) at both sites believed that crime 
was being facilitated by such worn out measures as warped and insecure entrance 
doors. Context of evaluation points to this investigation being an external, 
independent, and one-off academic exercise. Whilst the methodology of evaluation 
indicates this is a qualitative, action-comparison investigation using police-recorded 
and tenant self-reported crime data, together with qualitative data obtained from 
those tenants and professionals interviewed at length.  
 
Chapter conclusion 
Addressing these observations made by the professionals, three overriding aspects 
of evaluation become apparent: intensity, quality and appropriateness. Their 
commentary overwhelmingly supports the belief that a higher grade of CPTED was 
employed at the CSS, thereby satisfying the aspects of intensity and quality. But was 
it appropriate? If anything, the over-engineered front entrance doors at the CSS 
suggest that measure was not appropriate. And by common opinion, at the 
comparison the security of the doors was very poor post-refurbishment and therefore 
similarly inappropriate. Consequently, the lesser grade of CPTED also fails the tests 
of intensity and quality. Interestingly and despite the wide disparity in the 
backgrounds of these professionals (policing, CPTED, housing, planning, 
architecture, surveying) repeated common themes emerge, ones that will be picked 
up in the next and final findings chapter. These include: 
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1. How three decades ago, knowledge of the effectiveness of CPTED 
Interventions was limited – even amongst those (like DOCOs) with the 
delivery role. 
2. This absence of knowledge extended to the infrequency of opportunities to 
incorporate CPTED measures – described by some of the professionals as “a 
once in 30 years opportunity to design out crime”. 
3. All the professionals agreed on the validity of Broken Windows theory (Wilson 
and Kelling, 1982) although those from the LA disciplines were far more 
circumspect as to how this could be achieved. 
4. Unusually, financial constraints were minimal at the CSS. Whereas at the 
comparison they were in contention from the outset – thereby reinforcing a 
lack of consistency across the majority of SBD projects during the 1990s. 
5. It was appreciated that the 24/7 staffed concierge was financially unviable 
once central government changed the system of housing benefit payments. 
6. Whilst the council’s arguments for restricting CCTV coverage to the internal 
areas of the CSS and comparison were generally understood, amongst a 
majority of professionals there was a belief that the cameras should have 
been extended to include the external areas – most especially the car parks. 
7. Those professionals (five of the twelve) who expressed an opinion believed 
that the greatest disparity between the target hardening measures employed 
at the CSS, when compared to the comparison site, related to the entrance 
doors to the flats. Indeed, the difference between the Mul-T-Secure doors 
installed at the CSS and minimal additional security at the comparison was 
repeatedly described as the widest disparity. 
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8. Another consistent criticism was of the over-engineered security elements to 
the entrance doors of the flats at the CSS. Essentially, the quality of these 
measures was considered to be too high and unnecessary – most especially 
the inclusion of hinge bolts and frame armour. 
9. In direct contrast, the communal entrance doors were generally believed to be 
of too poor a quality (at least in terms of durability) and facilitated ‘tail-gating’ 
of legitimate tenants and visitors, by those with no right to enter the blocks. 
10. Multiple and inconsistent observations were expressed regarding the fear of 
crime, including the notion that the security inherent to residing within a 
secure flat at the CSS, increased the fear of crime when outside. 
11. There was a general consensus that prior to refurbishment, the balcony-to-
balcony fire-escape system at the CSS had facilitated crime and of the 
necessity to ensure that the security of same was improved to prevent such 
use in the future. 
12. It was acknowledged that evidence for the effectiveness of CPTED 
environmental elements and symbolic barriers was weak. This was especially 
the case in the car parks where vehicle crime was persistent. 
13. Pedestrian footpaths were problematic, providing hot-spots for criminal 
activity. And whilst the pedestrian subway was removed, the public footpath 
performed an identical hot-spot role (a potential issue of micro displacement). 
 
Qualitative evidence emanating from the professionals’ interviews has a natural 
interplay with the research aims of this project and the effect on crime following the 
refurbishments of the early 1990s. As with the two preceding ‘Findings’ chapters, the 
views expressed in these interviews largely support the other findings: recorded 
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crime data; tenants’ questionnaire data; and tenants interview qualitative data. 
However, the professionals possessed a greater understanding of the limitations of 
CPTED Interventions and how three decades before, the evidence and knowledge 
base relating to the effectiveness of such measures was especially limited. 
Nevertheless, there was a general perception that crime had reduced (more so at 
the CSS than the comparison) following the refurbishments and the encouragement 
to incorporate CPTED measures incentivised by way of the SBD award system. The 
increased reduction at the CSS was attributed to the higher grade of target 
hardening included – most especially the individual flat and communal entrance 
doors and (to a lesser extent) the on-site, 24/7 staffed concierge service. 
 
Most importantly, whilst a long-term crime prevention effect was identifiable at the 
CSS, once new entrance doors to each flat were installed at the comparison, long 
term sustainable reductions were identified, described and expected at both sites. 
Statements contained within the professionals’ interviews overwhelmingly support 
the concept and delivery of long-term durability and sustainability of the crime 
prevention effect at both the CSS and subsequently, at the comparison site. In terms 
of the original construction and refurbishment of both the CSS and comparison over 
the past 70 years, this equates at the macro level with police-led crime prevention 





Figure 8: Satellite view of the CSS – a visual triangle formed by the star-shaped High, Queens and 















This investigation aimed to establish the effectiveness of CPTED (Jeffery, 1971) 
measures when applied via the SBD mechanism during the refurbishment of high-
rise tower blocks and thereby, assist decision makers regarding what works in terms 
of durability and sustainability of these Interventions over the very long term (around 
25 years). It began by examining the literature and research findings in this subject 
area previously published, in order to establish the current body of knowledge and 
the gaps in what we know. With the notable exception of Armitage and Monchuk 
(2009), investigation of the crime reduction benefits of CPTED Interventions over a 
sustained time period, was found to be especially rare. For example, the canon of 
research into the effectiveness of the police operated SBD award system has tended 
to examine little more than before and after crime comparisons of no more than a 
few years duration: Armitage, 1999; Brown, 1999; Pascoe, 1999; Teedon et al., 
2009; Jones et al., 2016. And as the literature review disclosed, there is an absence 
of material relating to high-rise tower blocks – the focus of this investigation.  
 
Consequently, it was decided to embark upon a case study approach testing the 
effectiveness of SCP (Mayhew et al., 1976), CPTED and SBD (1989) Interventions 
employed at both sites. SARA (Clarke and Eck, 2003), was considered as the means 
of analysis. However, the 5Is were chosen on the basis they provided the most 
rigorous means of investigation and as its author describes “…reflecting the 
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requirement to handle the rich complexity of preventive action” (Ekblom, 2011a, 
p.86). 
 
For this Impact study, the investigation utilised two sets of high-rise tower blocks 
located in inner-city Birmingham – the CSS and the comparison. Construction of 
these sites began at the start and close of the 1950s respectively and each was 
subject to major refurbishment in the early 1990s. During those refurbishments, 
CPTED measures were necessary (determined by Intelligence) and deliberately 
included (Intervention) following the advice from the recently created police DOCOs 
(Implementation and Involvement). However, due to a combination of changes in the 
funding structure and SBD minimum standards, different grades of CPTED were 
incorporated at each site. In particular, new, very high-quality multi-point locking 
entrance doors to each flat were installed at the CSS. Whereas, at the comparison a 
simple additional locking mechanism (most often a BS 3621 five lever mortise 
deadlock) was fitted to the existing entrance door of each flat. The premise of this 
study was that the higher grade of CPTED would lead to sustainable crime 
reduction. Whereas, the lesser grade would not. As far as could be ascertained, the 
differential grading decisions had nothing to do with different crime levels and 
therefore, could not be considered as confounding the evaluation design. 
 
When first launched in 1989, the accompanying SBD award marketing and estate 
design material (1989) included pictures of detached houses, suggesting the award 
was aimed primarily at the private-for-sale house-building sector. Paradoxically, the 
recession of the early 1990s and a general indifference to security by the private 
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sector (and house-buyers) meant that across the UK the primary source of demand 
came from the LAs (most often refurbishment of existing council-owned RSL 
housing); and the HAs (new build RSL-owned housing). SBD quickly adapted to 
satisfying this demand with police DOCOs providing the service. However, despite 
specific training for the role, police understanding of CPTED was in its infancy and 
SBD minimum requirements were (in hindsight) set too low. As one now retired 
DOCO describes: 
             Looking back, we were fumbling in the dark. Oscar Newman’s opinions had  
            reached the Home Office Crime Reduction Centre in Stafford, but there was  
            no clear understanding of concepts like defensible space and territoriality, or  
            how to incorporate them in practice. (interviewee no. P7) 
Nor were there yet in place the standards for doors and windows that would 
eventually yield (over time) high quality products at reasonable financial cost.      
 
Four research aims permeate this investigation: Has there been a net reduction in 
recorded crime at the CSS compared to the comparison? Has any such net 
reduction been sustained over a period of 25 years? What Impact have the individual 
elements of design had on crime in the study area? Which (if any) specific crime 
prevention Interventions have Impacted on reductions in crime and how effective 
were they?  
 




Initial enquiries with WMP had indicated that it would be possible to obtain police-
recorded crime data for a 25-year timeframe at both the CSS and comparison. This 
data was necessary to scrutinise the preventive practice and its outcome. However, 
due to a change in computer hard drives only 18 years of data were supplied for both 
sites, covering the years 1997-2014. This still amounts to a considerable wealth of 
material – 1459 detailed recorded crimes. Nevertheless, the data do not commence 
until five years following completion of the refurbishment at the CSS and two years at 
the comparison. Fortuitously, additional police crime data was subsequently 
discovered for the years 1992-1994, albeit for the CSS alone. This data is of 
instrumental importance because it covers the final year of refurbishment at the 
CSS. Assessed in conjunction with the manual of works, it charts how burglary was 
all but eliminated towards the end of 1992 as the process of installing the entrance 
doors to each flat was completed and the on-site, 24/7 staffed concierge began 
operating. Furthermore, that near elimination of burglary at the CSS is replicated in 
the crime data for 1993, 1994 and in the bulk crime data covering the 18 years 1997-
2014. Compare this to “Worry about burglary peaked in 1993 in England and Wales.” 
Mawby (2001, p.16). Whereas the crime data indicates there was an unexplained 
increase in vehicle crime outside the tower blocks in 1993, possibly a result of crime 
displacement from within the blocks, although no evidence has been discovered to 
support such conjecture. And whilst the number of vehicle crime offences fell back in 
1994, this is one of only two crime categories where there is a higher incidence at 
the CSS than at the comparison during the years 1997-2014. Of greatest 
importance, between 1997-2014 (18 years) there were 40 police-recorded burglaries 




Issues with finding a CPTED-free comparison site are detailed in Chapter Three, 
Methodology. However, the lesser grade CPTED measures employed at the 
comparison are reflected in the subsequent police-recorded crime data for the period 
1997-2014 – most especially in relation to burglary compared to the CSS. Once the 
new entrance doors to each flat were installed at the comparison in 2003, followed 
by fob-reader access-controlled communal entrance doors, the incidence of burglary 
fell and overtook (no reported burglaries) the reductions at the CSS during the final 
five years of analysis. Consequently, that the comparison had initially received a 
lesser grade of CPTED has benefitted this investigation, in that only when higher 
grade measures (flat entrance doors and communal entrance doors) were installed 
did it replicate the crime reduction success previously witnessed at the CSS alone.  
 
Subsequent updates in the constantly improving minimum standards required by 
SBD (most recently SBD Homes 2019) indicate that this issue was solved by the turn 
of the century when the standard PAS 24 (1999) was launched. Nevertheless, it is a 
salient point that target hardening measures must be of sufficient quality and 
durability if they are to deliver sustainability over 25 years. At the CSS that was 
certainly true of the entrance doors to each flat – perhaps less so the communal 
entrance doors as evidenced in the qualitative evidence provided by both the tenants 
and professionals (see Chapters Five and Six).    
 
2. Has any such net reduction been sustained over a period of 25 years? 
Following on from the previous section, the Mul-T-Secure entrance doors to each flat 
at the CSS were installed in 1992 and only replaced in 2018 during the most recent 
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major refurbishment. Furthermore, whilst personal witness during the questionnaire 
phase indicated less than 10 per cent were demonstrating visible signs of wear, their 
27 years of durability had demonstrated how they had been an important element in 
delivering sustainable crime prevention over the very long term – at least in respect 
of residential burglary. More precisely, over 18 years 40 police-recorded burglaries at 
the CSS and 60 at the comparison. Whereas at the CSS and during the crucial year 
of 1992 (immediately before refurbishment was completed) 19 burglaries were 
recorded. Perhaps most importantly, the replacement doors are PAS 24:2016 
compliant, but without the hinge bolts and frame armour elements criticized about 
their predecessors – on grounds of safety and emergency access and exit. 
 
The rarity of forced-entry burglary at both the CSS and comparison (once the 
existing insecure doors had been replaced), suggests the combination of secure flat 
entrance doors and fob-reader, electronically-operated communal entrance doors 
has delivered much of the sustainable crime reduction witnessed at both sites, 
following installation. The one crime type that appears impervious to the CPTED 
treatment is that of assaults, which increased markedly during the study period. 
There are a number of explanations for this, including changes in the law, Home 
Office recording rules and police recording policies. The advent of common assault 
as a recordable offence has also influenced the apparent increase of such crimes. 
Nevertheless, the limitations of CPTED are demonstrated by this crime type, 
especially when the assault takes place within the home and may be attributable to 
domestic violence.  Wherever possible, CPTED Interventions should be developed 
to prevent these assaults. The advent of domestic violence sanctuary rooms (SBD, 
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2019) illustrates how with sufficient target hardening, the victims of domestic 
violence can continue to live in their homes – should they wish to. 
 
3. What impact have the individual elements of design had on crime in the 
study area? 
There exists an inherent difficulty in differentially attributing Impact to various 
individual Interventions. Nevertheless, amongst the CPTED Interventions introduced 
at both sites, the greatest Impact might be attributed to target hardening measures. 
In particular, the entrance doors to individual flats at the CSS and also at the 
comparison, once the existing doors were replaced (post-refurbishment) in 2003. 
Furthermore, the security of the fob-reader, electronically-operated communal 
entrance doors (target hardening and technological innovations) provided an added 
layer of security. In addition, a host of other CPTED elements were Implemented at 
one or both sites. The most contentious of these (in terms of its closure in 2015) was 
the much lauded on-site, 24/7 staffed concierge system at the CSS. For 14 years it 
acted as an immediate place management service and was much admired by the 
tenants before closure by BCC on grounds of cost. From April 2015 both sites were 
linked to an off-site 24/7 control room. However, even before this move, crime rates 
at both the CSS and comparison had all but converged, suggesting that the 
concierge was having no additional crime reducing effect at the CSS. 
 
Similarly, internal CCTV cameras were installed within the blocks at both locations 
and periodically enhanced. However, they were never extended to cover the external 
areas e.g. the car parks, and tenants interviewed at both sites were dismissive about 
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their value – in terms of prevention and detection capacity. During the 2018-2020 
refurbishment of the CSS, many of these CCTV cameras were removed. Indeed, 
LAs often can no longer afford the revenue costs of maintaining town and city centre 
CCTV systems and have been switching off their cameras over the past decade. 
Furthermore, as Gill et al. (2005) reported, the preventive value of public area CCTV 
was not well-evidenced. Least effective (in terms of evidence) are the CPTED 
environmental elements – in respect of the grounds and car parks outside the 
blocks. In these areas, there is no quantitative or qualitative evidence that supports 
the creation of semi-public defensible space, territoriality, surveillance (Newman, 
1972, 1973) or symbolic barriers (Shaftoe and James, 2004).  
 
One of the retired DOCOs interviewed described symbolic barriers as “the weakest 
tool in the tool-chest” (interviewee P8). Indeed, the police-recorded crime data, 
tenants’ quantitative and qualitative data, together with the professionals’ qualitative 
data, tends to confirm this. Once again, the quality of these CPTED measures as 
employed at the CSS is of a higher grade (and more aesthetically pleasing) than at 
the comparison. But this appears to have had no crime reduction effect. If anything, 
possibly the very opposite effect in terms of the incidence of vehicle crime and 
criminal damage at the CSS – both higher than at the comparison. 
 
One solution is how in theory, the grounds and car parks could become semi-private 
defensible space (Newman, 1972) were the walls and fencing that at present 
surround the blocks made secure and electronically-operated pedestrian and vehicle 
gates installed. This has happened at privately-owned developments in London, 
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Birmingham and in many other cities around the world. However, there currently 
exists in the UK some degree of hostility to such ‘gated communities’, by those who 
believe such restrictions on personal movement should not be permitted. The 
judgements of the Planning Inspectorate are also interesting here. Without such 
perimeter protection vehicle crime is likely to continue and likewise, crimes of assault 
and robbery on tenants when leaving/before entering the blocks.  
 
Sadly, CPTED measures cannot prevent crime committed within the home by 
members of that household. Nevertheless, the entrance doors to each flat at both the 
CSS and comparison meet the requirements of the SBD Sanctuary Scheme (2019) 
for when one partner has been legally excluded from the home. Consequently, 
should a CSS or comparison victim of domestic violence be referred to the sanctuary 
scheme, these doors already meet the necessary standards.   
 
Finally, and the second CSS-specific security measure that can be seen to have 
been highly effective in reducing burglary, relates to the balcony-to-balcony linked 
fire-escapes (see Appendix 7). Both the tenants’ and professionals’ qualitative data 
confirms that prior to refurbishment, access to the five emergency staircases within 
each block had been a repeat MO for burglary. This is an important aspect of design 
trade-offs/ conflicts (Ekblom, 2011a). During the 1989-92 refurbishment the 
balconies to the four ground floor flats within each block had been secured with 
decorative metal grilles and gates to prevent easy access. During 20 years of 
available data, only three burglaries were recorded by the police as having taken 
place by this same MO – presumably committed by fellow tenants of that block, or 
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permitted access by same as no forced access was reported. During the most recent 
refurbishment, all the balconies have been fully enclosed with PAS 24:2016 windows 
and now form an integral part of the building – together with a secure, outward 
opening fire door at ground floor level and adjacent to each of the separate fire-
escapes at each block.      
 
4. Which (if any) specific crime prevention interventions have impacted on 
reductions in crime and how effective were they?    
The SBD award (1989) was specifically developed as a delivery mechanism for 
incentivising the prevention of residential burglary. Despite the caveat regarding the 
difficulty in differentially attributing Impact to various individual Interventions, 
amongst the CPTED Interventions introduced at both sites, it might reasonably be 
suggested that specific target hardening measures delivered the greatest Impact. In 
particular, this investigation indicates how in high-rise tower blocks this might be 
achieved by ensuring the entrance door to each flat is of a sufficient security 
standard. In addition, the windows of ground floor flats (or other easily accessible 
windows) also need to meet such a security standard. Moreover, security can be 
further enhanced if the communal entrance doors to each block meet the necessary 
security standard. With these two layers of CPTED and using PAS 24 as the 
minimum-security standard for both doors and windows, residential burglary can be 
reduced to a minimum in high-rise tower blocks. 
 
Indeed, according to Ekblom (2011a) evidence that a particular measure whilst 
installed was not used, or that components were broken and not fixed, is acceptable 
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as ‘causal mechanism-type diagnostic evidence’. In this study, the Mul-T-Secure 
entrance doors to each CSS flat demonstrate both durability and sustainability over 
the very long-term (in excess of 25 years). Consequently, the absence of credible 
evidence of a forced-entry burglary via these doors is especially convincing. 
 
Limitations and further research 
This case study approach investigated the different grades (or intensity) of CPTED 
measures introduced at the CSS and comparison during their major refurbishments 
in the early 1990s. These were then examined in the context of the police-recorded 
crime data, tenants’ quantitative data and both the tenants and professionals’ 
qualitative data. Consequently, this in-depth investigation produced a large dataset 
of information, although there were inherent limitations in its scope and with the 
original research aims. For example, it soon became apparent that investigating 
crime displacement and diffusion of benefits was too ambitious.     
 
On the positive side, gathering oral testimony as evidence to either corroborate or 
qualify the quantitative crime data and tenant questionnaire responses, has been 
realised courtesy of the 22 extended interviews with tenants and 12 with 
professionals. And in conjunction with the police provided crime data, covering a 
period of 18 years for both the CSS and comparison (together with three years of 
earlier crime records for the CSS alone), this has enabled the study of CPTED 
measures delivered by the SBD award incentivisation scheme over the very long 
term and (as originally suspected) in the face of considerable practical and statistical 
challenges. A similarly favourable conclusion concerns the longevity of this 
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investigation (in terms of the period covered) and demonstrates how over the past 30 
years, SBD has become an effective incentive to RSLs and (increasingly over the 
past decade) even the private, for sale house-building sector. Without SBD raising 
the profile of home security at central government level (together with, independent 
academic assessment), poor quality doors and windows for all forms of housing 
might still be the norm. 
 
Nevertheless, throughout this investigation, repeated common (and potentially 
compromising) themes have emerged. Perhaps the most pre-eminent of these has 
been the difficulty in conducting an investigation over the very long term – close to a 
quarter-century in this instance). The unavailability of the full dataset of statistical 
information has been the greatest hurdle – with repeated intimations that it might 
have been discovered at some stage. And because in the twenty-first century such 
data is now held on repeatedly replaced and upgraded computer hard drives, 
accessing such information is often extremely difficult. Add to this information 
sharing protocols, data protection concerns and the complications surrounding the 
bureaucracy of management approval, these collectively make the investigator’s task 
especially arduous. Similarly, the absence of police-recorded crime data for the 
years 1988-1991 and 1995-1996 at the CSS; and 1988-1996 at the comparison 
means that it has been impossible to check the veracity of ‘anticipatory benefits’ 
(Smith, Clarke and Pease, 2002) about which there was conjecture these had taken 
place at the CSS once the refurbishment was announced in 1989. And even at the 




Another issue relating to the very long term was the impossible task of identifying a 
comparison that had received no CPTED treatment. All of the tower blocks that 
would have best suited such a role had been demolished – 251 in Birmingham over 
the past 30 years (Jones, 2002). The remaining 213, soon to become 203 as ten 
more have now been identified for demolition (BCC, 2017) each received at least a 
lesser grade of CPTED. Indeed, the comparison fell into this category during its 
1993-1995 refurbishment, but thereafter additional target hardening measures had 
been incorporated, including new entrance doors to each flat in 2003. Unsurprisingly, 
its pattern of recorded crime then reflected that of the CSS. This all tends to confirm 
Ekblom’s (2011a) description of how in the real world, research is often “messy”. 
 
One of the themes repeated during the extended interviews conducted with the 
professionals (detailed in Chapter Six), was the absence of revenue funding once a 
development project is completed. From a 5Is perspective this is especially relevant 
in the context of the Implementation/Involvement of sustainability. And where 
damage is left unrepaired for more than two decades, it demonstrably concurs with 
Broken Windows theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). On a related theme, one of the 
key motivations for conducting this investigation has been a perceived absence of 
corporate memory within police, LAs and other agencies as to what works and 
doesn’t work in a practical setting. This failure has probably existed since many of 
these organisations were established. However, since the financial crash of 2008 
and subsequent contraction of all these bodies, in many disciplines corporate 
memory has all but disappeared – especially where it might suggest that certain 




At the outset of this investigation, a major concern had been the diminishing number 
of police DOCOs. Armitage (2016) put this number at 137. However, as part of this 
study the author has been able to establish that as of autumn 2020, there are 199 
DOCOs in the UK – 172 of them with a remit that includes dwellings. As a result, the 
number of DOCOs can be seen to be increasing from the nadir of four years 
previously – partly as a result of Professor Armitage’s research and PCPI (who also 
manage SBD) taking over responsibility for the training of DOCOs and establishing 
the Police Crime Prevention Academy. The decision made by SBD to place door and 
window security within the English Building Regulations (2015) also provides some 
resilience, in ensuring that at least a basic level of security should be maintained 
when dwellings are built or refurbished. However, this presumes that Building 
Inspectors fully understand the necessity to check both standards and certification. 
Furthermore, reducing domestic security arrangements to just a pair of concerns 
(door and window security) ignores how best practice should treat DOC and CPTED 
as a holistic package of measures. And with evidence-based policing (Sidebottom, 
2017) now the dominant mantra within the police services of the UK, a fully-trained 
and experienced DOCO should be perceived as a considerable asset by colleagues 
and all levels of management – in effect a staff officer for crime prevention. 
 
Philosophically, there is one further point – addressed in Chapter Five. Namely, that 
making tenants feel safe inside their own homes is only part of the equation – 
especially if that sense of safety means they are even less likely to venture out. The 
real role for all social agents like architects, developers, DOCOs, developers, 
housing officers, planners, surveyors, etc., is to deliver a safe and secure 
environment within and external to the dwelling. Nevertheless, that should not be 
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perceived as a justification for inaction in securing the homes of everyone in society, 
including those who reside in what are by general consent hostile external 
environments, during at least some time of the day.  
 
There is also the Grenfell Tower legacy and the potential conflict between fire safety 
over security. At the CSS, some elements of target hardening, put in place between 
1989-1992 for example frame armour and hinge bolts on the doors, in retrospect can 
be perceived as compromising safety. However, the multiple fire-escape system 
within each block now appears especially forward-thinking and a lesson to future 
generations who want to build high.  
  
Contribution to knowledge 
This investigation has produced a number of key findings which are now detailed. 
 
1. Potential conflict between safety and security 
The potential conflict between security and fire safety issues requires careful/creative 
design to enable both – rather than compromise. In that regard, this author is mindful 
of the Grenfell Tower disaster in 2017 and how as a young police officer throughout 
the 1980s and early 90s, regularly policed what were then First Division football 
matches. Heavily influenced by the Bradford City fire disaster in 1985 and 
Hillsborough disaster of 1989, he would instinctively check the exit gates at the 
Coventry City ground were unlocked and transferred this primacy of safety attitude 




2. Knowledge of crime in high-rise tower blocks 
In this thesis, analysis of recorded-crime data, tenants’ quantitative and qualitative 
data, and professionals’ qualitative data helps to satisfy a previous absence of 
knowledge about crime in high-rise tower blocks. Furthermore, amongst the six 
crime categories analysed at both sites, residential burglary appears to be most 
susceptible to CPTED interventions. 
 
3. Analysis over a 25-year timeframe 
The uniqueness of this investigation in examining crime and ASB over a quarter- 
century timeframe (including issues of durability and sustainability) and addressing 
the problems encountered. The latter include: the extremely long timeframe of 
analysis; limitations of the data supplied in terms of its quality of detail, missing data 
and issues with human memory amongst those questioned and interviewed. 
   
4. Effectiveness of CPTED and SBD 
This thesis concludes that CPTED measures can deliver over the very long term at 
inner-city, high-rise tower blocks sustainable reductions in crime – most especially 
property crime and burglary in particular. This is achieved by means using the target 
hardening, technological innovations and environmental elements of CPTED to deny 
access by trespassers to both the individual flats and the tower block itself.  In 
particular, analysis confirms the effectiveness of CPTED measures when delivered 




5. Security of entrance doors to each flat and communal entrance-doors 
This investigation confirms that the entrance doors to each flat and ground floor 
communal entrance doors must be of sufficient quality (and durability) to deliver 
sustainability in terms of crime reduction over the very long term. Furthermore, 
examination of the police-recorded crime data, supplemented by the tenants’ 
quantitative and qualitative data, and professionals’ qualitative data, suggests that 
securing each flat is the most important requirement in terms of both preventing 
crime and making tenants (potential victims) feel safe and secure.  
 
6. Significance to senior LA and police managers and to DOCOs, planners and 
housing officers of partnership working and what works in practice 
The thesis details the benefits of partnership working, enabling senior LA and police 
managers to assess where resources should be concentrated. It also demonstrates 
what works in practice. Ultimately, the needs of victims of crime and ASB should be 
at the forefront of all such decision-making. 
 
7. Desirability of consulting the tenants/residents  
The prior existence of The Four Towers Tenants’ Association points to the 
Involvement of a such a consultative group. This thesis demonstrates that such 
consultation led to more sustainable results at the CSS. Consequently, 




8. Effectiveness in reducing residential burglary 
Amongst the six crime categories examined, this investigation concluded residential 
burglary in high-rise blocks is most susceptible to CPTED and SBD Interventions – 
delivering a sustained reduction over 20 years of 89.2 per cent at the CSS. And no 
instances of the more serious offence of aggravated burglary at either site. 
 
9. Number of DOCOs 
This investigation has ascertained that following a decreasing number of police 
DOCOs across the UK since the turn of the century, reaching a nadir of 137 four 
years ago (Armitage, 2016), their number has now increased. Indeed, as of summer 
2020 there are now 199 DOCOs across the UK, 172 of whom deal with residential 
premises. DOCOs are necessary to ensure the kind of Interventions installed are 
well-evidenced and appropriate to problem and context i.e. professionally working 
through a process model such as 5Is. 
 
10. Once in 30-year opportunity to get things right 
One of the former police DOCOs interviewed made a highly pertinent comment: 
            In this designing out crime role you soon realised how there was a once in a   
            30 years chance to get things right. Once the development was built that was   
            it. The only exception to that rule I discovered was counter-terrorism HVM  
            (hostile vehicle mitigation) measures, but even then the financial costs were  
            all but prohibitively expensive. (Interviewee no. P8). 
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This investigation illustrates how failing to get it right at the comparison site, meant 
that less than a decade later the entrance doors to each flat had to be replaced. 
Nevertheless, BCC has demonstrated how for more than three decades it has 
worked in partnership with WMP DOCOs in the service of their tenants. The most 
recent major refurbishment of the CSS has just been completed and work on the 
comparison begun – by Wates the original construction company six decades 
before. This will give both sites a further 30 years of life and as such the CSS should 
now reach its centenary anniversary. 
 
11. 5Is as a research tool 
This investigation has demonstrated that the 5Is has performed extremely well as a 
means of research – systematically identifying both the overview, and the details of 
the preventive process and guiding the researcher in bringing these to light and 
assessing their quality. Its holistic approach means that the capacity to miss data or 
nuances that are of seminal importance are minimised. Ultimately, thanks to 5Is this 
investigation adds to the canon of existing research regarding the effectiveness and 
the Implementation process of CPTED and SBD.  
 
12. Victim’s perspective         
Finally, and from the perspective of a shared humanity, perhaps most importantly 
there is the plight of victims living in such blighted inner-city environments. The 
following observation was made by one of the comparison site tenants interviewed at 
length and who’s flat had been burgled: 
            I couldn’t afford insurance so there was no point in reporting it to the police. I   
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            was also pretty sure who’d broken into my flat and he’s not a nice person. He  
            didn’t steal much, but then I haven’t got much, have I? (interviewee no. T20) 
The pathos contained in this statement explains why such victims, tenants of high-
rise tower blocks, deserve to be heard with both their safety and security concerns 
addressed. This also includes regular updates by the police in the aftermath of being 
a victim of crime. 
   
 






The original motivation for conducting the investigation and writing this thesis dates 
back to my 34-years’ service with West Midlands Police. Towards the end of that 
career there was a growing realisation concerning an absence of past experience in 
the corporate memory. During the early years of this century, that situation was 
exacerbated by short-term performance culture and a perception that preventing 
crime no longer mattered. Consequently, specialisms like crime prevention and 
Designing Out Crime did not fare well. And following contraction of the police service 
beginning in 2011, the role of DOCO itself was under threat in many forces. 
 
When this investigation began in 2013 it was envisaged that obtaining crime data 
would be a relatively easy task. However, this was the first indication of the perils 
that lie in wait when conducting research over the very long-term – a quarter-century 
in this instance. A computer hard-drive for the earlier data could not be located and 
consequently, the bulk crime Intelligence covers only(!) 18 years at both sites. 
However, three years of hard copy data for 1992-1994 albeit solely in respect of the 
CSS, was subsequently discovered and proved to be of crucial importance. 
 
In summary, this has been a very hard project – and a labour of love. Interviewing 
the tenants and professionals (and in person meetings with the supervision team) 
became the most enjoyable aspects – confirming an earlier realisation that working 
in partnership with the immensely supportive staff at BCC, we DOCOs had improved 
the quality of like for those living in such inner-city environments. If you have read 
this far, I hope you too have enjoyed the experience. 
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Unique Identifier: XX11 
 
Name of research student: Mark STOKES u1278143@hud.ac.uk   
 
Title of study: An investigation of the sustainability of crime prevention in the built 
environment: impact and implementation factors  
 
In plain English, this research project is trying to see what useful lessons can be learnt from 
the refurbishment of your tower that took place almost 25 years ago.  The study seeks to 
assess how crime prevention measures (like stronger front doors and windows, security 
lighting, staffed concierge, CCTV, etc.) make tenants like yourself feel safe and secure in the 
home, and their effectiveness over a very long time period – 10-25 years. 
 
You do not have to complete any of the following questions, although your co-operation in 
this regard will help in the accuracy of the research conclusions.  If you would prefer not to 
answer a specific question, please write ‘prefer not to say’. 
 
1. Would you like to volunteer to be interviewed regarding your experience of living in 
the high-rise tower block? 
  
2. Your age.  Please tick: 
   
18-30 (  ) 
 
31-45 (  ) 
 
46-60 (  ) 
 
60-70 (  ) 
 




3. How many people live in your household?  If you are the sole occupant, please state 
‘living alone’.................................................................................... 
 
4. Were you living at this address during the refurbishment in the early 
1990’s?............................................................................................................... 
 
5. If your answer to Question 4 was ‘Yes’, did you move out during the refurbishment 
that took place in the early 1990’s?............................................. 
 
6. How long have you been a tenant at this address.............................................. 
 
7. Have you been the victim of crime or anti-social behaviour since living at this 
address?............................................................................................................. 
 
8. If your answer to question ‘7’ above was yes, was the crime one of the following and 








d. Vehicle Crime?................................................................................................  
 
9. If applicable, was it reported to the Concierge of your tower block?................... 
 
10. Was the crime reported to the police.................................................................. 
 
11. What was the result (if any) of the police investigation?..................................... 
 
12. Are you aware of any CCTV recording of that crime being committed?.............  
 
13. How safe do you feel when inside your flat?  Please choose from and tick: ‘Very 
Safe’ (  ) 
 
 ‘Safe’ (  ) 
 
 ‘Neither Safe or Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
  ‘Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
  ‘Very Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
14. How safe do you feel when inside the communal areas of the tower block – on the 




‘Very Safe’ (  ) 
 
‘Safe’ (  ) 
 
 ‘Neither Safe or Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
 ‘Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
 ‘Very Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
15.  How safe do you feel when go out and leave the tower block? Please choose    
 from and tick: 
 
 ‘Very Safe’ (  ) 
 
 ‘Safe’ (  ) 
 
 ‘Neither Safe or Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
 ‘Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
 ‘Very Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
16. How safe do you feel when you go out that your flat is safe, secure and will not be 
broken into whilst you are away? Please choose from and tick: 
 
‘Very Safe’ (  ) 
 
 ‘Safe’ (  ) 
 
 ‘Neither Safe or Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
 ‘Unsafe’ (  )  
 
 ‘Very Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
17. Do you go out after dark?  Please tick:  No  (  ) or Yes (  ) 
 











19. What do you think is the most important element in ensuring your safety as a tenant 
living in your flat? Please choose from and rank in order of importance.  For example, 
if you think ‘Concierge’ the most important CCTV , number it  ‘1’: 
 
Concierge (  ) 
  
CCTV (  ) 
 
Fob Access Door Entry System (  ) 
 
Security of the front Entrance Door to your flat (  ) 
 
Other (  ) please specify...................................................................................... 
............................................................................................................................ 
 
20. If you own a car or other motor vehicle, how safe do you think it is to park that vehicle 
in the car park outside your tower block? Please choose one and tick:   
 
‘Very Safe’ (  ) 
 
 ‘Safe’ (  ) 
 
 ‘Neither Safe or Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
 ‘Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
 ‘Very Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
21. What single additional security feature do you think would improve your feelings of 
safety?  For example, please choose one: 
 
CCTV in the outside and parking areas (  ) 
 
Electronically-operated vehicle and pedestrian gates (  ) 
 
Security guards in the grounds (  ) 
 









22. How would you describe the level of crime in the area around your tower block?  
Please choose one of the below options: 
 
Very High (  ) 
 
High (  ) 
 
Medium (  ) 
 






23.  What do you think is the most common forms of crime in your area?  Please number 
in order of importance?  
  
Burglary (  ) 
 
Theft (  ) 
 
Vehicle crime (  ) 
 
Criminal Damage (  ) 
 
Robbery (  ) 
 
24. Please provide the contact details you are willing to share with the researcher 




25. Do you have any other comments?.................................................................... 
............................................................................................................................  
............................................................................................................................ 
I hereby consent to the information and any data I have supplied being used in the 
production of a research thesis being written by Mark Stokes. 
 
I understand that all such information and data will be anonymised so that it cannot be 
attributed to myself.   
 
Signed...................................................               (date)....................... 
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I am studying for a PhD degree at Huddersfield University and my interest is in how the 
architecture and management of buildings relates to crime.  The questions I am going to ask 
provide an opportunity for you to tell me about your views and experiences of being a tenant 
in this tower block. 
 
Ultimately, this research project is trying to see what useful lessons can be learnt from the 
refurbishment of your tower that took place almost 25 years ago.  The study seeks to assess 
how crime prevention measures (like stronger front doors and windows, security lighting, 
staffed concierge, CCTV, etc.) impact upon feelings of safety and their effectiveness over a 
very long time period of 10-25 years. 
 
You do not have to answer any of the following questions, although your co-operation in this 
regard will help in the accuracy of the research conclusions.  If you would prefer not to 
answer a specific question just tell me, ‘prefer not to say’.  I can assure you that when the 
PhD is published, no identifiable details of the people who answered the questions will be 
given.  I will store contact addresses only until the research is finished, at which point the list 
will be securely deleted.  Can I take it that you are happy to proceed on this basis? 
 




If you have any questions or concerns, please contact the Research Office at Huddersfield 












1. Your age: 
   
18-30 (  ) 
 
31-45 (  ) 
 
46-60 (  ) 
 
61-70 (  ) 
 
Over 70 (  ) 
 
2. How many people live in your household? 
 
Living alone (  ) 
 
2 (  ) 
 
3 (  ) 
 
4 or more (  ) 
 




4. Have you been the victim of crime or anti-social behaviour since living at this address 
– either inside your flat, within the tower block, or in the grounds surrounding the 
tower block?   
 
Yes  (  )  No  (  ) 
 
 
5. If the answer to ‘4’ was yes, how often were you the victim, was the crime one of the 






























      
Criminal 
Damage 
      
Theft 
 
      
Vehicle 
Crime 
      
 
 
6. How safe do you feel when inside your flat? 
                                During the Day                                     At Night 
 
‘Very Safe’                          (  )                                                 (  ) 
 
‘Safe’                                  (  )                                                  (  ) 
 
‘Neither Safe or Unsafe’     (  )                                                  (  ) 
 
‘Unsafe’                              (  )                                                  (  )       
 








7. How safe do you feel when inside the communal areas of the tower block – on the 
ground floor, in the lifts, staircase, landings?  Please choose from and tick:  
 
‘Very Safe’ (  ) 
 
‘Safe’ (  ) 
 
‘Neither Safe or Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
‘Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
‘Very Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
 
8. Is anywhere particularly unsafe?  Please specify............................................... 
 
 
9. How safe do you feel when you go outside the tower block and enter the grounds 
(the area surrounding the tower block but not the streets)? 
 
‘Very Safe’ (  ) 
 
‘Safe’ (  ) 
 
‘Neither Safe or Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
‘Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
‘Very Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
 
10. How safe do you feel when you leave the grounds of your tower block and enter the 
surrounding streets? 
 
‘Very Safe’ (  ) 
 
‘Safe’ (  ) 
 
‘Neither Safe or Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
‘Unsafe’ (  ) 
 




11. When you go out how happy do you feel that your flat is safe, secure and will not be 
broken into whilst you are away? 
 
‘Very Safe’ (  ) 
 
‘Safe’ (  ) 
 
‘Neither Safe or Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
‘Unsafe’ (  )  
 
‘Very Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
 
12. Do you go out after dark?  Please select from the following that apply to you: 
 
 Frequently Occasionally Almost Never Never At All 
On Foot     
Bicycle     
Private Car     
Taxi     
Bus     
Other (please specify) 
.................................... 
    
  
 
13. Do you go out after dark less than you want to?  Please select. 
 
Yes  (  )     No  (  ) 
 
 
14. If you don’t go out after dark, please specify why.  Is it due to a fear of Crime?  And 
are you afraid to go out during the day, if so why? 
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................








15. What do you think are the most important elements in ensuring your safety as a 
tenant living in your flat? Please grade the following security elements.  
 














     
CCTV 
 
     
Fob Access Door 
Entry System 
     
Door and Window 
Security 
     
Another element that 










16. If you own a car or other motor vehicle, how safe do you think it is to park that vehicle 
in the non-designated parking bays outside your tower block?   
 
‘Not applicable/don’t own a car’ (  ) 
 
‘Very Safe’ (  ) 
 
‘Safe’ (  ) 
 
‘Neither Safe or Unsafe’ (  ) 
 
‘Unsafe’ (  ) 
 




17. What single additional security feature do you think would improve your feelings of 




CCTV cameras outside the tower block and in the parking areas (  ) 
 
Electronically-operated vehicle and pedestrian gates (  ) 
 
Security guards in the grounds (  ) 
 






18. How would you describe the level of crime in the Nechells area compared to other 
parts of Birmingham?  Please choose one of the below options: 
 
Very High (  ) 
 
High (  ) 
 
Medium (  ) 
  
Low (  ) 
 
 
19.  What do you think are the most common forms of crime in the Nechells area outside 
the grounds of your tower block?  Please number in order of importance?  
  
Burglary (  ) 
 
Theft (  ) 
 
Vehicle crime (  ) 
 
Criminal Damage (  ) 
 







20. Do you think that crime in the Nechells area has changed over time?  Please select 
the one with which you most agree. 
 
Gone up a lot (  ) 
 
Gone up a little (  ) 
 
Stayed the same (  ) 
 
Gone down a little (  ) 
 
Gone down a lot (  ) 
 
 
21. Are you aware of the Secured by Design Award Scheme? Yes (  ) No (  ) 
 
22. Did you know your tower block won an SBD award in 1993 or 1995? 
 
Yes ( ) No ( ) 
 






24. Are you willing to volunteer to be interviewed in a bit more depth about your 
experience of living in the high-rise tower block?  If yes, can you please provide your 






I hereby consent to any of the information I have supplied being   used in the production of a 
research thesis being written by Mark Stokes.  I understand that anything I have said will be 
published in an anonymised form and that I will not be identifiable from this information; and 
that after the research has been completed and published any contact details about me will 
be securely destroyed. 
   
 
Tenant to tick here (  )   or sign…………………………… 
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I am studying for a PhD degree at Huddersfield University and my interest is in how the 
architecture and management of buildings relates to crime.  The questions I am going to ask 
provide an opportunity for you to tell me about your views and experiences of being a tenant 
in this tower block. 
 
Ultimately, this research project is trying to see what useful lessons can be learnt from the 
refurbishment of your tower that took place almost 25 years ago.  The study seeks to assess 
how crime prevention measures (like stronger front doors and windows, security lighting, 
staffed concierge, CCTV, etc.) impact upon feelings of safety and their effectiveness over a 
very long time period of 10-25 years. 
 
You do not have to answer any of the following questions, although your co-operation in this 
regard will help in the accuracy of the research conclusions.  If you would prefer not to 
answer a specific question just tell me, ‘prefer not to say’.  I can assure you that when the 
PhD is published, no identifiable details of the people who answered the questions will be 
given.  I will store contact addresses only until the research is finished, at which point the list 
will be securely deleted.  Can I take it that you are happy to proceed on this basis? 
 




If you have any questions or concerns, please contact the Research Office at Huddersfield 

































                                                                                                                 APPENDIX 4 
 
Title of Project 
 
An investigation of the sustainability of crime prevention in the built environment: 
impact and implementation factors 
 
 
INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM 
 
 
I ………………………………... (interviewee’s name) understand that I am being asked to 
participate in an interview that forms part of Mark Stokes’ postgraduate research project at 
Huddersfield University. 
 
I have been provided with some background information regarding this research project and 
the types of questions I can expect to answer. I understand the interview will be conducted in 
person and that it will be of approximately one hour‘s duration. 
 
I understand that my participation in this interview is completely voluntary and I am free to 
decline to participate or withdraw at any time without giving a reason. I understand that any 
information I provide will be kept confidential, used only for the purposes of completing this 
research project and will not be used in any way that could identify me. All interview 
responses, notes, and records will be kept in a secured environment.  The raw data will be 
destroyed by the researcher within two years of the completion of the research project. 
 
I understand that the results of this interview will be used solely in Mark Stokes’ research 
project and none of the information I provide will be published, in any form that can be 
attributable to me. 
 
I have read the information above. By signing below and returning this form, I am consenting 
to participate in this interview. 
 
Interviewee name (please print): ………………………………………………………………… 
Signature:                   ………………………………………………………………… 




Please keep a copy of this interview consent form. If you have other questions about your 
involvement in this research project, please contact me at u1278143@hud.ac.uk 
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Name of research student: Mark STOKES  u1278143@hud.ac.uk   
 
Title of study: An investigation of the sustainability of crime prevention in the built 
environment: impact and implementation factors  
 
Can I just check the following details: 
 
1.  Your occupation?...................................................................................................... 
 
2.  Your age range?....................................................................................................... 
 
3.  The size of your household?..................................................................................... 
 
4.  For how many years have you been a tenant at the tower block in question?......... 
 
6.  What was your perception of the level of crime at the tower blocks/immediate vicinity 
when you first moved here?  Please choose one of the below options: 
 
Very High (  ) 
 
High (  ) 
 
Medium (  ) 
 
Low (  ) 
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7.  What do you think were the most common forms of crime in your area when you first 
moved there?  Please number in order of importance?  
  
Burglary (  ) 
 
Theft (  ) 
 
Vehicle crime (  ) 
 
Criminal Damage (  ) 
 
Robbery (  ) 
 
8.  What has been your perception of the level of crime at the tower blocks/ immediate 
vicinity since you first moved here?  Please choose one of the below options: 
 
Very High (  ) 
 
High (  ) 
 
Medium (  ) 
 
Low (  ) 
 
9.  What do you think have been the most common forms of crime in your area since you 
first moved there?  Please number in order of importance?  
  
Burglary (  ) 
 
Theft (  ) 
 
Vehicle crime (  ) 
 
Criminal Damage (  ) 
 
Robbery (  ) 
 
10.  What is your perception of the level of crime at the tower blocks/immediate vicinity at the 
present time?  Please choose one of the below options: 
 




High (  ) 
 
Medium (  ) 
 
Low (  ) 
 
11.  What do you think are now the most common forms of crime in your area?  Please 
number in order of importance?  
  
Burglary (  ) 
 
Theft (  ) 
 
Vehicle crime (  ) 
 
Criminal Damage (  ) 
 
Robbery (  ) 
 
12.  Have you or any family member been the victim of a crime since you moved into your 
flat? 
 
13.  If the answer to ‘12’ above is ‘Yes’ enquire into the nature of that crime(s), when, where 
and how they were committed – mindful of the potential need to refer the complainant to the 
Victim Support Service or other social agency if such support was not previously given or is 
now required again. 
 
14.  If the answer to ‘12’ above is ‘No’, are they aware of friends or neighbours in the tower 
block who have been the victim of crime?   
  
15.  What is your perception of the level of crime that has been present at the tower 
blocks/immediate vicinity since the process of refurbishment?  
 
16.  Do you believe that refurbishment was more cost-effective than knocking it down and 
rebuilding it? 
 





18.  Do you think that the refurbishment and security measures employed 25 years improved 
matters? 
 
19.  Which physical security elements do you believe have proved to be the most effective in 
the long term? 
 
Concierge (  ) 
  
CCTV (  ) 
 
Fob Access Door Entry System (  ) 
 
Security of the front Entrance Door to your flat (  ) 
 
           Other (  ) please specify 
 
20.  If you were involved as a member of the refurbishment project team now, what elements 
would you do differently? 
 
21.  Are you or have you been a members of a Tenants Association, any social 
network/neighbour relations at the tower block?  If the answer is ‘Yes’ please detail. 
 
22.  Were you/are you aware of the police involvement in crime prevention at your tower 
block and the Secured by Design Award system?  If yes please elaborate. 
 
23.  Are you aware of any other crime reduction interventions?  If yes please detail. 
 
24.  Do you believe that the police should be involved in Designing Out Crime from the built 
environment? 
 
25.  Did you ask to move to your tower block or were you given no other option? 
 
26.  Are you happy being a tenant in the tower block?  And if not, where would you like to 
move to? 
 






THE UNIVERSITY OF HUDDERSFIELD 
School of Human and Health Sciences – Applied Criminology Centre 
 
PROFESSIONALS INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Unique identifier: XX11 
 
Name of research student: Mark STOKES  u1278143@hud.ac.uk   
 
Title of study: An investigation of the sustainability of crime prevention in the built 
environment: impact and implementation factors  
 
1.  Your Position/Job Title/Description 
 
2.  Were you actively involved in or aware of in the refurbishment programme(s) of the high- 
rise tower blocks located within the City of Birmingham during the late 1980/early 90’s? 
 
3.  If ‘Yes’ to ‘2’ above, what was that role?  Full description required. 
 
4.  If ‘No’ to 2 above what has been your subsequent role?  Full description required. 
 
5.  What is your perception of the level of crime, the different crime types and the patterns of 
crime that were present at the tower blocks and in their immediate vicinity prior to the 
process of refurbishment? 
 
6.  In your opinion, was the level of crime a significant issue in making the flats difficult to let?    
  
7.  What is your perception of the level of crime, the different crime types and the patterns of 
crime that have been present at the tower blocks and in the immediate vicinity during the 




8.  Do you believe that refurbishment was more cost-effective that a complete rebuild? 
 
9.  To what extent do you believe that the original layout of the buildings hampered the 
refurbishment process? 
 
10.  Do you believe that the refurbishment, physical security measures and management 
processes adopted 25 years ago have proved to be durable in the short, medium and long 
term? 
 
11.  Which physical security elements do you believe have proved to be the most effective in 
the long term?  (pause for their response) eg: Staffed Concierge, CCTV, Fob-operated 
Communal Door Entry Systems, Main Front Entrance Doors to each flat, Lighting   
 
12.  If you were involved as a member of the refurbishment project team now, what 
interventions, tasks and roles would you do differently? 
 
13.  Do you consider that the tenants’ views or reputation of safety at the tower blocks and in 
the surrounding area was improved post refurbishment? 
 
14.  Were you/are you aware of police involvement and the Secured by Design Award 
system? 
 
15.  Which external agencies do you believe should be involved in Designing Out Crime from 
the built environment? 
 
16.  Would you be prepared to reside in one of the flats within the tower blocks? 
 
17.  Do you have any further comments regarding the refurbishment of the high-rise tower 
blocks? 
 
18.  Do you have any suggestions as to any other individuals who you believe should be 
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